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ABSTRACT
Crowdsourcing—outsourcing tasks to a crowd of workers (e.g. Amazon Mechanical
Turk, peer grading for massive open online courseware (MOOCs), scholarly peer
review, and Yahoo answers)—is a fast, cheap, and effective method for performing
simple tasks even at large scales. Two central problems in this area are:
(1) Information Elicitation how to design reward systems that incentivize high
quality feedback from agents; and
(2) Information Aggregation how to aggregate the collected feedback to obtain
a high quality forecast.
This thesis shows that the combination of game theory, information theory, and
learning theory can bring a unified framework to both of the central problems in
crowdsourcing area. This thesis builds a natural connection between information
elicitation and information aggregation, distills the essence of eliciting and aggregat-
ing information to the design of proper information measurements and applies the
information measurements to both the central problems:
In the setting where information cannot be verified, this thesis proposes a simple
yet powerful information theoretical framework, the Mutual Information Paradigm
(MIP), for information elicitation mechanisms. The framework pays every agent a
measure of mutual information between her signal and a peer’s signal. The mutual
information measurement is required to have the key property that any “data pro-
cessing” on the two random variables will decrease the mutual information between
ix
them. We identify such information measures that generalize Shannon mutual infor-
mation. MIP overcomes the two main challenges in information elicitation without
verification: (1) how to incentivize effort and avoid agents colluding to report random
or identical responses (2) how to motivate agents who believe they are in the minority
to report truthfully.
To elicit expertise without verification, this thesis also defines a natural model for
this setting based on the assumption that more sophisticated agents know the beliefs
of less sophisticated agents and extends MIP to a mechanism design framework, the
Hierarchical Mutual Information Paradigm (HMIP), for this setting.
Aided by the information measures and the frameworks, this thesis (1) designs sev-
eral novel information elicitation mechanisms (e.g. the disagreement mechanism, the
f -mutual information mechanism, the multi-hierarchical mutual information mecha-
nism, the common ground mechanism) in various of settings such that honesty and
efforts are incentivized and expertise is identified; (2) addresses an important unsu-
pervised learning problem—co-training by reducing it to an information elicitation
problem—forecast elicitation without verification.
x
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Crowdsourcing, outsourcing tasks to a crowd of workers (e.g. Amazon Mechanical
Turk, peer grading for massive open online courses, scholarly peer review, and Yahoo
answers), is a fast, cheap, and effective method for performing simple tasks even at
large scales. To attract a large number of workers, crowdsourcing is usually open to
the public rather than just professional experts. Two central problems in this area
are:
(1) Information Elicitation how to design reward systems that incentivize high
quality feedback from agents, even when the information is unverifiable; and
(2) Information Aggregation how to aggregate the collected feedback to obtain
a high quality forecast.
The elicitation and aggregation of information play a central role in many decision-
making contexts (e.g. reputation systems, purchasing, product development, pricing),
and also deal with a key challenge in big data—the lack of labeled data: crowdsourc-
ing can be used to provide a massive amount of noisy labels; and the effective use
of the mass of noisy labels is an information aggregation problem. The two cen-
tral problems are hard especially when the information is unverifiable. However, in
the context of many applications, the information is expensive or even impossible to
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Figure 1.1: Eliciting and aggregating information
verify (e.g. do you like this restaurant? Y/N). In the situation where the lack of
labeled data is a key challenge, it is expensive to obtain the ground truth or to verify
the information, otherwise the lack of labeled data would not be a problem. Pre-
diction markets/stock markets and spot-checking (randomly picking some questions
and checking the answers provided by the participant) are two examples that elicit
information with (possibly future) verification. Supervised learning is an example of
information aggregation with verification. This thesis focuses on the elicitation and
aggregation of information without verification.
Information elicitation is a mechanism design problem which is closely related to
game theory and information aggregation is an algorithmic design problem which is
closely related to learning theory. The subject we are dealing with is information
which is related to information theory. Note that recently, the combination of game
theory and learning theory has made innovative progress (e.g. Generative Adversarial
Networks). Thus, a central contention of this thesis is that the combination of game
theory, information theory, and learning theory can bring a unified framework to
both of the central problems in crowdsourcing. Few previous works have deeply
connected the three fields in crowdsourcing or any other area while this thesis builds
several simple yet powerful connections among game theory, learning theory and
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information theory to solve several main challenges in the elicitation and aggregation
of information.
Thesis statement This thesis shows that the combination of game theory, informa-
tion theory, and learning theory can bring a unified framework to both of the central
problems in crowdsourcing area. This thesis builds a natural connection between
information elicitation and information aggregation, distills the essence of eliciting
and aggregating information to the design of proper information measurements and
applies the information measurements to both the central problems.
Main contribution In the setting where information cannot be verified, this thesis
proposes a simple yet powerful information theoretical frameworks, the Mutual In-
formation Paradigm (MIP), for information elicitation mechanisms. The framework
pays every agent a measure of mutual information between her signal and a peer’s
signal. The mutual information measurement is required to have the key property
that any “data processing” on the two random variables will decrease the mutual
information between them. We identify such information measures that generalize
Shannon mutual information. MIP overcomes the two main challenges in information
elicitation without verification: (1) how to incentivize effort and avoid agents collud-
ing to report random or identical responses; (2) how to motivate agents who believe
they are in the minority to report truthfully.
To elicit expertise without verification, this thesis also defines a natural model for
this setting based on the assumption that more sophisticated agents know the beliefs
of less sophisticated agents and extends MIP to a mechanism design framework, the
Hierarchical Mutual Information Paradigm (HMIP), for this setting.
Aided by the information measures and the frameworks, this thesis (1) designs sev-
eral novel information elicitation mechanisms (disagreement mechanism (Section 4.3),
f -mutual information mechanism (Section 3.3), multi-HMIM (Section 5.2.2), Learn-
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ing based multi-HMIM (Section 5.2.3), single-HMIM (Section 5.3.2), common ground
mechanism (Section 6.5.2) and multi-task common ground mechanism (Section 6.5.1))
in various of settings such that honesty and efforts are incentivized and expertise is
identified; (2) addresses an important unsupervised learning problem—co-training by
reducing it to an information elicitation problem—forecast elicitation without verifi-
cation.
1.1 Eliciting information without verification
User feedback requests (e.g Ebay’s reputation system) are increasingly promi-
nent and important. However, the overwhelming number of requests can lead to low
participation rates, which in turn may yield unrepresentative samples. To encourage
participation, a system can reward people for answering requests. But this may cause
perverse incentives: some people may answer a large of number of questions simply for
the reward and without making any attempt to answer accurately. Moreover, people
may be motivated to lie when they face a potential loss of privacy or can benefit in
the future by lying now. It is thus important to develop reward systems that motivate
honesty. If we can verify the information people provide in the future (e.g prediction
markets), we can motivate honesty via this future verification. However, sometimes
we need to elicit information without verification since the objective truth is hard to
access (e.g. a self-report survey for unethical activities) or even does not exist (e.g.
subjective ratings). This thesis focuses on the situation where the objective truth is
not observable—peer prediction [45]. A key problem in peer prediction literature is:
(+) how to motivate honest reporting without verification?
Two main challenges in solving problem (+) are: without verification,
1. (avoiding collusion) how to avoid colluding agents who report random or iden-
tical responses; and
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2. (motivating the minority) how to motivate agents who believe they are in the
minority to report truthfully.
Traditional reward systems (e.g. flat payment, majority vote, spot-checking) fail
to solve problem (+) since they either distort users’ incentives (e.g. flat payment, ma-
jority vote) or require partial verification and expensive gold-standard questions (e.g.
spot checking). In previous peer prediction literature, problem (+) is also not fully
solved in many important settings, even when we assume people are homogeneous
(have the same expertise, ability ...). Avoiding collusion is more difficult compared
with motivating the minority. Few previous works1 deal with collusion and their re-
sults are typically proved by clever algebraic computations, sometimes lack a deeper
intuition, and fail to extend to important settings.
After answering problem (+), an advanced central problem—task (++)—remains
to be solved:
(++) how to incentivize effort and identify expertise without verifica-
tion?
Previous peer prediction literature does not consider settings where
1. Agents have different levels of expertise or
2. A lack of effort can systemically bias agents’ reports.
The following two tasks exemplify settings 1) and 2) respectively:
Example 1. Which state (from a list all 50 states) in the United States of America
is closest to Africa? (Single-task)
Example 2. Peer grading several essays by providing a grade from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
(Multi-tasks)
1Prelec [51], Dasgupta and Ghosh [18], and Kamble et al. [31] deal with collusion and an inde-
pendent work with this thesis, Shnayder et al. [63], also propose a mechanism that avoids collusion.
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In the first example, an agent can guess randomly (no effort), look up the correct
answer (full effort), or guess at the correct answer (partial effort). Most people will
guess Florida, even though experts will know the correct answer is Maine. Thus
differing levels of expertise yield different answers. In the second example, a student
can, instead of carefully grading (full effort) or assigning a random grade (zero effort),
quickly check the name of the top of the paper and spot check the grammar (partial
effort). Thus partial effort can systematically bias agents: consider an essay from
a top student in impeccable pose, but which contains large conceptual errors. Here
partial effort can give some information about the correct answer, but also enable
agents to “coordinate” on an incorrect answer.
Gao, Wright, and Leyton-Brown [22] show that the effects of the settings 1) and
2) are devastating to previous peer-prediction mechanisms, which generally fail in
motivating the agents to invest effort for “expensive signals” when “cheap signals”
(that ensure agreement and may even be correlated with the sought signal) exist.
The main (very high-level) idea behind previous peer-prediction mechanisms can be
understood as a “clever majority vote”—every agent is paid according to a specific
similarity between her and her peer. Thus, they point out that in the peer-grading
example, coordinating on just checking the grammar can guarantee good agreement
with other agents, but with substantially reduced effort.
In fact, Gao et al point out that things are likely even worse than this. If the
cheap signals correlate more than the expensive signals, then the peer-prediction
techniques incentivize agents to not report the true answer, but instead focus on
cheap signals! For example, in the essay grading above, it is likely that assessments
of grammatical correctness will agree more than assessments of overall essay quality.
Because of this, peer-prediction mechanisms will pay agents more overall for lower-
quality information. In Example 1, even if agents know the answer is Maine, they
may report Florida, expecting that most others will do likewise.
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Such behavior undermines the goal of applying crowd-sourcing to increasingly
complex tasks, and, in fact, undercuts any application of crowd-sourcing to perform
any task where the answers are not “common knowledge.” The field must overcome
this key challenge of rewarding rather than suppressing expertise in order to begin
the project of expanding crowd-sourcing beyond simple labeling tasks.
This thesis proposes a simple yet powerful idea to solve problem (+) and problem
(++) that can be applied to various settings—rewarding every agent based on the
amount and value of the information she provides. It remains to design proper
information measurements to quantify information and evaluate information without
verification. Thus, this thesis distills the essence of eliciting information to the design
of proper information measurements.
Information theory is not typically used in the information elicitation literature, a
key novelty of this thesis is showing how the insights of information theory illuminate
the work and challenges in the information elicitation field.
1.1.1 Quantifying information
In a line of work [34] on designing mechanisms to elicit truthful, but unverifiable
information, this thesis noticed that many current mechanisms can be understood in
terms of information theory, specifically mutual information. This observation pro-
vides a unified framework—the Mutual Information Paradigm—for the field, simpli-
fies several existing and foundational results, and provides several novel mechanisms
in a variety of settings [38, 35, 34]. These mechanisms overcome a serious flaw of
many previous information elicitation mechanisms: agents can obtain high reward
by reporting meaningless information (e.g. everyone reports the a priori most likely
answer).
In the mutual information paradigm, each agent i is paid the mutual information
between her information and her peers’ information—
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MI(her information; her peers’ information).
If we pick “correct” mutual information measures, no agent can obtain strict
benefit by lying since intuitively the amount of information each agent has will not
increase no matter what kind of strategy she applies to her information. That is,
the mutual information measurement should be “information-monotone”. We found
two families of “(weakly) information-monotone” mutual information measures—f -
mutual information and Bregman mutual information—both of which generalize the
Shannon mutual information2.
By assuming that agents are expected utility maximizers, it is sufficient to con-
struct an unbiased estimator of the information measures. Unlike calculating the
information measure, obtaining an unbiased estimator of the information measure
only requires a small number of samples in many situations.
Section 1.1.3 will give an overview of the applications of the mutual information
paradigm in a variety of important settings and the techniques used to construct an
unbiased estimator of the information measures.
1.1.2 Evaluating information
Previous peer prediction mechanisms treat all information (cheap/expensive) equally,
and thus agents lack an incentive to invest effort to obtain expensive signals. More-
over, even when an expert can easily obtain the expensive signal, previous mechanisms
discourage her from providing it when she believes the non-experts will disagree.
A successful mechanism must break the symmetry between weak and expensive
signals and between expert and non-expert signals. We propose the following natural
assumption which will allow a mechanism to break this symmetry.
2Bregman mutual information is strictly weaker than f -mutual information since it only satisfies
information-monotonicity in one of its two coordinatess and is asymmetric.
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Assumption 3. Agents with high effort or expertise, know the beliefs of agents with
less effort or less expertise.
We can see that this assumption is very natural in Example 1 and Example 2.
Agents who look up or know the answer in Example 1 also know most people will
answer “Florida.” Agents that carefully grade an essay can also approximate the score
of an agent who spends very little effort. We will define a hierarchical information
structure to naturally capture Assumption 3.
Our mechanisms solicit not only agents’ own opinions but also their predictions
for the opinions of the other agents who have less information. This differs with the
previous peer prediction mechanisms which ask agents to provide their predictions for
all other agents’ opinions. For example, in the peer-grading example, we might ask
agents to report their own evaluation, and to optionally report one or more low-effort
/ low expertise evaluations (e.g. scores based on grammar, thesis statement, student
name, naive reading, etc).
The information theoretic techniques and Assumption 3 lead to a mechanism de-
sign framework from which we construct several mechanisms for a variety of settings,
such that expensive signals are incentivized and identified [37].
1.1.3 Overview of results and techniques
We present our results in designing multi-choice peer prediction mechanisms here.
In these mechanisms, the elicited information is a discrete signal from a finite set. We
will introduce our results in the context where the elicited information is a forecast
in the information aggregation section since we will show essentially the forecast
elicitation can be seen as an information aggregation problem. Important solution
desiderata in peer prediction literature are:
(Strictly) truthful : truth-telling is a (strict) Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A strictly
truthful mechanism motivates minority since for each agent, if she believes
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everyone else tells the truth, she should tell the truth even she is minority.
(Symmetric) focal : the truth-telling equilibrium is paid more than other (Sym-
metric) equilibria in expectation. A symmetric focal mechanism avoids “all
agree collusion”.
Dominantly truthful : truth-telling maximizes the expected payment regardless
of the other agents’ strategies.
Before presenting the results, let’s introduce a series of important settings.
Homogeneous/Heterogeneous In the homogeneous setting, we assume the prior
over the signals agents will receive is symmetric in the sense agents have the
same expertise. We do not have this assumption in heterogeneous setting.
Single/Multi-task In the single-task setting, each agent is assigned a single task
(e.g. have you ever texted while driving before?). Miller, Resnick, and Zeck-
hauser [45] and Prelec [51] are two seminal works in this setting. Another is
the multi-task setting in which each agent is assigned a batch of apriori similar
tasks (e.g., peer grading, or is there a cat in this picture?). Dasgupta and Ghosh
[18] is the foundational work in this setting.
Known prior/Detail free Detail free mechanisms require no knowledge of the prior
over the signals agents will receive (e.g. with probability 0.6, 70% agents will
receive “yes”, with probability 0.4, 70% agents will receive “no”) while known
prior mechanisms are the opposite.
Minimal/Non-minimal Minimal mechanisms only require agents to report their
information rather than forecasts for other agents’ reports (e.g. is there a cat
in this picture?) while non-minimal mechanisms requires the agents to report
both (e.g. have you texted while driving before and what percentage of your
peers have texted while driving before?).
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Small/Medium/Large group Large group mechanisms require the number of par-
ticipants to be large or even infinite. Small group mechanisms can be applied
to the situation where the number of participants is greater than a small con-
stant (e.g 3,6). In the medium group mechanisms, the number of participants
are required to be greater than an integer that depends on the agents’ prior
N(Prior).
In addition to the novel information theoretic mechanism design frameworks, we
also propose disagreement mechanism (Section 4.3) in the single-task, homogeneous
setting, f -mutual information mechanism (Section 3.3) in the multi-task, homoge-
neous setting. The above mechanisms are all detail free. Figure 1.3, 1.4 show the
comparison between these mechanisms and previous literature in homogeneous set-
ting. In the heterogeneous setting, by assuming Assumption 3, we apply HMIP to
create the following mechanisms:
Multi-HMIM: (Section 5.2.2) which works in the multiple task setting even for a
small number of tasks but requires the mechanism to know the hierarchical
information structure.
Learning based Multi-HMIM: (Section 5.2.3) which works in the multiple task setting
even when the mechanism does not know the hierarchical information structure;
however requires a large number of tasks.
Single-HMIM: (Section 5.3.2) which works in the single-task setting.
All of the above mechanisms work for small populations. Prelec, Seung, and
McCoy [52] and Agarwal et al. [2] design mechanisms for settings with heterogeneous
participants. Prelec, Seung, and McCoy [52] only consider the single-task setting and
make a different assumption on the expertise. The mechanism in Prelec, Seung, and
McCoy [52] requires an infinite number of participants. The mechanism in Agarwal
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et al. [2] does not assume the hierarchy of the information and cannot be applied to
identify and elicit expertise.
To apply MIP and HMIP in designing these mechanisms, we need to construct an
unbiased estimator of the information measure using agents’ reports. In the homo-
geneous setting, we pay each agent the unbiased estimator such that in expectation,
each agent is paid based on the amount of the information. In the heterogeneous
setting, we first evaluate the value of the information based on Assumption 3 and
then use the same method as in the homogeneous setting to quantify the information
using agents’ reports. In the end, we pay each agent based on both the value and the
amount of the information.
To construct an unbiased estimator of the information measure using agents’ re-
ports, different settings have different techniques. In the single-task setting, we use a
non-minimal mechanism to ask agents their posterior (e.g. what percentage of your
peers have texted while driving before?) and construct the estimator using both the
first order information (e.g Y/N) and the second order information (e.g. 80% Yes). In
the multi-task setting, either we ask a large number of questions to estimate the prior
and use the prior to calculate the information measure, or we ask a small number
questions but require the knowledge of information structure.
To give a flavor of the techniques used in constructing the estimator, we use a
special case of the f -mutual information mechanism as an example. This special case
is the TV D-mutual information mechanism which is also independently proposed by
Shnayder et al. [63] (Section 3.5).
We assume that there are two agents: Alice and Bob. They are both asked to
grade the same three essays. Their payment is
Average agreements for the same essay− Average agreements for different tasks
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Figure 1.2: TV D-mutual information mechanism
When both Alice and Bob’s answers are (0, 1, 1), their average agreements for the
same task are 1 and their average agreements for different tasks are 2/6 = 1/3. Thus,
they will be paid 2/3.
By assuming Alice’s answer is positively correlated with Bob’s answer, the above
payment is an unbiased estimator of the TV D-mutual information between Alice’s
answer and Bob’s answer (Section 3.5). The major difference between this mutual
information style payment and the naive “pay for agreements” is that this payment
also punishes the agreements for different tasks. When both Alice and Bob’s answers
are (1, 1, 1), although they have the maximal average agreements for the same essay,
they also have maximal average agreements for the different essays. In this case,
both Alice and Bob are paid nothing. Later we will show an extension of this idea in
forecast elicitation where agents’ reports are forecasts (Figure 1.7).
Figure 1.3: Multi-choice single-task mechanisms comparison in homogeneous setting
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Figure 1.4: Multi-choice multi-task mechanisms comparison in homogeneous setting
1.2 Aggregating information without verification
Co-training/multiview learning is a problem that asks to aggregate two views of
data into a prediction for the latent label, and was first proposed by Blum and Mitchell
[9]. Although co-training is an important learning problem, it lacks a unified and
rigorous approach to the general setting. The current thesis will make an innovative
connection between the co-training problem and a peer prediction style mechanism
design problem: forecast elicitation without verification, and develop a unified theory
for both of them via the same information theoretic approach.
1.2.1 Aggregating information=Eliciting information
We use “forecasting whether a startup company will succeed” as our running
example. We have two possible sources of information for each startup: the features
XA (e.g. products, business idea, target customer) of the startup; and the survey
feedbackXB, collected from the crowd (e.g. a survey of amateur investors). Sometimes
we have access to both the sources, and sometimes we have access to only one of the
sources. We want to learn how to forecast the result Y (succeed/fail) of a startup
company, using both or one of the sources.
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We are given a set of candidates predictors {PA} (e.g. a set of hypotheses) such
that each candidate predictor PA maps the features XA to a forecast for the result
Y of the startup (e.g. succeed with 73% probability, fail with 27% probability).
We are also given a set of candidates predictors {PB} (e.g. a set of aggregation
algorithms like majority vote/weighted average) such that each candidate predictor
PB maps the survey feedback XB to a forecast for the result Y . Our goal is to
evaluate the performance of a specific pair PA, PB. The learning problem, learning
how to forecast, can be reduced to this goal since if we know how to evaluate the
two candidates PA, PB’s performance, we can select the two candidates P
∗
A, P
∗
B which
have the highest performance and use them to forecast.
Given a batch of past startup data each with the features XA, the crowdsourced
feedback XB, and the result Y , we can evaluate the performance of the predictors
through many existing measurements (e.g. proper scoring rules, loss functions). This
evaluation method is related to the supervised learning setting. However, there may
be only very few data points about the startups with results Y .3 When we only use a
few labeled data points to train the predictor, the predictor will likely over-fit. Thus,
we can boldly ask:
(*Learning) Can we evaluate the performance of the candidate predictors, as well
as learn how to forecast the ground truth Y , without access to any data labeled with Y ?
(see Figure 1.5) It is impossible to solve this problem without making an additional
assumption on the relationship between XA, XB and Y . However, it turns out we can
solve this problem with a natural assumption; conditioning on Y , XA and XB are
independent. With this assumption, a naive approach is to learn the joint distribution
of XA and XB using the past data, and then solve the relationship between Y and
XA, XB by some calculations, using the lemma that XA and XB are independent
conditioning on Y . However, this naive approach will not work if either XA or XB
3For example, if we focus on cryptographic or self-driving currencies, there are very few startups
labeled with results.
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Figure 1.5: Problem (*): Finding the common ground truth
has very high dimension. We will solve this problem using learning methods. Before
we go further on the learning problem, let’s consider a corresponding mechanism
design problem. In the scenario where the forecasts are provided by human beings,
we want to ask a mechanism design problem:
(**Mechanism design) Can we design proper instant reward schemes to incentivize
high quality forecast for Y without instant access to Y ? (see Figure 1.6)
Figure 1.6: Problem (**): Forecast elicitation
People will obtain instant payments from instant reward schemes. If we do not
require the reward schemes to be instant, proper scoring rules will work by rewarding
people in the future after Y is revealed. It turns out the above learning problem (*)
and mechanism design problem (**) are essentially the same, since there is a natural
correspondence between an evaluation of their performance and their rewards. A
first try would be rewarding the predictors according to their “agreement”, since high
quality predictors should have a lot of agreement with each other. However, if we
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train the predictors based on this criterion, then the output of the training process
will be two meaningless constant predictors which perfectly agree with each other
(e.g. always forecast 100% success). We call this problem the “naive agreement”
issue.
Note that the mechanism design problem (**) is closely related to the peer pre-
diction literature, incentivizing high quality information reports without verification.
It is natural to leverage the techniques and insights from peer prediction to address
problems (*) and (**). In fact, the peer prediction literature provides an information
theoretic idea to address the “naive agreement” issue, that is, replacing “agreement”
by mutual information. In the thesis, we will show that with a natural assumption,
conditioning on Y , XA, and XB are independent, we can address problem (*) and
(**) simultaneously via rewarding the predictors the mutual information between
them and using the predictors’ reward as the evaluation of their performance.
1.2.2 Overview of results and techniques
Our contribution We build a natural connection between mechanism design and
machine learning by simultaneously addressing a learning problem and a mechanism
design problem in the context where ground truth is unknown, via the same informa-
tion theoretic approach.
Learning We focus on the co-training problem [9]: learning how to forecast Y us-
ing two sources of information XA and XB, without access to any data labeled
with ground truth Y (Section 6.3). By making a typical assumption in the
co-training literature, conditioning on Y , XA and XB are independent, we re-
duce the learning problem to an optimization problem maxPA,PB MIG
f (PA, PB)
such that solving the learning problem is equivalent to picking the P ∗A, P
∗
B that
maximize MIGf (PA, PB), i.e., the f -mutual information gain between PA and
PB (Section 6.4). Formally, we define the Bayesian posterior predictor as the
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predictor that maps any input information X = x to its Bayesian posterior fore-
cast for Y = y, i.e., Pr(Y = y|X = x). Then when both PA, PB are Bayesian
posterior predictors, MIGf (PA, PB) is maximized and the maximal value is the
f -mutual information between XA and XB. With an additional mild restric-
tion on the prior, MIGf (PA, PB) is maximized if and only if both PA, PB are
permuted versions of the Bayesian posterior predictor.
We also design another family of optimization goals, PS-gain4, based on the
family of proper scoring rules (Section 6.6). We can also reduce the learning
problem to the PS-gain optimization problem. We will show a special case of
the PS-gain, picking PS as the logarithmic scoring rule LSR, corresponds to
the maximum likelihood estimator method. The range of applications of PS-
gain is more limited when compared with the range of applications of f -mutual
information gain, since the application of PS-gain requires either one of the
information sources to be low dimensional or that we have a simple generative
model for the distribution over one of the information sources and ground truth
labels, while f -mutual information gain does not have these restrictions.
As is typical in related literature, we do not investigate the computation com-
plexity or data requirement of the learning problem.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first optimization goal in the co-training
literature that guarantees that the maximizer corresponds to the Bayesian poste-
rior predictor, without any additional assumption. Thus, our method optimally
aggregates the two sources of information.
Mechanism design Consider the scenario where we elicit forecasts for ground truth
Y from agents and pay agents immediately. Without access to Y , given the prior
on the distribution of Y , i.e., Pr[Y ], 5 by assuming agents’ private information
4PS is a proper scoring rule.
5This is not a very strong assumption since we do not need the knowledge of the joint distribution
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are independent conditioning on Y , in the single-task setting (there is only a
single forecasting task), we design a strictly truthful mechanism, the common
ground mechanism, where truth-telling is a strict equilibrium (Section 6.5.2); in
the multi-task (there are at least two a priori similar forecasting tasks) setting,
we design a family of focal mechanisms, the multi-task common ground mecha-
nism MCG(f)s, where the truth-telling equilibrium pays better than any other
strategy profile and strictly higher than any non-permutation strategy profile
(Section 6.5.1).
Technical contribution Our main technical ingredient is a novel performance
measurement, the f -mutual information gain, which is an unbiased estimator of the
f -mutual information. To give a flavor of this measurement, we give an informal
presentation here: both PA and PB are assigned a batch of forecasting tasks, the
f -mutual information gain between PA and PB is
The agreements between PA’s forecast and PB’s forecast for the same task
− f ?(The agreements between PA’s forecast and PB’s forecast for different tasks)
where f ? is the conjugate of the convex function f . With this measurement, two
agreeing constant predictors have small gain since their outputs have large agreements
for both the same task and different tasks. The formal definition will be introduced
in Section 6.4.1 and the agreement measure is introduced in Definition 115.
The f -mutual information gain is conceptually similar to the correlation payment
scheme (Figure 1.2) proposed by Dasgupta and Ghosh [18] (in the binary choice
setting), and Shnayder et al. [63] (in to multiple choice setting), which pays agents
“the agreements for the same task minus the agreements for the distinct task”. In
Dasgupta and Ghosh [18] and Shnayder et al. [63], the payment scheme is designed
over the event and agents’ private information.
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Figure 1.7: f -mutual information gain
PA and PB are assigned three forecasting tasks. PA’s outputs are (0.7, 0.3), (0.1, 0.9), (0.5, 0.5) and
PB ’s outputs are (0.6, 0.4), (0.2, 0.8), (0.4, 0.6). To calculate the f -mutual information gain between
them, we pick a task (e.g. Task no.2) uniformly at random and calculate the agreements as between
PA and PB ’s forecasts for this task; we also pick a pair of distinct task (i, j) uniformly at random
(e.g. (Task no.1, Task no.2)) and calculate the agreements ad between PA’s forecast for task i and
PB ’s forecast for this task j. The f -mutual information gain is set as as − f?(ad). We can also
calculate a more concentrated version of the f -mutual information gain by replacing as and f
?(ad)
by their empirical expectations. The formal definition (Section 6.4.1) uses the concentrated version.
for discrete signals and the measure of agreements is a simple indicator function.
This thesis also show that this correlation payment is related to a special f -mutual
information, TV D-mutual information (Section 3.5). Thus, the f -mutual information
gain can be seen as an extension of the correlation payment scheme and work for
forecasts report.
1.3 Roadmap
This thesis will start by introducing the general information theoretic mechanism
design frameworks in Chapter II that quantify (Mutual information paradigm) and
evaluate information (Hierarchical mutual information paradigm) without verification
and price information such that agents will be incentivized to invest effort and provide
high quality information.
Both Chapter III and Chapter IV assume agents and information are homoge-
neous. Chapter III applies the mutual information paradigm into multi-task setting
and propose two families of novel mechanisms: the f -mutual information mechanism
and the Bregman mutual information mechanism, and map the seminal work [18] in
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multi-task peer prediction literature into the mutual information paradigm. Chap-
ter IV considers the single-task setting and proposes a novel mechanism—the Dis-
agreement mechanism. The Disagreement mechanism is the first detail free, strictly
truthful, focal mechanism in the single-task setting that works for a small number
of participants. Although the design of the Disagreement mechanism does not di-
rectly use the mutual information mechanism, it also employs the information theory
tools and uses the information monotonicity property. Chapter IV also maps the
first detail free and truthful mechanism—Bayesian truth serum [51]—into the mutual
information paradigm such that the results can be constructed easily.
Chapter V considers the setting where agents have different expertise and applies
the hierarchical mutual information paradigm in both single-task and multi-task set-
ting to propose several novel mechanisms that can identify expertise and incentivize
low cost agents to invest high level effort and provide an honest report.
Chapter VI considers an important unsupervised learning problem—co-training [9]
which can be also seen as an information aggregation problem. Chapter VI reduces
this learning problem to a peer-prediction-style mechanism design problem—forecast
elicitation without verification and addresses them simultaneously using the same
information theoretic approach—the mutual information paradigm.
Chapter VII concludes this thesis and proposes several potential future works.
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CHAPTER II
An Information Theoretic Framework
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Transition probability
We define a m×m′ transition matrix M ∈ Rm×m′ as a matrix such that for any
i, j ∈ [m]× [m′], Mi,j ≥ 0 and
∑
jMi,j = 1. We define a permutation transition matrix
pi as a m×m permutation matrix.
Given a random variable X with m possible outcomes, by abusing notation a
little bit, a m ×m′ transition matrix M defines a transition probability M that
transforms X to M(X) such that X ′ := M(X) is a new random variable that has m′
possible outcomes where Pr[X ′ = j|X = i] = Mi,j.
If the distribution of X is represented by an m × 1 column vector p, then the
distribution over M(X) is MTp where MT is the transpose of M .
2.1.2 f-divergence
f -divergence Df : ∆Σ × ∆Σ → R is a non-symmetric measure of the difference
between distribution p ∈ ∆Σ and distribution q ∈ ∆Σ and is defined to be
Df (p,q) =
∑
σ∈Σ
p(σ)f
(
q(σ)
p(σ)
)
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where f(·) is a convex function and f(1) = 0. Now we introduce the properties of
f -divergence:
Fact 4 (Non-negativity [16]). For any p,q, Df (p,q) ≥ 0 and Df (p,q) = 0 if and
only if p = q.
Fact 5 (Joint Convexity [16]). For any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, for any p1,p2,q1,q2 ∈ ∆Σ,
Df (λp1 + (1− λ)p2, λq1 + (1− λ)q2) ≤ λDf (p1,q1) + (1− λ)Df (p2,q2).
Fact 6 (Information Monotonicity ([3, 40, 5])). For any strictly convex function f ,
f -divergence Df (p,q) satisfies information monotonicity so that for any transition
matrix θ ∈ R|Σ|×|Σ|, Df (p,q) ≥ Df (θTp, θTq).
Moreover, the inequality is strict if and only if there exists σ, σ′, σ′′ such that
p(σ′′)
p(σ′) 6= q(σ
′′)
q(σ′) and θσ′,σp(σ
′) > 0, θσ′′,σp(σ′′) > 0.
If the strictness condition does not satisfied, we can see θTp and θTq are p and
q’s sufficient statistic which means the transition θ does not lose any information,
thus, the equality holds.
Proof. The proof follows from algebraic manipulation and one application of convex-
ity.
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Df (θ
Tp, θTq) =
∑
σ
(θTp)(σ)f
(
(θTq)(σ)
(θTp)(σ)
)
(2.1)
=
∑
σ
θTσ,·pf
(
θTσ,·q
θTσ,·p
)
(2.2)
=
∑
σ
θTσ,·pf
(
1
θTσ,·p
∑
σ′
θTσ,σ′p(σ
′)
q(σ′)
p(σ′)
)
(2.3)
≤
∑
σ
θTσ,·p
1
θTσ,·p
∑
σ′
θTσ,σ′p(σ
′)f
(
q(σ′)
p(σ′)
)
(2.4)
=
∑
σ
p(σ)f
(
q(σ)
p(σ)
)
= Df (p,q) (2.5)
The second equality holds since (θTp)(σ) is dot product of the σth row of θT and
p.
The third equality holds since
∑
σ′ θ
T
σ,σ′p(σ
′)q(σ
′)
p(σ′) = θ
T
σ,·q.
The fourth inequality follows from the convexity of f(·).
The last equality holds since
∑
σ θ
T
σ,σ′ = 1.
We now examine under what conditions the inequality in Equation 2.4 is strict.
Note that for any strictly convex function g, if ∀u, λu > 0, g(
∑
u λuxu) =
∑
u λug(xu)
if and only if there exists x such that ∀u, xu = x. By this property, the inequality is
strict if and only if there exists σ, σ′, σ′′ such that q(σ
′)
p(σ′) 6= q(σ
′′)
p(σ′′) and θ
T
σ,σ′p(σ
′) > 0,
θTσ,σ′′p(σ
′′) > 0.
Definition 7. Given two signals σ′, σ′′ ∈ Σ, we say two probability measures p,q
over Σ can distinguish σ′, σ′′ ∈ Σ if p(σ′) > 0, p(σ′′) > 0 and q(σ′)
p(σ′) 6= q(σ
′′)
p(σ′′)
Fact 6 directly implies
Corollary 8. Given a transition matrix θ and two probability measures p,q that can
distinguish σ′, σ′′ ∈ Σ, if there exists σ ∈ Σ such that θ(σ′, σ), θ(σ′′, σ) > 0, we have
Df (p,q) > Df (θ
Tp, θTq) when f is a strictly convex function.
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Now we introduce two f -divergences in common use: KL divergence, and Total
variation Distance.
Example 9 (KL divergence). Choosing − log(x) as the convex function f(x), f -
divergence becomes KL divergence DKL(p,q) =
∑
σ p(σ) log
p(σ)
q(σ)
Example 10 (Total Variation Distance). Choosing |x − 1| as the convex function
f(x), f -divergence becomes Total Variation Distance Dtvd(p,q) =
∑
σ |p(σ)− q(σ)|
2.1.3 Proper scoring rules
Informally, a scoring rule measures the accuracy of the forecasts. Formally, a
scoring rule [66, 24] PS : Σ×∆Σ → R takes in a signal x ∈ Σ and a distribution over
signals δΣ ∈ ∆Σ and outputs a real number. A scoring rule is proper if, whenever
the first input is drawn from a distribution δΣ, then δΣ will maximize the expectation
of PS over all possible inputs in ∆Σ to the second coordinate. A scoring rule is
called strictly proper if this maximum is unique. We will assume throughout that the
scoring rules we use are strictly proper. Slightly abusing notation, we can extend a
scoring rule to be PS : ∆Σ ×∆Σ → R by simply taking PS(δΣ, δ′Σ) = Ex←δΣ(x, δ′Σ).
We note that this means that any proper scoring rule is linear in the first term.
Example 11 (Log Scoring Rule [66, 24]). Fix an outcome space Σ for a signal x.
Let q ∈ ∆Σ be a reported distribution. The Logarithmic Scoring Rule maps a signal
and reported distribution to a payoff as follows:
L(x,q) = log(q(x)).
Let the signal x be drawn from some random process with distribution p ∈ ∆Σ.
Then the expected payoff of the Logarithmic Scoring Rule
Ex←p[L(x,q)] =
∑
x
p(x) log q(x) = L(p,q)
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This value will be maximized if and only if q = p.
Intuitively, more information should imply a more accurate prediction. This intu-
ition is valid when the accuracy is measured by a proper scoring rule. When predicting
a random variable Y , assuming that all agents have a common prior, the agent who
has more information will have higher prediction score when the prediction score is
measured by a proper scoring rule. We denote the prediction of Y conditioning on X
as Pr[Y |X] := (Pr[Y = 1|X],Pr[Y = 2|X], ...,Pr[Y = |Σ||X]) ∈ ∆Σ.
Fact 12 (Information monotonicity of proper scoring rules). Given any strictly proper
scoring rule PS,
EX,Y,ZPS(Y,Pr[Y |X,Z]) ≥ EX,Y PS(Y,Pr[Y |X]).
The equality holds if and only if Pr[Y |X = x, Z = z] = Pr[Y |X = x] for all (x, z)
where Pr[X = x, Z = z] > 0.
We defer the proof to the appendix.
2.2 (Weakly) Information-monotone information measures
2.2.1 f-mutual information
Given two random variables X, Y , let UX,Y and VX,Y be two probability measures
where UX,Y is the joint distribution of (X, Y ) and V is the product of the marginal
distributions of X and Y . Formally, for every pair of (x, y),
UX,Y (X = x, Y = y) = Pr[X = x, Y = y] VX,Y (X = x, Y = y) = Pr[X = x] Pr[Y = y].
If UX,Y is very different with VX,Y , the mutual information between X and Y
should be high since knowing X changes the belief for Y a lot. If UX,Y equals to
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VX,Y , the mutual information betweenX and Y should be zero sinceX is independent
with Y . Intuitively, the “distance” between UX,Y and VX,Y represents the mutual
information between them.
Definition 13 (f -mutual information). The f -mutual information between X and
Y is defined as
MIf (X;Y ) = Df (UX,Y ,VX,Y )
where Df is f -divergence.
Example 14 (KL divergence and I(·; ·)). Choosing f -divergence as KL divergence,
f -mutual information becomes the Shannon (conditional) mutual information [15]
I(X;Y ) := MIKL(X;Y ) =
∑
x,y
Pr[X = x, Y = y] log
Pr[X = x, Y = y]
Pr[X = x] Pr[Y = y]
I(X;Y |Z) :=MIKL(X;Y |Z)
=
∑
x,y
Pr[X = x, Y = y, Z = z] log
Pr[X = x, Y = y|Z = z]
Pr[X = x|Z = z] Pr[Y = y|Z = z] .
Example 15 (Total Variation Distance and MI tvd(·; ·)). Choosing f -divergence as
Total Variation Distance, f -mutual information becomes
MI tvd(X;Y ) :=
∑
x,y
|Pr[X = x, Y = y]− Pr[X = x] Pr[Y = y]|.
For the strictness guarantee, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 16 (Fine-grained distribution). P ∈ ∆ΣX×ΣY is a fine-grained joint dis-
tribution over X and Y if for every two distinct pairs (x, y), (x′, y′), UX,Y (X, Y ) :=
P (X, Y ) and VX,Y (X, Y ) := P (X)P (Y ) can distinguish (see Definition 7) (x, y) and
(x′, y′).
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Fact 17 (General data processing inequality). When f is strictly convex, f -mutual
information MIf is information-monotone and strictly information-monotone with
respect to all fine-grained joint distributions over X and Y .
Definition 18 (Fine-grained prior). Given general setting (n,Σ), Q is fine-grained
prior if for every pair i, j, Q(Ψi,Ψj) is a fine-grained joint distribution over Ψi and
Ψj.
Proof of Theorem 17. We will apply the information monotonicity of f -divergence
to show the data processing inequality of f -mutual information. We first introduce
several matrix operations to ease the presentation of the proof.
Definition 19 (vec operator [27]). The vec operator creates a column vector vec(A)
from a matrix A by stacking the column vectors of A.
Definition 20 (Kronecker Product [27]). The Kronecker product of two matrices
A ∈ Rm×n, B ∈ Rp×q is defined as the mp × nq matrix A ⊗ B = {Ai,jB} =
A11B . . . A1nB
...
. . .
...
Am1B . . . AmnB
.
Fact 21 (vec operator and Kronecker Product [61]). For any matrices A ∈ Rn1×n2 ,
X ∈ Rn2×n3 , B ∈ Rn3×n4 , vec(AXB) = BT ⊗ Avec(X).
Let X : Ω 7→ ΣX , Y : Ω 7→ ΣY be two random variables. UX,Y and VX,Y can be
seen as two ΣX × ΣY matrices. Let M be a |ΣX | × |ΣX | transition matrix.
We define ΣX,Y as ΣX × ΣY .
Note that the vectorization of the matrix that represents the probability measure
over X and Y will not change the probability measure. Thus,
Df (UM(X),Y , VM(X),Y ) = Df (vec(UM(X),Y ), vec(VM(X),Y )).
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We define I as a |ΣY | × |ΣY | identity matrix. For any transition matrix M , by
simple calculations, we can see the Kronecker product between M and the identity
matrix I is a transition matrix as well.
When Y is independent with M(X) conditioning on X, for any probability mea-
sure P ∈ ∆ΣX×ΣY on X and Y ,
P (M(X) = x′, Y = y) =
∑
x
P (M(X) = x′|X = x, Y = y)P (X = x, Y = y) (2.6)
=
∑
x
P (M(X) = x′|X = x)P (X = x, Y = y)
(Y is independent with M(X) conditioning on X)
MIf (M(X);Y ) =Df (UM(X),Y , VM(X),Y ) (2.7)
=Df (vec(UM(X),Y ), vec(VM(X),Y ))
=Df (vec(M
TUX,Y I), vec(M
TV(X),Y I))
(equation (2.6), replacing P by UX,Y and VX,Y )
=Df (I
T ⊗MTvec(UX,Y ), IT ⊗MTvec(UX,Y )) (Fact 21)
≤Df (vec(UX,Y ), vec(VX,Y ))
(information monotonicity of f -divergence)
=Df (UX,Y , VX,Y )
=MIf (X;Y )
Now we show the strictness guarantee. When M is a non-permutation matrix,
Θ := (IT ⊗MT )T = M ⊗ I is a non-permutation matrix as well. Thus there must
exist (x, y), (x′, y′), (x′′, y′′) such that both Θ((x, y), (x′, y′)) and Θ((x, y), (x′′, y′′)) are
strictly positive where (x′, y′) 6= (x′′, y′′). According to the definition of fine-grained
prior (see Definition 18 ), UX,Y and VX,Y can distinguish (x
′, y′) and (x′, y′). Then
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Corollary 8 implies that the inequality in (2.7) is strict.
Fact 22 (Convexity of f -mutual information). For any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, for any random
variables X1, X2, Y , let Bλ be an independent Bernoulli variable such that Bλ = 1
with probability λ and 0 with probability 1 − λ. Let X be a random variable such
that if Bλ = 1, X = X1, otherwise, X = X2,
MIf (X;Y ) ≤ λMIf (X1;Y ) + (1− λ)MIf (X2;Y ).
Proof. Based on the definition of X,
UX,Y = λUX1,Y + (1− λ)UX2,Y VX,Y = λVX1,Y + (1− λ)VX2,Y .
Combining the joint convexity of Df (Fact 5) and the fact that MI
f (X;Y ) =
Df (UX,Y , VX,Y ),
MIf (X;Y ) ≤ λMIf (X1;Y ) + (1− λ)MIf (X2;Y ).
2.2.2 Bregman mutual information
It is naturally to ask whether in addition to f -divergence, can we use another
commonly used divergence—Bregman divergence DPS—to define an information-
monotone information measure. Since the general Bregman divergence may not
satisfy information monotonicity, the answer is likely to be negative. However, sur-
prisingly, by properly using the Bregman divergence, we can obtain a new family of
information measures BMIPS that satisfies almost all information-monotone proper-
ties of f -mutual information except the symmetry and one half of the data processing
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inequality. Therefore, by plugging BMIPS into the Mutual Information Paradigm,
we may lose the focal property but can preserve the dominantly truthful property.
Bregman Divergence [10, 24] Bregman divergence DPS : ∆Σ×∆Σ → R is a non-
symmetric measure of the difference between distribution p ∈ ∆Σ and distribution
q ∈ ∆Σ and is defined to be
DPS(p,q) = PS(p,p)− PS(p,q)
where PS is a proper scoring rule (see the definition of PS in Section 2.1.3).
Inspired by the f -mutual information, we can first try DPS(UX,Y ,VX,Y ) to de-
fine the Bregman mutual information. However, since the Bregman divergence may
not satisfy the information monotonicity, this idea does not work. Intuitively, more
information implies a more accurate prediction. Inspired by this intuition, we define
Bregman mutual information between X and Y as an accuracy gain—the accuracy of
the posterior Pr[Y|X] minus the accuracy of the prior Pr[Y]. With this definition, if
X changes the belief for Y a lot, then the Bregman mutual information between them
is high; if X is independent with Y , Pr[Y|X] = Pr[Y], then the Bregman mutual
information between them is zero.
We define UY |X=x and UY as two probability distribution over Y such that
UY |X=x(Y = y) = Pr[Y = y|X = x] UY (Y = y) = Pr[Y = y].
Definition 23 (Bregman mutual information). The Bregman mutual information
between X and Y is defined as
BMIPS(X;Y ) = EXDPS(UY |X ,UY ) = EXPS(Pr[Y|X],Pr[Y|X])−PS(Pr[Y|X],Pr[Y]).
31
Bridging log scoring rule and Shannon mutual information Inspired by the
definition of Bregman mutual information, we will show a novel connection between
log scoring rule and Shannon information theory concepts—the log scoring rule can be
used to construct an unbiased estimator of (conditional) Shannon mutual information.
A powerful application of this connection is the information theoretic reconstruction
of Prelec [51] (Section 4.4.0.2).
The definition of Bregman mutual information says that the accuracy gain mea-
sured by a proper scoring rule PS equals the information gain measured by the (con-
ditional) Bregman mutual information BMIPS. The following theorem (Theorem 24)
shows that we can bridge the log scoring rule and Shannon mutual information by
showing the accuracy gain measured by log scoring rule equals the information gain
measured by (conditional) Shannon mutual information. Therefore, like f -mutual in-
formation, Bregman mutual information also generalizes Shannon mutual information
(Corollary 25).
Theorem 24 (expected accuracy gain = information gain). For random variables
X, Y, Z, when predicting Y , the logarithm score of prediction Pr[Y |Z,X] minus the
logarithm score of prediction Pr[Y |Z]
EX,Y,ZL(Y,Pr[Y |Z,X])− L(Y,Pr[Y |Z]) = I(X;Y |Z)
where L : Σ×∆Σ 7→ R is the log scoring rule and I(X;Y |Z) is the Shannon mutual
information between X and Y conditioning on Z.
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Proof.
EX,Y,ZL(Y,Pr[Y |Z,X])− L(Y,Pr[Y |Z])
=
∑
x,y,z
Pr[X = x, Y = y, Z = z] log(
Pr[Y = y|Z = z,X = x]
Pr[Y = y|Z = z] )
=
∑
x,y,z
Pr[X = x, Y = y, Z = z] log(
Pr[Y = y,X = x|Z = z]
Pr[Y = y|Z = z] Pr[X = x|Z = z] )
= I(X;Y |Z)
Recall that the conditional mutual information (Definition 29) is defined as
∑
z
Pr[Z = z]MI(X;Y |Z = z).
Thus,
BMIPS(X;Y |Z) = EX,ZPS(Pr[Y|X,Z],Pr[Y|X,Z])− PS(Pr[Y|X,Z],Pr[Y|Z])
which is the accuracy of posterior Pr[Y|X,Z] minus the accuracy of prior Pr[Y|Z].
Therefore, Fact 24 directly implies Corollary 25.
Corollary 25. BMIL(·,·)(X;Y |Z) = I(X;Y |Z) where BMIL(·,·) is a Bregman mutual
information that chooses Log scoring rule L(·, ·) as the proper scoring rule.
Definition 26 (Quasi Information-monotone mutual information). We say MI is
quasi information-monotone if and only if it is always non-negative and satisfies the
data processing inequality for the first entry.
A quasi information-monotone mutual information may not be symmetric. Thus,
even if it satisfies the data processing inequality for the first entry, it may not satisfy
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the data processing inequality for the second entry which means data processing
methods operating on Y may increase MI(X;Y ).
Theorem 27. The Bregman mutual information is quasi information-monotone.
Intuitively, more information about X provides a more accurate prediction for
random variable Y . That is, Pr[Y|M(X)] is less accurate than Pr[Y|X]. We will
show the property of the proper scoring rules directly implies the above intuition and
then the quasi information-monotonicity of BMIPS follows.
Proof. The definition of proper scoring rules implies the non-negativity of Bregman
divergence as well as that of Bregman mutual information.
For any transition probability M that operates on X,
BMIPS(M(X);Y ) = EM(X)PS(Pr[Y|M(X)],Pr[Y|M(X)])− PS(Pr[Y|M(X)],Pr[Y])
= EX,M(X)PS(Pr[Y|X,M(X)],Pr[Y|M(X)])− PS(Pr[Y],Pr[Y])
(PS is linear for the first entry)
= EX,M(X)PS(Pr[Y|X],Pr[Y|M(X)])− PS(Pr[Y],Pr[Y])
(conditioning on X, M(X) is independent with Y )
≤ EXPS(Pr[Y|X],Pr[Y|X])− PS(Pr[Y],Pr[Y])
(PS is proper)
= EXPS(Pr[Y|X],Pr[Y|X])− PS(Pr[Y|X],Pr[Y])
= BMIPS(X;Y )
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2.3 Mutual information paradigm (MIP)
General Setting We introduce the general setting (n,Σ) of the mechanism design
framework where n is the number of agents and Σ is the set of possible private
information. Each agent i receives a random private information / signal Ψi : Ω 7→ Σ
where Ω is the underlying sample space. She also has a prior for other agents’ private
information.
Formally, each agent i believes the agents’ private information is chosen from a
joint distribution Qi before she receives her private information. Thus, from agent i’s
perspective, before she receives any private information, the probability that agent
1 receives Ψ1 = σ1, agent 2 receives Ψ2 = σ2, ..., agent n receives Ψn = σn is
Qi(Ψ1 = σ1,Ψ2 = σ2, ...,Ψn = σn). After she receives her private information based
on her prior, agent i will also update her knowledge to a posterior distribution which
is the prior conditioned on her private information. Without assuming a common
prior, agents may have different priors, that is, Qi may not equal Qj. We define ∆Σ
as the set of all possible probability distributions over Σ.
2.3.1 Mechanism design framework: MIP
The original idea of peer prediction [45] is based on a clever insight: every agent’s
information is related to her peers’ information and therefore can be checked using
her peers’ information. Inspired by this, we propose a natural yet powerful informa-
tion theoretic mechanism design idea—paying every agent the “mutual information”
between her reported information and her peer’s reported information where the
“mutual information” should be information-monotone—any “data processing” on
the two random variables will decrease the “mutual information” between them.
Definition 28 (Information-monotone mutual information). We sayMI is information-
monotone if and only if for any random variables X : Ω 7→ ΣX and Y : Ω 7→ ΣY :
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Symmetry MI(X;Y ) = MI(Y ;X);
Non-negativity MI(X;Y ) is always non-negative and is 0 if X is independent with
Y ;
Data processing inequality for any transition probability M ∈ R|ΣX |×|ΣX |, when
Y is independent with M(X) conditioning on X, MI(M(X);Y ) ≤MI(X;Y ).
We say MI is strictly information-monotone with respect to a probability mea-
sure P ∈ ∆ΣX×ΣY if when the joint distribution over X and Y is P , for any non-
permutationM , when Y is independent withM(X) conditioning onX, MI(M(X);Y ) <
MI(X;Y ).
Definition 29 (Conditional mutual information). Given three random variables
X, Y, Z, we define MI(X;Y |Z) as
∑
z
Pr[Z = z]MI(X;Y |Z = z)
where MI(X;Y |Z = z) := MI(X ′;Y ′) where Pr[X ′ = x, Y ′ = y] = Pr[X = x, Y =
y|Z = z].
We now provide a paradigm for designing information elicitation mechanisms—
the Mutual Information Paradigm. We warn the reader that this paradigm represents
some “wishful thinking” in that is it clear the paradigm cannot compute the payments
given the reports.
Mutual Information Paradigm (MIP(MI)) Given a general setting (n,Σ),
Report For each agent i, she is asked to provide her private information Ψi. We
denote the actual information she reports as Ψˆi.
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Payment/Information Score We uniformly randomly pick a reference agent j 6= i
and denote his report as Ψˆj. Agent i is paid by her information score
MI(Ψˆi; Ψˆj)
where MI is information-monotone.
Given a general setting (n,Σ), we say MI is strictly information-monotone with
respect to prior Q if for every pair i, j, MI is strictly information-monotone with
respect to Q(Ψi,Ψj).
Resolving “wishful thinking” MIP pays agents according to the information
measure. The calculation of the information measure requires the knowledge of the
prior, i.e., the joint distribution which is unrealistic in practical. To removing this
“wishful thinking”, a key observation is that paying agents an unbiased estimator of
the information measure is sufficient when we assume agents are expected payment
maximizers. To construct an unbiased estimator of the information measure using
agents’ reports, different settings have different techniques. In the multi-task setting,
either we ask a large number of questions to estimate the prior and use the prior
to calculate the information measure (f -mutual information mechanism), or we ask
a small number questions but require the knowledge of information structure and
use a special f -mutual information, MI tvd (TV D-mutual information mechanism).
In the single-task setting (disagreement mechanism, BTSPrelec [51]), we ask agents
their posterior (e.g. what percentage of your peers have texted while driving before?)
and construct the estimator using both the first order information (e.g Y/N) and the
second order information (e.g. 80% Yes). Thus, although the proposed mechanisms
are based on the MIP, they are all detail free in the sense that they do not need any
priori knowledge of the distributions (nor wishful thinking).
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2.3.2 Analysis of MIP
Definition 30 (Mechanism). We define a mechanism M for a setting (n,Σ) as a
tuple M := (R,M) where R is a set of all possible reports the mechanism allows,
and M : Rn 7→ Rn is a mapping from all agents’ reports to each agent’s reward.
The mechanism requires agents to submit a report r. For example, r can simply be
an agent’s private information. In this case, R = Σ. We call this kind of mechanism
a minimal mechanism. We define r to be a report profile (r1, r2, ..., rn) where ri is
agent i’s report.
Typically, the strategy of each agent should be a mapping from her received knowl-
edge including her prior and her private signal, to a probability distribution over her
report space R. But since all agents’ priors are fixed during the time when they
play the mechanism, without loss of generality, we omit the prior in the definition of
strategy.
Definition 31 (Strategy). Given a mechanism M, we define the strategy of each
agent in the mechanism M for setting (n,Σ) as a mapping s from σ (private signal)
to a probability distribution over R.
We define a strategy profile s as a profile of all agents’ strategies (s1, s2, ..., sn) and
we say agents play s if for all i, agent i plays strategy si.
Note that actually the definition of a strategy profile only depends on the setting
and the definition of all possible reportsR. We will need the definition of a mechanism
when we define an equilibrium.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium consists of a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) such
that no agent wishes to change her strategy since other strategy will decrease her
expected payment, given the strategies of the other agents and the information con-
tained in her prior and her signal.
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Definition 32 (Agent Welfare). Given a mechanism M, for a strategy profile s, we
define the agent welfare of s as the sum of expected payments to agents when they
play s under M.
We can use transition matrices to represent agents’ strategies of reporting their
private information. Given the general setting (n,Σ), for the minimal mechanisms,
fixing the priors of the agents, each agent i’s strategy si can be seen as a transition
matrix that transforms her private information Ψi to her reported information Ψˆi =
si(Ψi). We define truth-telling T as the strategy where an agent truthfully reports
her private signal. T corresponds to an identity transition matrix.
We say agent i plays a permutation strategy if si corresponds to a permutation
transition matrix. An example is that an agent relabels / permutes the signals and re-
ports the permuted version (e.g. she reports “good” when her private signal is “bad”
and reports “bad” when her private signal is “good”). Note that T 1 is a permutation
strategy as well. We call the strategy profile where all agents play a permutation strat-
egy a permutation strategy profile. Note that in a permutation strategy profile, agents
may play different permutation strategies. When a permutation strategy profile is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we call such equilibrium a permutation equilibrium.
We hope our mechanisms can be strictly truthful, focal, and even dominantly
truthful (see informal definitions in Section 1.1.3 and formal definitions will be in-
troduced later). Here we propose two additional, stronger equilibrium goals. A
mechanism M is strongly focal if the truth-telling strategy profile maximizes every
agent’s expected payment among all strategy profiles, while in the focal mechanism,
truth-telling maximizes the agent welfare—the sum of agents’ expected payment. A
mechanism M is truth-monotone if when any truthful agent changes to play a non-
truthful strategy s, no matter what strategies other agents play, it decreases every
1The above definitions of T and the permutation strategy are sufficient to analyze the frame-
work. When considering more general settings, we will provide generalized definitions of T and the
permutation strategy.
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agent’s expected payment. Note that the truth-monotone property is stronger than
the strongly focal or focal property and it says any non-truthful behavior of any
agent will hurt everyone. In addition to the above equilibrium goals, we also hope
the mechanism can be minimal and detail free (see definitions in Section 1.1.3).
For the strictness guarantee, it turns out no truthful detail free mechanism can
make truth-telling strategy profile be strictly better than any permutation strategy
profile. Therefore, the best we can hope is making the truth-telling strategy profile be
strictly better than any other non-permutation strategy profile. We give the formal
definitions for the equilibrium goals with the strictness guarantee in the following
paragraph.
Mechanism Design Goals
(Strictly) Truthful A mechanism M is (strictly) truthful if for every agent, T
(uniquely) maximizes her expected payment given that everyone else plays T.
(Strictly) Dominantly truthful A mechanismM is dominantly truthful if for ev-
ery agent, T maximizes her expected payment no matter what strategies other
agents play. A mechanismM is strictly dominantly truthful if for every agent,
if she believes at least one other agent will tell the truth, playing T pays her
strictly higher than playing a non-permutation strategy.
(Strictly) Focal A mechanism M is (strictly) focal if the truth-telling equilib-
rium maximizes the agent welfare among all equilibria (and any other non-
permutation equilibrium has strictly less agent welfare).
(Strictly) Strongly focal A mechanismM is (strictly) strongly focal if the truth-
telling strategy profile maximizes every agent’s expected payment among all
strategy profiles (and in any other non-permutation strategy profile, every
agent’s expected payment is strictly less).
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(Strictly) Truth-monotone A mechanismM is (strictly) truth-monotone if when
any truthful agent changes to play a non-truthful strategy s, no matter what
strategies other agents play, it decreases every agent’s expected payment (and
strictly decreases every other truthful agent’s expected payment if s is a non-
permutation strategy).
Section 2.5 will show that it is impossible to ask the truth-telling strategy profile
to be strictly better than other permutation strategy profiles when the mechanism is
detail free. Thus, the strictly truth-monotone is the optimal property for equilibrium
selection when the mechanism is detail free.
Theorem 33. Given a general setting (n,Σ), when MI is (strictly) information-
monotone (with respect to every agent’s prior), the Mutual Information Paradigm
MIP(MI) is (strictly) dominantly truthful, (strictly) truth-monotone.
Theorem 33 almost immediately follows from the data processing inequality of the
mutual information. The key observation in the proof is that applying any strategy
to the information is essentially data processing and thus erodes information.
Note that the Mutual Information Paradigm is not a mechanism since it requires
the mechanism to know the full joint distribution over all agents’ random private infor-
mation while agents only report (or even have access to) a realization / sample of the
random private information. Rather, if we design mechanisms such that the payment
in the mechanism is an unbiased estimator of the payment in Mutual Information Paradigm,
the designed mechanisms will obtain the desirable properties immediately according
to Theorem 33. In the future sections, we will see how to design such mechanisms in
both the multi-question and single-question settings.
Proof. For each agent i, for any strategy si she plays, comparing with the case she
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honestly reports Ψi, her expected information score is
∑
j 6=i
1
n− 1MI(Ψˆi; Ψˆj) =
∑
j 6=i
1
n− 1MI(si(Ψi); Ψˆj) ≤
∑
j 6=i
1
n− 1MI(Ψi; Ψˆj)
since MI is information-monotone. Thus, MIP(MI) is dominantly truthful when MI
is information-monotone.
For the strictness guarantee, we need to show when agent i believes at least one
agent tells the truth, for agent i, any non-permutation strategy will strictly decrease
her expected payment. Let’s assume that agent i believes agent j0 6= i plays T.
When MI is strictly information-monotone with respect to every agent’s prior, MI is
strictly information-monotone with respect to Qi(Ψi,Ψj0) as well. Then the inequality
of the above formula is strict if agent i plays a non-permutation strategy si since
MI(si(Ψi); Ψˆj0) = MI(si(Ψi); Ψj0) < MI(Ψi,Ψj0).
Thus, when MI is strictly information-monotone with respect to every agent’s
prior, MIP(MI) is strictly dominantly truthful.
Fixing other agents’ strategies except agent k, for i 6= k, agent i’s expected pay-
ment is
∑
j 6=i
1
n− 1MI(Ψˆi; Ψˆj) =
∑
j 6=i,k
1
n− 1MI(Ψˆi; Ψˆj) +
1
n− 1MI(Ψˆi; Ψˆk)
≤
∑
j 6=i,k
1
n− 1MI(Ψˆi; Ψˆj) +
1
n− 1MI(Ψˆi; Ψk).
Thus, agent i’s expected payment decreases when truthful agent k changes to play
a non-truthful strategy. For i = k, the dominantly truthful property already shows
agent i = k’s expected payment will decrease when truthful agent k changes to play
a non-truthful strategy. Therefore when MI is information-monotone, MIP(MI) is
truth-monotone.
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For the strictness guarantee, when MI is strictly information-monotone with re-
spect to every agent’s prior, if truthful agent k changes to play a non-permutation
strategy sk, then a truthful agent i’s expected payment will strictly decrease since
MI(Ψi; sk(Ψk)) < MI(Ψi; Ψk) if sk is a non-permutation strategy and MI is strictly
information-monotone.
Therefore, when MI is (strictly) information-monotone (with respect to every
agent’s prior), MIP(MI) is (strictly) truth-monotone.
Theorem 17 and Theorem 33 imply the following corollary.
Corollary 34. Given a general setting (n,Σ), when f is (strictly) convex (and ev-
ery agent’s prior is fine-grained), the Mutual Information Paradigm MIP(MIf) is
(strictly) dominantly truthful, (strictly) truth-monotone.
If we use Bregman mutual information instead of f -mutual information, the dom-
inantly truthful property will still be preserved.
Theorem 35. Given a general setting (n,Σ), when MI is quasi information-monotone,
the Mutual Information Paradigm MIP(MI) is dominantly truthful.
Proof. For each agent i, for any strategy si she plays, comparing with the case she
honestly reports Ψi, her expected information score is
∑
j 6=i
MI(Ψˆi; Ψˆj) =
∑
j 6=i
MI(si(Ψi); Ψˆj) ≤
∑
j 6=i
MI(Ψi; Ψˆj)
which is less than if she had reported truthfully since quasi information-monotone
MI has data processing inequality for the first entry.
Corollary 36. Given a general setting (n,Σ), the Mutual Information Paradigm
MIP(BMIPS) is dominantly truthful.
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2.4 Hierarchical mutual information paradigm (HMIP)
In this section, we will define the hierarchical information structure and provide
a mechanism design framework that helps design mechanisms which elicit the hierar-
chical information. Section 6.3 defines the information model; Section 2.4.2 defines
our mechanism framework; and Section 2.4.3 analyzes the framework. We will use the
peer grading process (Figure 2.1) as a running example to throughout this section.
Figure 2.1:
An illustration of the hierarchical information structure in the peer grad-
ing process.
2.4.1 Hierarchical information structure
There are n agents and one task. The agents have a finite set M of methods
to perform on the task based on the task’s attributes a ∈ A where a is a random
(possibly high dimensional) vector drawn from a distribution QA ∈ ∆A. Each method
m : A 7→ Σm maps the attributes a ∈ A to a signal m(a) from a finite set Σm. We
now introduce our peer grading example.
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10 evaluators are asked to judge one essay. The essay has eight possible attributes:
a = (qi, wj, lk), i, j, k ∈ {0, 1}. (q1, w0, l1) means the essay has (good quality, bad
writing, long length); (q0, w1, l0) means the essay has (bad quality, good writing,
short length). The distribution over the attributes space QA is defined as:
QA((q0, w0, ∗)) QA((q0, w1, ∗)) QA((q1, w0, ∗)) QA((q1, w1, ∗))
0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4
With this distribution, an essay of good quality usually has good writing as
well. Moreover, we assume the essay’s length is independent with the essay’s
quality and writing and an essay has long length with probability 0.5. That is:
QA((qi, wj, l1)) = QA((qi, wj, ∗)) ∗ 0.5, QA((qi, wj, l0)) = QA((qi, wj, ∗)) ∗ 0.5.
Each evaluator can perform three methods: ml(a), mw(a), and mq(a) which are,
respectively, (possibly noisy) signals about the essay’s length; writing style and
grammar; and quality. Σl = Σw = Σq = {,,/}.
We define ψmi (a) as agent i’s received output by performing m on attributes a.
Different agents may receive different signals by performing the same method on the
same attributes. But we assume the distribution is symmetric/homogeneous in the
sense that for any permutation pi : [n] 7→ [n], the probability that ψm1 (a) = σ1,
ψm2 (a) = σ2, ... ψ
m
n (a) = σn equals the probability that ψ
m
pi(1)(a) = σ1, ψ
m
pi(2)(a) = σ2,
... ψmpi(n)(a) = σn. We also assume that each agent performs methods independently
(see (2.8)). When the attributes a is drawn from a distribution QA, we can define
define Ψmi as agent i’s received output by performing m on a random attributes a
that is drawn from a distribution QA. Analogously, we define a random variable Ψ
m
−i
as an arbitrary agent j 6=’s received output by performing m on a random attributes
a that is drawn from a distribution QA. This definition is well-defined since we have
assumed the distribution is symmetric. We define prior Q as a joint distribution over
all {Ψmi }i∈[n],m∈M .
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Conditioning on the attributes of the essay a = (qi, wj, lk), i, j, k ∈ {0, 1}, for each
method m, each agent will receive ψmi (a) = , with probability pm,a independently
by performing m. That is, agents’ received signals by performing m is a Binomial
distribution B(n = 10, pm,a).
a
good quality essayb bad quality essay
Pr[mq(a) = ,] 70% 30%
This means conditioning on the essay having good quality, the distribution over
agents’ received quality signals by performing mq is Qmq ,(q1,∗,∗) = B(10, 0.7);
while conditioning on the essay having good quality, the distribution is
Qmq ,(q0,∗,∗) = B(10, 0.3). Similarly, we have
good writing essay bad writing essay
Pr[mw(a) = ,] 90% 10%
long essay short essay
Pr[ml(a) = ,] 100% 0%
Note that the cheap length signal is noiseless. We also assume that fixing the
attributes, every agent performs the different methods independently. That is,
when a = (q1, w1, l1)
Pr
(
Ψmli (a) = ,,Ψmwi (a) = ,,Ψmqi (a) = ,) = 0.7 ∗ 0.9 ∗ 1. (2.8)
With the above set up, the probability that agent i receives a , writing signal
and agent j receives a , quality signal will be
Pr[Ψmwi = ,,Ψmqj = ,] = 0.4∗0.1∗0.3+0.1∗0.3∗0.9+0.1∗0.7∗0.1+0.4∗0.7∗0.9 =
0.298.
aTo give a concrete example, we use the Binomial distribution here. In fact, we only need
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the distribution to be symmetric.
bThis means a = (q1, ∗, ∗)
We define a partial order on the methods. We say m1  m2—the level of m1 is
higher than that of m2—if method m1 cannot be performed without performing m2.
By m1  m2 we mean m1  m2 but m2 6 m1. Note that the partial order  is
transitive—m1  m2,m2  m3 ⇒ m1  m3. Each agent i needs effort hi(m) > 0 to
perform method m and when she spends effort hi(m) to perform m, the methods that
have lower levels than m are performed as well without additional effort. We assume,
as is natural, that hi(m) is an increasing function, that is, hi(m1) ≥ hi(m2) when
m1  m2. The higher the level of the method an agent performs, the more effort
she must invest. However, it may be the case that some agents (low cost agents)
can perform methods more economically than others (high cost agents). The partial
order definition is essentially our key assumption (Assumption 3).
mq  mw  ma. Among the 10 evaluators, there are 2 low cost evaluators
who need 1, 2, 5 effort to perform ml,mw,mq respectively. There are 8 high cost
evaluators who need 1, 4, 10 effort to perform ml,mw,mq respectively (Figure 2.1).
Based on the partial order definition, when an evaluator spends sufficient effort to
perform mq and obtains the quality signal, she also obtains the length and writing
signals without additional effort, which is natural in real life.
We assume agents share a hierarchical information structure and allow agents to
have different priors Q2. We will design mechanisms that incentivize agents to invest
efforts based on their costs and report honestly.
2.4.2 Mechanism design framework: HMIP
We start by introducing the formal definition of a mechanism.
2To ease the presentation of the example, in our peer grading example, we assume agents share
the same prior Q.
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Definition 37 (Mechanism). We define a mechanism M for n agents as a tuple
M := (R, S) where R is a set of all possible reports the mechanism allows, and
S : Rn 7→ Rn is a mapping from all agents’ reports to each agent’s payment.
We will extend the Mutual Information Paradigm to the Hierarchical Mutual
Information Paradigm that handles the hierarchical information structure. We can
naturally extend the Mutual Information Paradigm for Peer Prediction Mechanisms
to the hierarchical model by paying agent i
MIf (her information; {Ψm−i}m∈M)3.
This idea has a severe drawback: sometimes low level information has very large
correlation with the high level information. In this case, MIf (her information; {Ψm−i}m∈M)
will pay low level information nearly as much as high level information; and so agents
will lack incentive to perform high level methods.
To solve the above problem, we pay agents method by method. For each m, we
only value the “information gain” in the sense that we pay each agent i the mutual
information between her information and the method m’s information conditioning
on the information output by the methods are lower than m.
Formally, we chose a payment scale αm for each m and pay each agent i
∑
m
αmMI
f (her information; Ψm−i|{Ψm
′
−i}m′≺m).
In our actual paradigm, we hope to pay each agent i using the above payment
when the mechanism has access to all levels of honest information provided by other
agents.
3Recall that (Ψm1 ,Ψ
m
2 , ...,Ψ
m
n ) are the random signals agents receive by performing method m
on the same random attributes.
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In the peer grading example, the information about the writing style / grammar
may already have a very high correlation with the quality of the essay. With the
above concrete set up, we are ready to calculate the (conditional) Shannon mutual
information (Euler number base) between agent i’s received signals and agent j’s
received signals. For example, the 2× 2 entry is the mutual information between
agent i’s received length signal, writing signal by performing method mw and
agent j’s writing signal, conditioning on agent j’s length signal, which is 0.2259.
We calculate the values by first calculating the joint distribution over 6 random
variables—agent i’s length, writing, quality signals and agent j’s length, writing,
quality signals.
We show the values in the following table and defer the calculation to Appendix.
According to the information monotonicity, for each column, the values increase
from bottom to top.
agent i’s
MI(·; ·) agent j’s
length writing|length a quality | writing, length length, writing, qualityb
length, writing, quality 0.6931 0.2259 0.0115 0.9305
length, writing 0.6931 0.2218 0.0041 0.9190
length 0.6931 0 0 0.6931
Even though performing the quality method provides the information that has
the highest mutual information 0.9305 with other agents’ information, performing
writing method already outputs information that has 0.9190 ≈ 0.9305∗0.98 mutual
information with other agents’ information.
In this case, what we really value is the additional quality of information after
conditioning on the information of cheap signals like writing style / grammar. In
other words, we value the information about an essay which has a high quality
but is written carelessly (or low quality but impeccable prose).
Each agent, performing the writing method only has 0.0041 mutual information
with other agents’ quality signal conditioning on other agents’ writing and length
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signals while performing the quality method has 0.0115 ≈ 0.0041∗2.80 conditional
mutual information.
Looking ahead, we seek to pay each evaluator i by:
αlMI
f (her information; agent j’s length signal) (2.9)
+αwMI
f (her information; agent j’s writing signal|agent j’s length signal)
+αqMI
f (her information; agent j’s quality signal|agent j’s length & writing signal).
where αq is set to be rather larger than αl and αw.
ax|y means x conditioning on y.
bSince we use Shannon mutual information which satisfies chain rule, the last column is the
sum of the previous columns.
Hierarchical Mutual Information Paradigm (HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m)) We now
present our hierarchical Mutual Information Paradigm. We emphasize that this is
not a mechanism that can be run. Instead we engage in the wishful thinking that
the reports of the agents are distributions rather than draws from the distribution.
Of course, this will never happen. Nonetheless, we will show that using the HMIP
paradigm we can design actual mechanisms in both the multiple-task setting (Sec-
tion 6.5.1) and the single-task setting (Section 6.5.2).
The paradigm requires as parameters a payment scale αm ∈ R≥0 for each method
m.
Report For each agent i, for each m ∈ M , she is asked to optionally provide the
random signal Ψmi . We denote the set of methods whose outputs are reported
by agent i as Mi and the actual random signal she reports for each ` ∈ Mi as
Ψˆ`i .
Payment/Information Score We define M−i as
⋃
j 6=iMj. For each m ∈ M−i, we
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arbitrarily pick an agent j 6= i who provides method m’s output and denote his
report for method m’s output as Ψˆm−i.
Agent i is paid by her information score
∑
m∈M−i
αmMI
f ({Ψˆ`i}`∈Mi ; Ψˆm−i|{Ψˆm
′
−i}m′≺m,m′∈M−i)
We use the same techniques introduced in Section 2.3.1 to resolve “wishful think-
ing”.
2.4.3 Analysis of HMIP
For each agent i, we define her utility as her payment minus her effort.
Definition 38 (Strategy). We define the effort strategy of each agent i as a mapping
ei from her priors to a probability distribution over the methods she will perform. We
define the report strategy of each agent i as a mapping si from her received information
to a probability distribution over R.
Definition 39 (Amount of information in HMIP). In HMIP, for agent i, the amount
of information acquired with method mi is defined as
AOI(mi,HMIP(MI
f , {αm}m)) :=
∑
m∈M
αmMI
f ({Ψ`i}`mi ; Ψm−i|{Ψm
′
−i}m′≺m).
We have already give the example of the amount of information in (2.9). Later in
the proof of Theorem 43, we will see the amount of information is also the optimal
payment of agent i who performs method mi when HMIP has access to all levels of
honest signals reported by other agents.
An especially desirable strategy in HMIP is a prudent strategy. Informally, agents
play a prudent strategy if they (a) choose the method they perform to maximize their
51
utility—trading off the amount of information acquired with the effort it costs; (b)
report all received information honestly.
Definition 40 (Prudent strategy in HMIP). For each agent i, we say she plays a
prudent strategy in HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m) if she chooses to (a) perform method m∗i
such that
m∗i ∈ arg max
mi
(
AOI(mi,HMIP(MI
f , {αm}m))− hi(mi)
)
; and
(b) reports all received information honestly.
Definition 41 (Truthful strategy in HMIP). We say an agent plays truthful strategy
if she always reports her received information honestly.
A truthful strategy is a special report strategy. An agent can play any effort
strategy and truthful strategy simultaneously. If an agent invests no effort and reports
nothing or meaningless information, she is still considered as playing truthful strategy.
Mechanism design goals A mechanism M is (strictly) potent if for each agent,
when she believes everyone else plays their prudent strategy, she can (strictly) max-
imize her expected utility by playing a prudent strategy as well. A mechanism M
is dominant truthful if for each agent, regardless of other agents’ strategies, she can
maximize her expected utility by playing a pure effort strategy and truthful strategy.
The dominant truthful property is incomparable with the potent property. A
flat payment scheme is dominant truthful but not potent since investing no effort and
reporting nothing is also considered as a pure effort and truthful strategy. The potent
property is desirable since it encourages low cost agents to invest high level effort and
high cost agents to invest low level effort, and incentivizes them to report honestly
as well.
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In order to design potent mechanism, the coefficients {αm}m should be chosen
appropriately.
We say a method m is maximal if there does not exist m′ 6= m ∈ M such that
m′  m.
Definition 42 (potent coefficients for HMIP). Given the priors {Qm}m, we say the
coefficients {αm}m are potent for HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m) if given the coefficients {αm}m,
for every maximal m, there exists at least two agents whose prudent strategy in
HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m) is performing method m.
This is a weak requirement since we only need to set sufficiently high coefficients
to incentivize two low cost agents such that for each agent (including one of the low
cost agent), she will believe there exists a low cost agent who will be incentivized
to report all levels of information. Potent coefficients exist since we can always set
the coefficient of the highest level information sufficiently high and the coefficients
of other levels arbitrarily close to zero such that agents will be incentivized to invest
the highest level effort. We use our peer grading example to show how to set potent
coefficients. With our example, we will see we can always set the optimal potent
coefficients that minimize the mechanism’s cost by solving a linear programming.
In our example, the 2 low cost agents need efforts 1,2,5 to perform ml,mw,mq
respectively and 8 high cost agents need efforts 1,4,10. With the above set up, we
need αq ∗ 0.0115 +αw ∗ 0.2259 +αl ∗ 0.6931− 5 > max{αq ∗ 0.0041 +αw ∗ 0.2218 +
αl ∗ 0.6931− 2, αl ∗ 0.6931− 1, 0} to make the coefficients potent and we also want
to minimize the mechanism’s cost which is
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2 ∗ (αq ∗ 0.0115 + αw ∗ 0.2259 + αl ∗ 0.6931)
+ 8 ∗

vq := αq ∗ 0.0115 + αw ∗ 0.2259 + αl ∗ 0.6931 if vq − 10 ≥ vw − 4, vl − 1, 0
vw := αq ∗ 0.0041 + αw ∗ 0.2218 + αl ∗ 0.6931 if vw − 4 ≥ vq − 10, vl − 1, 0
vl := αl ∗ 0.6931 if vl − 1 ≥ vw − 4, vq − 10, 0
0 otherwise
After solving this linear programming, the optimal solution is around αl, αw, αq =
a, 0.5562, 423.8571 and the amount of information for performing ml,mw,and mq
are O(), 1.86+O(), and 5+O() respectively. The minimal cost is 2∗(5+O()) =
10 +O().
a is an arbitrarily small positive real number, we need  since we want agents will be incen-
tivized to report the length signal as well.
Theorem 43. Given a convex function f , HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m) is dominant truthful;
moreover, when {αm}m are potent for HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m), HMIP(MIf ,{αm}m) is
potent and dominant truthful.
The proof of the theorem uses the information monotonicity of MIf . The key
observation in the proof is that applying any strategy to the information is essentially
data processing and thus erodes information.
Proof for Theorem 43. In order to show the dominant truthful property, we will show
for each agent, fixing any other agents’ strategies, she can maximize her payment as
well as her utility by reporting her received information honestly. The information
monotonicity property of f -mutual information MIf (Fact 17) says any data process-
ing decreases the (conditional) mutual information. For each m ∈ M−i, fixing the
strategies other agents use, the distribution of Ψˆm−i, whose randomness comes from
random variable Ψm−i and the agents’ strategies, is also fixed. Any strategy (data
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processing) agent i applies to her received signals decreases
MIf (her received signals; Ψˆm−i|{Ψˆm
′
−i}m′≺m,m′∈M−i).
Thus, for agent i, honestly reporting her received signals maximizes her payment no
matter what strategies other agents use.
We start to show HMIP is potent when the coefficients are potent . When the
coefficients are potent , for every agent i, when she believes everyone else plays a
prudent strategy, she will believe for each m, there exists an agent j(m) 6= i who
reports {Ψ`j}`m
HMIP provides a framework to design information elicitation mechanisms for our
hierarchical information model. To apply the HMIP framework in different settings,
it remains to design the report requirement for agents and to use agents’ reports to
calculate the (conditional) mutual information without underlying distributions. We
apply HMIP in both the multi-task setting (Section 6.5.1) and the single-task setting
(Section 6.5.2).
2.5 Impossibility (Tightness) results
In this section, we will show an impossibility result that implies the optimality
of the information theoretical framework. We will see when the mechanism knows
no information about the prior profile, no non-trivial mechanism has truth-telling as
the unique “best” equilibrium. Thus, it is too much to ask for a mechanism where
truth-telling is paid strictly higher than any other non-truthful equilibrium. The best
we can hope is to construct a mechanism where truth-telling is paid strictly higher
than all non-truthful equilibria / strategy profiles excluding all permutation strategy
profiles (Definition 48) when the prior is symmetric; or all non-truthful equilibria /
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strategy profiles excluding all generalized permutation strategy profiles (Definition 49)
when the prior may be asymmetric. Because permutation strategies seem unnatural,
risky, and require the same amount of effort as truth-telling these are still strong
guarantees.
Actually we will show a much more general result in this section that is suffi-
ciently strong to imply the optimality of the framework. Recall that a mechanism
is strictly focal if truth-telling is strictly better than any other strategy profiles ex-
cluding generalized permutations strategy profiles. The results of this section imply
that no truthful detail free mechanism can pay truth-telling T strictly better than all
generalized permutations strategy profiles (Definition 49) no matter what definition
is the truth-telling strategy T.
We omit the prior in the definition of strategy before since we always fix the prior.
However, when proving the impossibility results, the prior is not fixed. Therefore, we
use the original definition of strategy in this section.
Definition 44 (Strategy). Given a mechanism M, we define the strategy of M for
setting (n,Σ) as a mapping s from (σ,Q) (private signal and prior) to a probability
distribution over R.
(Generalized) Permutation Strategy Profiles A permutation pi : Σ 7→ Σ can
be seen as a relabelling of private information. Given two lists of permutations pi =
(pi1, pi2, ..., pin), pi
′ = (pi′1, pi
′
2, ..., pi
′
n), we define the product of pi and pi
′ as
pi · pi′ := (pi1 · pi′1, pi2 · pi′2, ..., pin · pi′n)
where for every i, pii · pi′i is the group product of pii and pi′i such that pii · pi′i is a new
permutation with pii · pi′i(σ) = pii(pi′i(σ)) for any σ.
We also define pi−1 as (pi−11 , pi
−1
2 , ..., pi
−1
n ).
By abusing notation a little, we define pi : Q 7→ Q as a mapping from a prior Q
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to a generalized permuted prior pi(Q) where for any σ1, σ2, ..., σn ∈ Σ,
pi(Q)(σ1, σ2, ..., σn) = Q(pi
−1
1 (σ1), pi
−1
2 (σ2), ..., pi
−1
2 (σn))
where σi is the private signal of agent i. Notice that it follows that:
pi(Q)(pi1(σ1), pi2(σ2), ..., pi2(σn)) = Q(σ1, σ2, ..., σn).
Intuitively, pi(Q) is the same as Q after the signals are relabelled according to pi.
Definition 45 (Permutation List Operator on Strategy). For every agent i, given
her strategy is si and a permutation list pi, we define pi(si) as the strategy such that
pi(si)(σ,Q) = si(pii(σ),pi(Q)) for every private information σ and prior Q.
Definition 46 (Permutation List Operator on Strategy Profile). Given a permutation
list pi, for any strategy profile s, we define pi(s) as a strategy profile with pi(s) =
(pi(s1),pi(s2), ...,pi(sn)).
Note that pi−1piQ = Q which implies pi−1pi(s) = s.
We say (pi, pi, ..., pi) is a symmetric permutation list for any permutation pi. For con-
venience, we write (pi, pi, ..., pi)(Q) as pi(Q), (pi, pi, ..., pi)(s) as pi(s) and (pi, pi, ..., pi)(s)
as pi(s).
We define a permutation strategy (profile) and then give a generalized version of
this definition.
Definition 47 (Permutation Strategy ). We define a strategy s as a permutation
strategy if there exists a permutation pi such that s = pi(T).
Definition 48 (Permutation Strategy Profile ). We define a strategy profile s as a
permutation strategy profile if there exists a permutation pi such that s = pi(T).
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Definition 49 (Generalized Permutation Strategy Profile). We define a strategy
profile s as a generalized permutation strategy profile if there exists a permutation
list pi = (pi1, pi2, ..., pin) such that s = pi(T) = (pi1, pi2, ..., pin)(T).
2.5.1 Tightness proof
Definition 50. Given a prior profile Q = (Q1, Q2, ..., Qn) and a strategy profile
s = (s1, s2, ..., sn), and a mechanism M, for every agent i, we define
νMi (n,Σ,Q, s)
as agent i’s ex ante expected payment when agents play s and all agents’ private
information is drawn from Qi that is, from agent i’s viewpoint.
The impossibility result is stated as following:
Proposition 51. LetM be a mechanism that does not know the prior profile, then
for any strategy profile s, and any permutation list pi:
(1) s is a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium of M for any prior profile iff pi(s) is a
strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium of M for any prior profile.
(2) For every agent i, there exists a prior profile Q such that νMi (n,Σ,Q, s) ≤
νMi (n,Σ,Q,pi(s)).
Additionally, if the mechanism knows the prior is symmetric, the above results
only hold for any symmetric permutation list (pi, pi, ..., pi).
Proposition 51 implies
Corollary 52. Let M be a truthful mechanism, given truth-telling strategy T, when
M knows no information about the prior profile of agents, if there exists a permutation
list pi such that pi(T) 6= T, T cannot be always paid strictly higher than all generalized
permutation strategy profiles.
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Additionally, if the mechanism knows the prior is symmetric, the above results
only hold for any symmetric permutation list (pi, pi, ..., pi) and all permutation strategy
profiles.
We note that the requirement that there exists pi such that pi(T) 6= T only fails
for very trivial mechanisms where the truthfully reported strategy does not depend
on the signal an agent receives.
The key idea to prove this theorem is what we refer to as Indistinguishable
Scenarios:
Definition 53 (Scenario). We define a scenario for the setting (n,Σ) as a tuple (Q, s)
where Q is a prior profile, and s is a strategy profile.
Given mechanism M, for any scenario A = (QA, sA), we write νMiA (n,Σ, A) as
agent iA’s ex ante expected payment when agents play sA and all agents’ private
signals are drawn from QiA .
For two scenarios A = (QA, sA), B = (QB, sB) for setting (n,Σ), let σA :=
(σ1A , σ2A , ..., σnA) be agents (1A, 2A, ..., nA)’ private signals respectively in scenario
A, σB := (σ1B , σ2B , ..., σnB) be agents (1B, 2B, ..., nB)’ private signals respectively in
scenario B.
Definition 54 (Indistinguishable Scenarios). We say two scenarios A,B are indistin-
guishable A ≈ B if there is a coupling of the random variables σA and σB such that ∀i,
siA(σiA , QiA) = siB(σiB , QiB) and agent iA has the same belief about the world as agent
iB, in other words, for every j, Pr(rˆjA = rˆ|σiA ,QA, sA) = Pr(rˆjB = rˆ|σiB ,QB, sB)
∀rˆ ∈ R.
Now we will prove two properties of indistinguishable scenarios which are the main
tools in the proof for our impossibility result.
Observation 55. If (QA, sA) ≈ (QB, sB), then (i) for any mechanism M, sA is a
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(strict) equilibrium for the prior profile QA iff sB is a (strict) equilibrium for the prior
profile QB. (ii) ∀i, νMiA (n,Σ, A) = νMiB (n,Σ, B)
At a high level, (1) is true since any reported profile distribution that agent iA
can deviate to, agent iB can deviate to the same reported profile distribution as well
and obtain the same expected payment as agent iA.
Formally, we will prove the ⇒ direction in (1) by contradiction. The proof of the
other direction will be similar. Consider the coupling for σA, σB mentioned in the
definition of indistinguishable scenarios. For the sake of contradiction, assume there
exists i and σiB such that rˆ
′ 6= siB(σiB , QiA) is a best response for agent iB. Since agent
iA has the same belief about the world as agent iB and siA(σiA , QiA) = siB(σiB , QiB),
rˆ′ 6= siA(σiA , QiA) is a best response to agent iA as well, which is a contradiction to
the fact that sA is a strictly equilibrium for prior QiA .
To gain intuition about (2), consider the coupling again. For any i, agent iA
reports the same thing and has the same belief for the world as agent iB, which
implies the expected payoff of agent iA is the same as agent iB. (2) follows.
Now we are ready to prove our impossibility result:
of Proposition 51. We prove part (1) and part (2) separately.
Proof of Part (1) Let A := (Q, s), B := (pi−1(Q),pi(s)). We will show that for
any strategy profile s and any prior Q, A ≈ B. Based on our above observations,
part (1) immediately follows from that fact.
To prove (Q, s) ≈ (pi−1Q,pi(s)), for every i, we can couple (σ1, σ2, ..., σn) with
(pi−11 (σ1), pi
−1
2 (σ2), .., pi
−1
n (σn)) where (σ1, σ2, ..., σn) is drawn from Qi. It is a legal
coupling since
pi−1(Qi)(pi−11 (σ1), pi
−1
2 (σ2), .., pi
−1
n (σn)) = Qi(σ1, σ2, ..., σn)
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according to the definition of pi−1(Q).
Now we show this coupling satisfies the condition in Definition 54. First note that
pi(si)(pi
−1(σi),pi−1(Q)) = si(σi, Q). Now we begin to calculate Pr(rˆjB = rˆ|σiB ,QB, sB)
Pr(rˆjB = rˆ|σiB ,QB, sB) =Pr(rˆjB = rˆ|pi−1i (σiA),pi−1(QjA),pi(sA)) (2.10)
=
∑
σ′
pi−1(QiA)(σ
′|pi−1i (σiA))Pr(pi(sjA)(σ′,pi−1(QjA)) = rˆ)
(2.11)
=
∑
σ′
pi−1(QiA)(σ
′|pi−1i (σiA))Pr(sjA(pi(σ′),pipi−1(QjA)) = rˆ)
(2.12)
=
∑
σ′
QiA(pij(σ
′)|σiA)Pr(sjA(pi(σ′), QjA) = rˆ) (2.13)
=
∑
σ′′
QiA(σ
′′|σiA)Pr(sjA(σ′′, QiA) = rˆ) (2.14)
=Pr(rˆjA = rˆ|σiA ,QA, sA) (2.15)
From (2.10) to (2.11): To calculate the probability that agent jB has reported rˆ,
we should sum over all possible private signals agent jB has received and calculate the
probability agent jB reported rˆ conditioning on he received private signal σ
′, which
is determined by agent jB’s strategy pi(sjA).
By abusing notation a little bit, we can write pi(sjA)(σ
′,pi−1QjA) as a random vari-
able (it is actually a distribution) with Pr(pi(sjA)(σ
′,pi−1Q) = rˆ) = pi(sjA)(σ
′,pi−1Q)(rˆ).
According to above explanation, (2.11) follows.
(2.12) follows from the definition of permuted strategy.
(2.13) follows from the definition of permuted prior.
By replacing pij(σ
′) by σ′′, (2.14) follows.
We finished the proof A ≈ B, as previously argued, result (1) follows.
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Proof for Part (2) We will prove the second part by contradiction:
Fix permutation strategy profile pi. First notice that there exists a positive integer
Od such that pi
Od = I where I is the identity and agents play I means they tell the
truth.
Given any strategy profile s, for the sake of contradiction, we assume that there ex-
ists a mechanismM with unknown prior profile such that νMiA (n,Σ,Q, s) > νMiA (n,Σ,Q,pi(s))
for any prior Q. For positive integer k ∈ {0, 1, ..., Od}, we construct three scenarios:
Ak := (pi
k(Q), s), Ak+1 := (pi
k+1(Q), s), Bk := (pi
k(Q), pi(s))
and show for any k,
(I)νMiA (n,Σ, Ak) > ν
M
iA
(n,Σ, Bk),
(II) νMiA (n,Σ, Ak+1) = ν
M
iA
(n,Σ, Bk).
Combining (I), (II) and the fact A0 = AOd , we have
νMiA (n,Σ, A0) > ν
M
iA
(n,Σ, A1) > ...ν
M
iA
(n,Σ, AOd) = ν
M
iA
(n,Σ, A0)
which is a contradiction.
Now it is only left to show (I) and (II). Based on our assumption
νMiA (n,Σ,Q, s) > ν
M
iA
(n,Σ,Q,pi(s))
for any prior Q, we have (I). By the same proof we have in part (1), we have Ak+1 ≈
Bk, which implies (II) according to our above observations.
When the mechanism knows the prior is symmetric, the above proof is still valid
if we replace the permutation list pi by symmetric permutation list (pi, pi, ..., pi).
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CHAPTER III
Multi-task Signal Elicitation
3.1 Related work
Since Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser [45] introduced peer prediction, several
works follow the peer prediction framework and design information elicitation mech-
anisms without verification in different settings. In this section, we introduce these
works in multi-task, detail free, minimal setting.
Dasgupta and Ghosh [18] consider a setting where agents are asked to answer
multiple a priori similar binary choice questions. They propose a mechanism Md that
pays each agent the correlation between her answer and her peer’s answer, and show
each agent obtains the highest payment if everyone tells the truth. In retrospect, one
can see that our techniques are a recasting and generalization of those of Dasgupta
and Ghosh [18]. Kamble et al. [31] considers both homogeneous and heterogeneous
populations and design a mechanism such that truth-telling pays higher than non-
informative equilibria in the presence of a large number of a priori similar questions.
However, they leave the analysis of other non-truthful equilibria as a open question.
Agarwal et al. [2] consider a peer prediction mechanism for heterogeneous users.
63
3.1.1 Independent work
Like this thesis, Shnayder et al. [63] also extends Dasgupta and Ghosh [18]’s binary
signals mechanism to multiple signals setting. However, the two works differ both in
the specific mechanism and the technical tools employed.
Shnayder et al. [63] analyze how many questions are needed (whereas we simply
assume infinitely many questions). Like this thesis, they also analyze to what extent
truth-telling can pay strictly more than other equilibria. Additionally, they show
their mechanism does not need a large number of questions when “the signal corre-
lation structure” is known (that is the pair-wise correlation between the answers of
two questions). While the this thesis does not state such results, we note that the
techniques employed are sufficiently powerful to immediately extend to this interest-
ing special case (Section 3.5)—when the signal structure is known, it is possible to
construct an unbiased estimator for f -mutual information of the distribution, when
the total variation distance is used to define the f -mutual information. Both Shnay-
der et al. [63] and this thesis also show their results generalize Dasgupta and Ghosh
[18]’s.
Moreover, when the number of questions is large, f -mutual information mechanism
has truth-telling as a dominant strategy while Shnayder et al. [63] do not.
3.2 Background and assumptions
In this section, we introduce the multi-task setting which was previously studied
in Dasgupta and Ghosh [18] and Radanovic and Faltings [55]: n agents are assigned
the same T questions (multi-tasks). For each question k, each agent i receives a
private signal σki ∈ Σ about question k and is asked to report this signal. We call
this setting (n, T,Σ).
We see mechanisms in which agents are not required to report their forecasts for
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other agents’ answer (minimal), and were the mechanism does not know the agents’
priors (detail free). Agent i may lie and report σˆki 6= σki . Dasgupta and Ghosh [18]
give the following example for this setting: n workers are asked to check the quality
of m goods, they may receive signal “high quality” or “low quality”.
Agents have priors for questions. Each agent i believes agents’ private signals for
question k are chosen from a joint distribution Qki over Σ
n. Note that different agents
may have different priors for the same question.
In the multi-task setting, people usually make the following assumption:
Assumption 56 (A Priori Similar and Random Order). For any i, any k 6= k′,
Qki = Q
k′
i . Moreover, all tasks/questions appear in a random order, independently
drawn for each agent.
This means agents cannot distinguish each question without the private signal
they receive.
We define (Ψ1,Ψ2, ...,Ψn) as the joint random variables such that
Pr(Ψ1 = σ1,Ψ2 = σ2, ...,Ψn = σn)
equals the probability that agents 1, 2, .., n receive private signals (σ1, σ2, ..., σn) cor-
respondingly for a question which is picked uniformly at random.
We define (Ψˆ1, Ψˆ2, ..., Ψˆn) as the joint random variables such that
Pr(Ψˆ1 = σˆ1, Ψˆ2 = σˆ2, ..., Ψˆn = σˆn)
equals the probability that agents 1, 2, .., n reports signals (σˆ1, σˆ2, ..., σˆn) correspond-
ingly a question which is picked uniformly at random. Note that the joint distribution
over (Ψˆ1, Ψˆ2, ..., Ψˆn) depends on the strategies agents play.
For each question k, each agent i’s effort strategy is λki and conditioning on that she
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invests full effort ei, her strategy is s
k
i . We say agent i plays a consistent strategy
if for any k, k′, λki = λ
k′
i and s
k
i = s
k′
i .
Recall that in the minimal mechanism, the strategy corresponds to a transition
matrix. We define truth-telling T as the strategy where an agent truthfully reports
her private signal for every question. T corresponds to the identity matrix. We say
agent i plays a permutation strategy if there exists a permutation transition matrix
pi such that ski = pi,∀k. Note that a permutation strategy is a consistent strategy. We
define a consistent strategy profile as the strategy profile where all agents play a
consistent strategy.
With the a priori similar and random order assumption, Dasgupta and Ghosh [18]
make the following observation:
Observation 57. [18] When questions are a priori similar and agents receive ques-
tions in random order (Assumption 56), for every agent, using different strategies for
different questions is the same as a mixed consistent strategy.
With the above observation, it is sufficient to only consider the consistent strategy
profiles.
3.3 The f-mutual information mechanism and Bregman mu-
tual information mechanism
In this section, we give direct applications of the Mutual Information Paradigm in
multi-task setting—the f -mutual information mechanism and the Bregman mutual
information mechanism. Both of them are a family of mechanisms that can be applied
to the non-binary setting / multiple-choices questions which generalize the mechanism
in Dasgupta and Ghosh [18] that can only be applied to the binary setting / binary
choices questions. Moreover, both the f -mutual information mechanism and the
Bregman mutual information mechanism are dominantly truthful without considering
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efforts. Later we will map the mechanism in Dasgupta and Ghosh [18] to a special
case of the f -mutual information mechanism1.
f-mutual Information Mechanism MMIf Given a multi-task setting (n, T,Σ),
Report For each agent i, for each question k, she is asked to provide her private
signal σki . We denote the actual answer she reports as σˆ
k
i .
Payment/Information Score We arbitrarily pick a reference agent j 6= i. We
define a probability measure P over Σ × Σ such that T ∗ P (Ψˆi = σi; Ψˆj = σj)
equals the number of questions that agent i answers σi and agent j answers σj.
Agent i is paid by her information score
MIf (Ψˆi; Ψˆj)
where (Ψˆi; Ψˆj) draws from the probability measure P .
Theorem 58. Given a multi-task setting (n, T,Σ) with the a priori similar and ran-
dom order assumption (56), when the number of questions is infinite, f is (strictly)
convex (and every agent’s prior is fine-grained),MMIf is detail free, minimal, (strictly)
dominantly truthful, (strictly) truth-monotone.
Proof. We would like to show that the f -mutual information mechanism is the same
as MIP(MIf ). Then Corollary 34 directly implies the theorem.
Based on observation 57, it is sufficient to only consider the consistent strategy
profiles. When the number of questions is infinite and ∀i, agent i play the consistent
strategy,
P (Ψˆi = σi; Ψˆj = σj) = Pr(Ψˆi = σi; Ψˆj = σj).
1Although f -mutual information mechanism requires infinite number of question for clean anal-
ysis, with an extra positively correlated assumption for the information structure, we can construct
an unbiased estimator for f -mutual information of the distribution via only 3 questions (See Sec-
tion 3.1.1, Appendix 3.5).
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Therefore, with Assumption 56, when the number of questions is infinite, the f -
mutual information mechanism is the same as MIP(MIf ) in the multi-task setting.
Theorem 58 follows immediately from Corollary 34.
Bregman mutual Information Mechanism MBMIPS We can define Bregman
mutual information mechanism via the same definition of f -mutual information ex-
cept replacing MIf by BMIPS.
Corollary 36 directly imply the following theorem.
Theorem 59. Given a multi-task setting (n, T,Σ) with the a priori similar and ran-
dom order assumption (56), when the number of questions is infinite, without con-
sidering efforts, the Bregman mutual information mechanism MBMIPS is detail free,
minimal, dominantly truthful.
3.4 Mapping Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] into our informa-
tion theoretic framework
This section maps Dasgupta and Ghosh [18] to a special case of f -mutual in-
formation mechanism—TV D-mutual information mechanism MMItvd (restricted to
the binary choice setting)—using the specific f -divergence, total variation distance.
With the mapping, we can simplify the proof in Dasgupta and Ghosh [18] to a direct
application of our framework.
3.4.0.1 Prior Work
We first state the mechanism Md and the main theorem in Dasgupta and Ghosh
[18].
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Mechanism Md Agents are asked to report binary signals 0 or 1 for each question.
Uniformly randomly pick a reference agent j for agent i. We denote Ci as the set of
questions agent i answered. We denote Cj as the set of questions agent j answered.
We denote Ci,j as the set of questions both agent i and agent j answered. For
each question k ∈ Ci,j that both agent i and agent j answered, pick subsets A ⊆
Ci\k,B ⊆ Cj\(k ∪A) with |A| = |B| = d. If such A,B do not exist, agent i’s reward
is 0. Otherwise, we define ¯ˆσAi =
∑
l∈A σˆ
l
i
|A| to be agent i’s average answer for subset A,
¯ˆσBj =
∑
l∈B σˆ
l
j
|B| is agent j’s average answer for subset B.
Agent i’s reward for each question k ∈ Ci,j is
Rki,j := [σˆ
k
i ∗ σˆkj + (1− σˆki ) ∗ (1− σˆkj )]− [¯ˆσAi ∗ ¯ˆσBj + (1− ¯ˆσAi ) ∗ (1− ¯ˆσBj )]
By simple calculations, essentially agent i’s reward for each question k ∈ Ci,j is
the correlation between her answer and agent j’s answer—E[ΨˆiΨˆj]− E[Ψˆi]E[Ψˆj].
Dasgupta and Ghosh [18] also make an additional assumption:
Assumption 60 (Positively Correlated). Each question k has a unknown ground
truth ak and for every agent i, with probability greater or equal to 1
2
, agent i receives
private signal ak.
We succinctly interpret the main results of Dasgupta and Ghosh [18] as well as
the results implied by the main results into the following theorem.
Theorem 61. [18] Given an multi-question setting (n, T,Σ) with the a priori similar
and random order assumption (56), the positively correlated assumption (89), when
T ≥ d+ 1, Md is truthful, and strongly focal.
The parameter d can be any positive integer. Larger d will make the mecha-
nism more robust. We will see Md equals a special case of the f -mutual information
mechanism only if agent i, j’s reported answers are positively correlated. Thus, with-
out considering efforts, Md is not dominantly truthful while the f -mutual information
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mechanism is. Although Md only requires a small number of questions, it only applies
to binary choice questions, makes an extra assumption, and obtains weaker properties
than the f -mutual information mechanism.
3.4.0.2 Using our information theoretic framework to analyze Dasgupta
and Ghosh [18]
Proof Outline We will first connect the expected payment in Md with a specific f -
mutual information—MI tvd. Then the result follows from the information monotone
property of f -mutual information. Formally, we use the following claim to show the
connection between mechanism Md and f -mutual information mechanism.
Claim 62. [Md ≈ MMItvd ] With a priori similar and random order assumption, in
Md, for every pairs i, j, for every reward question k,
E[Rki,j] =
1
2
MI tvd(Ψi; Ψj)
if both of them play T;
E[Rki,j] ≤
1
2
MI tvd(Ψˆi; Ψˆj)
if one of them does not play T.
Claim 141 shows the connection between Md and MMItvd . The only difference
between Md and MMItvd is that for agents i, j, when one of the agent does not play
T, the correlation between their reports is upper-bounded by rather than equal to the
tvd-mutual information. Therefore, in Md, truth-telling is not a dominant strategy.
But the information-monotone property of MI tvd still guarantees the informative
truthful and strongly focal property of Md.
Proof of Theorem 61. We start to show the truthful property of Md.
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For every agent i, given that everyone else plays T, agent i’s expected payment
for each reward question is
E[Rki,j] ≤
1
2
MI tvd(Ψˆi; Ψj) ≤ 1
2
MI tvd(Ψi; Ψj)
since MI tvd is information-monotone. Thus, Md is truthful. Moreover,
E[Rki,j] ≤
1
2
MI tvd(Ψˆi; Ψˆj) ≤ 1
2
MI tvd(Ψi; Ψj)
Thus, the truth-telling strategy profile maximizes every agent’s expected payment
among all strategy profiles which implies Md is strongly focal.
Proof for Claim 141 We first show that
E[Rki,j] =
1
2
MI tvd(Ψi; Ψj)
if both of agents i, j play T.
Note that by simple calculations, Assumption 89 implies that for any σ ∈ {0, 1},
Pr[Ψj = σ|Ψi = σ] ≥ Pr[Ψj = σ],
Pr[Ψj = σ|Ψi = σ′] ≤ Pr[Ψj = σ],∀σ′ 6= σ.
When both of agents i, j play T,
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MI tvd(Ψi; Ψj) =
1
2
∑
σ,σ′
|Pr[Ψi = σ,Ψj = σ′]− Pr[Ψi = σ] Pr[Ψj = σ′]|
(Definition of MI tvd)
=
1
2
∑
σ,σ′
1(σ = σ′) (Pr[Ψi = σ,Ψj = σ′]− Pr[Ψi = σ] Pr[Ψj = σ′])
+ 1(σ 6= σ′) (Pr[Ψi = σ] Pr[Ψj = σ′]− Pr[Ψi = σ,Ψj = σ′])
(Assumption 89)
=
∑
σ
(Pr[Ψi = σ,Ψj = σ]− Pr[Ψi = σ] Pr[Ψj = σ])
(Combining like terms, Pr[E]− Pr[¬E] = 2 Pr[E]− 1)
= E[Rki,j] (Definition of Rki,j in Md)
The proof of
E[Rki,j] ≤
1
2
MI tvd(Ψˆi; Ψˆj)
is similar to above proof. We only need to replace Ψi by Ψˆi and change the second
equation to greater than, that is,
1
2
∑
σ,σ′
|Pr[Ψˆi = σ, Ψˆj = σ′]− Pr[Ψˆi = σ] Pr[Ψˆj = σ′]|
≥ 1
2
∑
σ,σ′
1(σ = σ′)
(
Pr[Ψˆi = σ, Ψˆj = σ
′]− Pr[Ψˆi = σ] Pr[Ψˆj = σ′]
)
+ 1(σ 6= σ′)
(
Pr[Ψˆi = σ] Pr[Ψˆj = σ
′]− Pr[Ψˆi = σ, Ψˆj = σ′]
)
. (
∑ |x| ≥∑x)
We have finished the proof of Claim 141.
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3.5 Independent work analysis
The analysis in Section 3.4 is not restricted to Dasgupta and Ghosh [18]. Replacing
the Rki,j defined in Md by the R
k
i,j defined in the non-binary extension of Md in the
independent work of Shnayder et al. [63] will not change the analysis. Thus, Shnayder
et al. [63] is also a special case of f -mutual information mechanism—TVD-mutual
information mechanism MMItvd in the non-binary settings.
CA applies to a more general setting than the positively correlated setting (As-
sumption 89), in the sense that CA assumes the knowledge of signal structure but the
signal structure does not need to be positively correlated. Here we give the analysis
for CA in the special setting where the signal structure is positively correlated. The
analysis for other settings is similar.
The Correlated Agreement (CA) Mechanism [63] In the special setting where
the signal structure is positively correlated, the non-binary extension of Md—the CA
mechanism—can be reinterpreted as Md by defining
Rki,j := 1(σˆ
k
i = σˆ
k
j )− 1(σˆ`Ai = σˆ`Bj )
where `A is picked from subset A uniformly at random and `B is picked from subset
B uniformly at random.
With this new definition of Rki,j, Claim 141 is still valid since the proof of Claim 141
that uses the definition of Rki,j—
∑
σ
(Pr[Ψi = σ,Ψj = σ]− Pr[Ψi = σ] Pr[Ψj = σ])
= E[Rki,j] (Definition of Rki,j in Md)
—is still valid for this new definition of Rki,j. Therefore, Theorem 61 is still valid when
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we replace Md by the CA mechanism which means we can also use our information
theoretic framework to analyze Shnayder et al. [63].
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CHAPTER IV
Single-task Signal Elicitation
4.1 Related work
After Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser [45] introducing peer prediction, a host of
results (see, e.g., [51, 67, 53, 55, 74, 59, 21, 71, 70, 69, 28, 29, 36]) have followed.
In this section, we will introduce them and classifies them into several categories
according to the properties they (do not) have.
(1) Single-task, detail free, focal (not small group): Bayesian Truth Serum
(BTS) [51] first successfully weakened the known common prior assumption (detail
free) and addresses the equilibrium multiplicity issue (focal). Prelec [51] also provides
an important framework for mechanisms without known common prior. BTS requires
the agents report—in addition to their reported signal—a forecast (prediction) of the
other agents’ reported signals, and uses this predictions in lieu of the common prior.
BTS incentives agents to report accurate forecasts by rewarding forecasts that have
the ability to predict the other agents’ reported signal. However, BTS has two weak-
ness: (1) BTS requires that the number of agents goes to infinity (or is large enough
in a modified version) since the mechanism needs agents to believe it has access to
the true distribution of from which agents’ signals are drawn. (2) The analysis of
non-truthful equilibria provided in [51] requires that the number of agents goes to
infinity and only proves that truth-telling has total expected payment at least as high
75
as other equilibrium. Specifically, it does not rule out the existence of many other
equilibrium which are all paid the same as the truth-telling equilibrium. Logarithmic
Peer Truth Serum (PTS) [54] extends BTS to a slightly different setting involving
sensors, but still requires a large number of agents.
(2) Single-task, small group, detail free (not focal): Several mechanisms [67, 53,
55, 59, 71, 70, 69] are based on the BTS framework and address the first weakness
of BTS. Robust Bayesian Truth Serum (RBTS) [67] is a mechanism which can only
be applied to binary signals. Multi-Valued RBTS [53] and Multi-Signal Shadowing
Method (Multi-Signal SM) [68] can be applied to non-binary signals while they require
an additional assumption that an agent will think the probability that other agents
receive signal σ higher if he himself also receives σ. Divergence-based BTS [55] can
be applied to non-binary signals and does not require additional assumptions on the
prior. All of those works do not address the equilibrium multiplicity issue, but do
work for a small number of agents. Minimal Truth Serum (MTS) [59] is a mechanism
where agents have the option to report or not report their predictions, and also
lacks analysis of non-truthful equilibria. MTS uses a typical zero-sum technique such
that all equilibria are paid equally. In contrast, we show that in our Disagreement
Mechanism any equilibrium that is even close to paying more than the truth-telling
equilibrium must be close to a small set of permutation equilibrium. The Divergence
based BTS only requires the common prior assumption to be truthful. Because of its
generality, we use it as a building block in our Disagreement Mechanism. However,
the Divergence based BTS contains effortless equilibrium that pay significantly more
than truth-telling. Moreover, analysing the set of equilibria in Divergence-based BTS
is very complicated and becomes a main technical obstacle in this chapter. Thus,
while the above work addresses the first weakness of BTS, it exacerbates the second.
(3) Single-task, small group, focal (not detail free): Jurca and Faltings [28, 29] use
algorithmic mechanism design to build their own peer prediction style mechanism
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where truth-telling is paid strictly better than non-truthful pure strategies but leaves
the analysis of mixed strategies as a open question. Kong, Schoenebeck, and Ligett
[36] modify the peer prediction mechanism such that truth-telling is paid strictly
better than any other non-truthful equilibrium. Additionally, they optimize the cost
their mechanism needs over a natural space. The assumption that the mechanism
knows the prior, allows these mechanisms to only require that agent’s report a signal
(there is no prediction report). However, unlike the current work, the mechanism still
needs to know the prior and the analysis only works for the case of binary signals.
(4) Different Settings: We have introduced multi-task setting in the previous chap-
ter. In addition to the multi-task setting, there are many other works in the settings
that are different from our results. For example, Cai, Daskalakis, and Papadimitriou
[11] and Liu and Chen [41] consider the machine learning setting. Kamble et al. [31],
and Agarwal et al. [2] consider the heterogeneous participants setting in the multi-
task setting. Mandal et al. [42] consider the heterogeneous tasks setting. Zhang and
Chen [74] consider a sequential game. Faltings et al. [21] consider a setting where
they have an estimation of the public distribution of previous answers on other a
priori similar questions.
4.2 Preliminary and background
We will defer the proofs for most claims to Appendix A.1.4.
4.2.1 Prior definitions and assumptions
We consider a setting with n agents and a set of signals Σ, and define a setting as a
tuple (n,Σ). Each agent i has a private signal σi ∈ Σ chosen from a joint distribution
Q over Σn called the prior. Given a prior Q, for σ ∈ Σ, let qi(σ) = PrQ[σi = σ] be the
a priori probability that agent i receives signal σ. Let qj,i(σ
′|σ) = PrQ[σj = σ′|σi = σ]
be the probability that agent j receives signal σ given that agent i received signal σ′.
77
We say that a prior Q over Σ is symmetric if for all σ, σ′ ∈ Σ and for all pairs of
agents i 6= j and i′ 6= j′ we have qi(σ) = qi′(σ) and qi,j(σ|σ′) = qi′,j′(σ|σ′). That is,
the first two moments of the prior do not depend on the agent identities.
Assumption 63 (Symmetric Prior). We assume throughout that the agents’ signals
σ are drawn from some joint symmetric prior Q.
Because we will assume that the prior is symmetric, we denote qi(σ) by q(σ) and
qi,j(σ|σ′) (where i 6= j) by q(σ|σ′). We also define qσ = q(·|σ).
Assumption 64 (Non-zero Prior). We assume that for any σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, q(σ) >
0, q(σ|σ′) > 0.
Assumption 65 (Informative Prior). We assume if agents have different private
signals, they will have different expectations for the fraction of at least one signal.
That is for any σ 6= σ′, there exists σ′′ such that q(σ′′|σ) 6= q(σ′′|σ′).
The following assumption conceptually states that one state is not just a more
likely version of another state, and can be thought of as a weaker version of assuming
q(σ|·) are linearly independent.
Assumption 66 (Fine-grained Prior). We assume that for any σ 6= σ′ ∈ Σ, there
exists σ′′, σ′′′ such that
q(σ|σ′′)
q(σ′|σ′′) 6=
q(σ|σ′′′)
q(σ′|σ′′′)
If this assumption does not hold, then in some since σ and σ′ are the same signal.
We can create a new prior by replacing σ and σ′ with a new signal σ0 := σ or σ′, and
not lose any information, in the sense that we can still recover the original prior. To
see this, we first define p = q(σ)
q(σ′) , and note that for all σ
′′, p = q(σ|σ
′′)
q(σ′|σ′′) . Whenever σ0
is drawn in the new prior, we simply replace it by σ with probability p and σ′ with
probability 1− p. This produces the same prior for agents that have no information
or other their signal’s information.
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We illustrate this in the following example:
Example 67. Q =

q(s1|s1) q(s1|s2) q(s1|s3)
q(s2|s1) q(s2|s2) q(s2|s3)
q(s3|s1) q(s3|s2) q(s3|s3)
 =

0.1 0.2 0.3
0.2 0.4 0.6
0.7 0.4 0.1
 is not a
fine-grained prior since
q(s1|s1)
q(s2|s1) =
q(s1|s2)
q(s2|s2) =
q(s1|s3)
q(s2|s3)
Note that in this example, even we combine s1 and s2 to be a single signal s0
which is defined as s0 := s1 or s2, we do not lose any information: if an agent knows
that the fraction of agents who report s0 is x, we know his belief for the expectation
of the fraction of s1 must be
x
3
no matter what private signal he receives.
We only require the fine-grained prior assumption to show that truth-telling is
strictly “better” than any other symmetric equilibrium (excluding permutation equi-
librium). In the above example where the prior is not fine-grained, if agents always
report s1 when they receive s1 or s2, this does not lose information (is not “worse”)
comparing with the case agents always tell the truth. So we cannot say truth-telling is
strictly “better” than any other equilibrium when the prior is not fine-grained. How-
ever, this assumption is not necessary to show that truth-telling is a strict Bayesian
equilibrium of our mechanism, nor to show that the agent welfare of truth-telling is
at least as high as other symmetric equilibrium.
Assumption 68 (Ensemble Prior). Although we talk of a single prior, in fact we
have an ensemble Q = {Qn}n∈N,n≥3 of priors; one for each possible number of agents
greater than 3. We assume that all Qn are over the same signal set Σ have have
identical q(σ) and q(σ′|σ).
When the number of agents n changes, the joint prior actually changes as well,
but the first two moments of the prior are fixed. This allows us to make meaningful
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statements about n going to infinity.
We sometimes will denote the class of priors that satisfy all five of these assump-
tions as SNIFE priors.
4.2.2 Game setting and equilibrium concepts
Given a setting (n,Σ) with prior Q, we consider a game in which each agent i is
asked to report his private signal σi ∈ Σ and his prediction pi ∈ ∆Σ, a distribution
over Σ, where pi = qσi . For any σ ∈ Σ, pi(σ) is agent i’s (reported) expectation for
the fraction of other agents who has received σ given he has received σi. However,
agents may not tell the truth. We denote Σ ×∆Σ by R. We define a report profile
of agent i as ri = (σˆi, pˆi) ∈ R where σˆi is agent i’s reported signal and pˆi is agent i’s
reported prediction.
We would like to encourage truth-telling, namely that agent i reports σˆi = σi, pˆi =
qσi . To this end, agent i will receive some payment νi(σˆi, pˆi, σˆ−i, pˆ−i) from our mech-
anism.
Now we consider the strategy an agent plays in the game.
Definition 69 (Strategy). Given a mechanism M, we define the strategy of M for
setting (n,Σ) as a mapping s from (σ,Q) (the signal and common prior received) to
a probability distribution over R (the reported signal, prediction pair).
That is, for each possible signal σ and prior Q an receives, he will choose a signal,
prediction pair to report from some distribution s(σ,Q). We define a strategy profile
s as a profile of all agents’ strategies {s1, s2, ...sn} and we say agents play s if for any
i, agent i plays strategy si. We say a strategy profile is symmetric if each agent
plays the same strategy.
We define the agent welfare of a strategy profile s and a mechanism M for
setting (n,Σ) with prior Q to be the expectation of the sum of payments to each
agent and we write it as AWM(n,Σ, Q, s). Note that for symmetric strategy profile,
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the agent welfare is proportional to each agent’s expected payment since everyone
plays the same strategy.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium consists of a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) such
that no player wihes to change her strategy, given the strategies of the other players
and the information contained in the prior and her signal. Formally,
Definition 70 (Bayesian Nash equilibrium). Given a family of priors Q, a strategy
profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if for any prior
Q ∈ Q, for any i, and for any s′i
E(σˆ′i,pˆ′i)←s′i(σi,Q),(σˆ−i,pˆ−i)←s−i(σ−i,Q)[νi(σˆ
′
i, pˆ
′
i, σˆ−i, pˆ−i)]
≤E(σˆi,pˆi)←si(σi,Q),(σˆ−i,pˆ−i)←s−i(σ−i,Q)[νi(σˆi, pˆi, σˆ−i, pˆ−i)]
In the case where, for some i, the equality holds if and only if s′i = si, we say this
strategy profile is a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium for prior family Q.
Remark 71 (Equilibrium for a Given Prior). Note that we assume agents have a
common prior Q, so often for convenience, we will implicitly assume Q is fixed, at
which point a strategy is a mapping from Σ to a probability distribution over R. We
will call such a strategy profile s an equilibrium for prior Q if it satisfies the condition
of Bayesian Nash equilibrium when Q is fixed.
Assuming a fixed prior Q, for any strategy profile s = (s1, s2, ..., sn), we will
represent the marginal distribution of an agent i’s strategy for her signal report as
a matrix θi where θi(σˆ, σ) is the probability that agent will report signal σˆ when his
private signal is σ. Note that θi is a transition matrix, that is the sum of every
column is 1. We call θi the signal strategy of agent i. We also call (θ1, θ2, ..., θn) the
signal strategy of s. We define the average signal strategy of s as θ¯n =
∑
i θi
n
. The
following claim relates this average signal strategy to the distribution of all reported
signals:
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Claim 72. Assume that the distribution over all agents’ private signals is ω ∈ ∆Σ,
the distribution over all agents’ reported signals will be θ¯nω.
Note that the mechanism actually collects agents’ reported signals, so in order
to estimate the distribution over their private signals, we hope θ¯n is (close to) the
identity matrix I.
4.2.3 Special strategy profiles
In this section, we will introduce three special types of strategy profiles that we
call truth-telling, best prediction strategy profiles, and permutation strategy profiles.
Definition 73 (Truth-telling). We define a strategy profile as truth-telling if for all
i, and for all Q, s(σi, Q) = (σi,qσi) with probability 1. We write the truth-telling
strategy profile as T.
For every agent i, let σˆ be a randomly chosen agent’s reported signal, when other
agents tell the truth, the distribution of σˆ is qσi . However, if agents play strategy s,
for agent i, the distribution of σˆ depends on not only his prior Q but also the strategy
s. We define the distribution of σˆ for agent i as qsσi .
Claim 74.
qsσi = θ−iqσi
where (θ1, θ2, ..., θn) is s’s signal strategy and θ−i =
∑
j 6=i θj
n−1 .
When agents play strategy s, to best predict other agents’ reported signal, agent
i should be report qsσi rather than qσi . This motivates our definition for best pre-
diction strategy profile which is a strategy profile where every agent i gives his “best
prediction” qsσi .
Definition 75 (Best Prediction Strategy Profile). We say a strategy profile s is a best
prediction strategy profile if for every agent i, he reports qsσi . We call a best strategy
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prediction strategy profile s a symmetric best strategy prediction strategy profile if
θi = θ for every i.
Now we begin to introduce the definition of a permutation strategy profile. Intu-
itively, if agents “collude” to relabel the signals and then tell the truth with relabeled
signals, they actually play what we will call permutation strategy profile.
Given a permutation pi : Σ 7→ Σ (which is actually a relabeling of signals), by
abusing notation a little bit, we define pi : Q 7→ Q as a mapping from a prior Q to a
permuted prior pi(Q) where for any σ1, σ2, ..., σn ∈ Σ,
Prpi(Q)(σ1, σ2, ..., σn) = PrQ(pi
−1(σ1), pi−1(σ2), ..., pi−1(σn))
where σi is the private signal of agent i. Notice that it follows that:
Prpi(Q)(pi(σ1), pi(σ2), ..., pi(σn)) = PrQ(σ1, σ2, ..., σn).
Intuitively, pi(Q) is the same with Q when the signals are relabeled according to pi.
For any strategy s, we define pi(s) as the strategy such that pi(s)(σ,Q) = s(pi(σ), pi(Q)).
Definition 76 (Permuted Strategy Profile). For any strategy profile s, we define pi(s)
as a strategy profile with pi(s) = (pi(s1), pi(s2), ..., pi(sn)).
Note that pi−1piQ = Q which implies pi−1pi(s) = s.
Definition 77 (Permutation Strategy Profile). We define a strategy profile s as a
permutation strategy profile if there exists a permutation pi : Σ → Σ such that
s = pi(T).
Note that if agents play pi(T), then the signal strategy of each agent is pi, and so
the distribution of report profiles is θ¯nω = piω.
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There exists a natural bijection between permutation strategy profiles and |Σ|×|Σ|
permutation matrices. If the permutation strategy profile is constructed by permu-
tation pi, the only non-zero entries of the corresponding permutation matrix θpi are
θpi(pi(σ), σ) = 1 for all σ ∈ Σ. For a transition matrix θ, if θ is not a permutation
matrix, we would like to give a definition for when a transition matrix θ is what we
call τ -close to a permutation given any τ > 0. This definition is motivated by the
following claim and will be described after it.
Claim 78. For any transition matrix θm×m where the sum of every column is 1, θ is
a permutation matrix iff for any row of θ, there at most one non-zero entry.
Now we give a definition for τ -close.
Definition 79 (τ -close). We say a signal strategy θ is τ -close to a permutation if for
any row of θ, there is at most one entry that is greater than τ .
Thus a permutation stragety is 0-close to a permutation. For any stategy profile
s, if the average signal strategy of s is τ -close to a permutation matrix, we say s is
τ -close to a permutation profile as well.
Recall that f -divergence([4]) is used to measuring the “difference” between dis-
tributions. One important property of the f -divergence family is information mono-
tonicity: for any two distributions, if we post-process each distribution in the same
way, the two distributions will become “closer” because of the information loses.
The information monotonicity of f -divergence implies that:
Fact 80. Given SNIFE prior Q, for any θ that is not a permutation, there exists two
private signals σ1 6= σ2 such that Df (θqσ1 , θqσ2) < Df (qσ1 ,qσ2)
Proof. First notice that when θ is not a permutation, based on Claim 78, there exists
a row of θ such that the row has at least two positive entries, in other words, there
exists σ, σ′, σ′′ such that θ(σ, σ′), θ(σ, σ′′) > 0. Based on the non-zero and fine-grained
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assumptions of Q, there exists σ1 6= σ2 such that
θ(σ, σ′)p(σ′), θ(σ, σ′′)p(σ′′) > 0 and p(σ
′)
p(σ′′) 6= q(σ
′)
q(σ′′) where p = qσ1 ,q = qσ2 . When
θ(σ, σ′)p(σ′), θ(σ, σ′′)p(σ′′) > 0, we have θ(σ, ·)p > 0. By Lemma 6, we have
Df (θqσ1 , θqσ2) < Df (qσ1 ,qσ2)
4.2.4 Mechanism design tools
Hellinger-divergence and strictly proper scoring rules are two of the main tools
we will use in our mechanism design. Starting with [45], proper scoring rules have
become a common ingredient in mechanisms for unverifiable information elicitation
(e.g. [51, 67]). Hellinger-divergence is a type of f -divergence ([4]). F -divergence
is always used in measuring the “difference” between distributions. One important
property of f -divergence is information monotonicity: For any two distributions,
if we use the same way to post-process each distribution, the two distributions will
become “closer” because of potential information loses. The reason we pick Hellinger-
divergence rather than other f -divergence is that we need square root triangle
inequality of Hellinger-divergence (which we will describe later).
Hellinger-divergence Hellinger-divergence is a special case of f -divergence.
D∗ : ∆Σ×∆Σ → R is a non-symmetric measure of difference between distribution
p ∈ ∆Σ and distribution q ∈ ∆Σ and is defined to be
D∗(p,q) =
∑
σ
(
√
p(σ)−
√
q(σ))2.
We highlight two important properties of Hellinger-divergence: one is Information
Monotonicity which other f -divergences also have; another is square root triangle
inequality.
(1) Information Monotonicity: For any p,q, and transition matrix θ ∈ R|Σ|×|Σ|
where θ(σ, σ′) is the probability that we map σ′ to σ, we have D∗(p,q) ≥ D∗(θp, θq).
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When θ is a permutation, D∗(p,q) = D∗(θp, θq).
(2) Square root triangle inequality: |√D∗(p,q)−√D∗(p,q′)| <√D∗(q′,q)
for any p,q,q′
Proper scoring rules are a key tool in the design of mechanisms [51] in the BTS
framework. In such mechanism, agents are asked to report their private information
and forecast for other agents and paid based on a “prediction score” and an “infor-
mation score”. The prediction score is usually calculated by a proper scoring rule
and the information score is customized.
Prediction Score via Proper Scoring Rules Agents will receive a prediction
score based on how well their prediction predicts a randomly chosen agent’s reported
signal. Say an agent i reports prediction pˆi then a random agent, call him agent j, is
chosen, agent i will receive a prediction score PS(σˆj, pˆi) where PS is a proper scoring
rule. Note that any proper scoring rule works. PS(σˆj, pˆi) is maximized if and only
if agent i’s reported prediction pˆi is his expected likelihood for σˆj. Agent i cannot
pretend to have a different expected likelihood without reducing his expectation for
his prediction score.
4.3 The Disagreement mechanism
4.3.1 Buiding block—Divergence-Based BTS
In this section, we introduce a building block of our Disagreement Mechanism—
Divergence-Based BTS [55]. It follows the BTS framework and still pays agents an
“information score” and a “prediction score”. The main idea of Divergence-Based
BTS is that the mechanism punishes the Inconsistency of agents—the “difference”
between two random agents’ predictions when they report the same signal. The
common prior assumption tells us agents cannot agree to disagree. That is, if two
agents receive the same private information, they must have the same “belief” about
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the world. In our setting, if agents tell the truth, whenever two agents report the
same signal, they will report the same prediction as well. Thus, everyone telling the
truth is a consistent strategy. Since Divergence-Based BTS punishes inconsistency,
the truth-telling strategy will be encouraged in Divergence-Based BTS.
Divergence-Based BTS [55] M: Let α, β > 0 be parameters and let PS be a
strictly proper scoring rule, then we define M(α, β, PS)1 as follows:
1. Each agent i reports a signal and a prediction ri = (σˆi, pˆi)
2. For each agent i and agent j, we define a prediction score that depends on agent
i’s prediction and agent j’s report signal
scoreP (ri, rj) = PS(σˆj, pˆi),
and an information score
scoreI(ri, rj) =

0 σˆi 6= σˆj
−(PS(pˆj, pˆj)− PS(pˆj, pˆi)) σˆi = σˆj
3. Each agent i is matched with a random agent j. The payment for agent i is
paymentM(α,β,PS)(i, r) = αscoreP (ri, rj) + βscoreI(ri, rj).
Theorem 81. [55]
For any α, β > 0 and any strictly proper scoring rule PS, M(α, β, PS) has truth-
telling as a strict Bayesian-Nash equilibrium whenever the prior Q is informative and
symmetric.
1This mechanism is a little bit different with Divergence-Based BTS mechanism [55]. Divergence-
Based BTS uses specific proper scoring rule (log scoring rule). But it is easy to see using general
proper scoring rules still keeps the strictly truthful property of Divergence-Based BTS.
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We introduce the proof in appendix (Section A.1.5).
Main Drawback of Divergence-Based BTS The main drawback is that there
may be many other equilibria with inconsistency score 0. Agents can simply report the
a priori most popular signal and predict that everyone does the same. This strategy
is a consistent equilibrium and gives agents the maximum possible payoff since their
predictions are perfect. In particular, for any non-trivial prior, this strategy pays
strictly more than the truth-telling equilibrium—so that it Pareto dominates truth-
telling.
The above extreme example provides a effortless and meaningless equilibrium but
is preferred by agents in Divergence-Based BTS. To deal with this problem, one
key observation is that in the meaningless equilibrium mentioned above, the unitary
predictions implies their report profiles have little information. At a high level, the
“disagreement” between agents represents the amount of information their report
profiles have. Motivated by this extreme example, we design a new mechanism—the
Disagreement Mechanism—that encourages “disagreement”.
4.3.2 The Disagreement mechanism and main theorem
In this section, we will describe our Disagreement Mechanism and state our main
theorem. To design our mechanism, we start with the Divergence-Based BTS and
(a) first use a typical trick to create a zero-sum game which has the same equilibria
as the Divergence-Based BTS; (b) pay each agent an extra score that only depends
on other agents which will not change the structure of the equilibria. We want this
extra score to represent “classification score” (See Figure 4.1).
Disagreement Mechanism M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) r = {r1, r2, ..., rn} is all agents’
report profiles where for any r, ri = (σˆi, pˆi).
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Figure 4.1: An illustration of Classification Score
Each point represents an agent’s report profile—the color represents the signal the agent reports;
the position represents the prediction the agent reports. We informally define Inconsistency as
the average disagreement between every two agents’ predictions when they report the same signal
and Diversity as the average disagreement between every two agents’ predictions when they report
different signals. We informally define Classification Score as Diversity minus Inconsistency. Note
that the report profiles in the right figure will have a much higher classification score than those in
the left figure since the right figure has high Diversity and low Inconsistency.
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1. Zero-sum Trick : Divide the agents into two non-empty groups—group A and
group B. Each group of agents plays the game (mechanism)M that is restricted
in their own group. For group A, each agent iA receives a
scoreM(iA, r) =paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(iA, rA)
− 1|A|
∑
jB∈B
paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(jB, rB)
Where paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(iA, rA) is agent iA’s payment when he is paid by
mechanismM(α, β, PS(·, ·)) given group A’s report profiles rA and that he can
only be paired with a random peer from group A (we have similar explanation
for paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(jB, rB)). For agents in group B, we use the analogous
way to score them.
2. Additional Classification Reward : Each agent i is matched with two random
agents j, k chosen from all agents (including group A and group B), the payment
for agent i is
paymentM+(α,β,PS(·,·)(i, r) = scoreM(i, r) + scoreC(rj, rk)
where
scoreC(rj, rk) =

D∗(pˆj, pˆk) σˆj 6= σˆk
−
√
D∗(pˆj, pˆk) σˆj = σˆk
recall that D∗ denotes the Hellinger Divergence.
Theorem 82. For any number of signals m, given any SNIFE prior, if the number
of agents n ≥ 3, then in M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) with α
β
< 1
4m
,
1. (Truthful) truth-telling is a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium;
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2. (Focal) in any permutation equilibrium, every agent has equal expected payment
with truth-telling; and in any symmetric equilibrium that is not a permutation
equilibrium, every agent’s expected payment is strictly less than that of truth-
telling.
3. (Robust Focal) any symmetric equilibrium that pays within γ1 of truth-telling
must be τ1(γ1) close to a permutation strategy profile; and moreover
4. (Tight) no detail free mechanism can have truth-telling as an equilibrium that
has strictly higher agent-welfare than all other permutation equilibria.
where τ1(γ1) = O( 3
√
γ1), (the constants we omit only depend on the first two
moments of prior Q)2.
We extend our results to asymmetric equilibria when the number of agents is
sufficiently large in Section A.1.2.
4.3.3 Proof highlights
In this section we give a few proof highlights.
First note that to show each agent’s expected payment in a symmetric equilibrium
is less than that of truth-telling, we only need to show the sum of all agents’ expected
payments—agent welfare—is less than that of truth-telling since everyone plays the
same strategy in a symmetric equilibrium.
We first show that the agent welfare of our Disagreement Mechanism is Diversity
minus Inconsistency, which follows by a straightforward computation. It remains to
show that Diversity minus Inconsistency has the aforementioned properties.
Best Prediction Strategy Profiles: We call a strategy profile a best prediction
strategy profile if for any i, agent i reports a prediction that maximizes his prediction
2Actually τ1(γ1) =
1
c1
3
√
γ1
c2,c3,c4
91
score. By some calculations, we know agent i’s best prediction is θ−iqσi given σi is his
private signal and recall that θ−i =
∑
j 6=i θi
n−1 where (θ1, θ2, ...., θn) is the signal strategy.
We call this strategy profile a symmetric best prediction strategy profile if there exists
a signal strategy θ such that θi = θ for any i. Based on the definition of permutation
strategy profile, it is clear that any permutation strategy profile is a symmetric best
prediction strategy profile.
Consider two agents who report different signals. If they use a permutation strat-
egy profile pi then their predictions will be piqσ, piqσ′ given their private signals are
σ 6= σ′. If they use a symmetric best prediction strategy, then their reported pre-
dictions will be θqσ, θqσ′ . In the first case, the Hellinger divergence between the
two agents’ reported predictions is D∗(piqσ, piqσ′) = D∗(qσ,qσ′) while in the sec-
ond case, the Hellinger divergence between the two agents’ reported predictions is
D∗(θqσ, θqσ′) ≤ D∗(qσ,qσ′) = D∗(piqσ, piqσ′). The inequality follows from the infor-
mation monotonicity of Hellinger divergence. Thus, the two agents’ predictions in the
second case is “closer” than those in the first case. So a permutation strategy profile
is more diverse than any other symmetric best prediction strategy, and additionally
has no inconsistency. To make permutation strategy profiles beat symmetric best
prediction strategy profiles, it is enough to just pay agents the additional diversity
reward.
General Equilibria: However, the biggest challenge is that there exists equi-
libria that are not best prediction strategy profiles. Thus, it is not enough to just
pay agents an additional diversity reward. To deal with this challenge, we replace
diversity by classification score. To show that classification score works, we map each
equilibrium s∗ to a strategy profile s∗BP that belongs to best prediction strategy pro-
files. The technical heart of the proof bounds the classification score of an equilibrium
strategy profile s∗ by the diversity of its corresponding best prediction strategy profile
s∗BP . Once we finish this, we can bound the classification score of any equilibrium
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strategy profile by the classification score of permutation strategy profiles (note that
for permutation strategy profiles, the classification score is equal to the diversity since
they are consistent strategy profiles) and complete the proof.
Asymmetric Equilibria: In the more complicated asymmetric case, the diffi-
culty is that even if agents play best prediction strategy profiles, we cannot use infor-
mation monotonicity to prove permutation strategy profiles gain the strictly highest
classification score. However, if the number of agents is large enough, we will see any
strategy profile that belongs to best prediction strategy profiles family is “almost sym-
metric”. Using “almost symmetric” result, we can generalize the above framework to
approximate work for asymmetric case.
Finally, we show that equilibrium that having the classification score close to that
of truth-telling, must be close to a permutation equilibrium.
Tightness Result: The intuitive explanation for this tightness result is that the
agents can collude to relabel the signals and the mechanism has no way to defend
against this relabelling without knowing some information about agents’ common
prior. The key idea to prove that result is what we refer to as Indistinguishable
Scenarios, that is, for the scenario A where agents collude to relabel the signals,
there always exists another scenario B where agents tell the truth such that no detail
free and truthful mechanism can distinguish A and B.
4.4 Mapping Bayesian truth serum into our information the-
oretic framework
Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) [51] rewards the agents whose answer is “surpris-
ingly popular”. In this section, we will show that in BTS, essentially each agent is
paid the mutual information between her information and the aggregated informa-
tion conditioning a random peer’s information which matches our Mutual Information
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Paradigm. We show this via the connection we found between the log scoring rule and
Shannon mutual information—the accuracy gain equals the information gain. Map-
ping Bayesian Truth Serum into our information theoretic framework substantially
simplifies the proof in Prelec [51] via directly applying the information-monotone
property of Shannon mutual information.
4.4.0.1 Prior work
Prelec [51] proposes the Bayesian Truth Serum mechanism in the single-task set-
ting. In addition to the common prior and the symmetric prior assumptions, two
additional assumptions are required:
Assumption 83 (Conditional Independence). We define the state of the world as a
random variable W : Ω 7→ ∆Σ such that given that W = ω, agents’ private signals are
independently and identically distributed. That is, for every i, agent i receives signal
σ with probability ω(σ).
Assumption 84 (Large Group). The number of agents is infinite.
We define a random variable Wˆ : Ω 7→ ∆Σ such that its outcome is the distribu-
tion over agents’ reported signals. The distribution over Wˆ dependes on all agents’
strategies. With the large group assumption, when agents tell the truth, Wˆ = W .
BTS uses Wˆ as the posterior distribution and uses agents’ forecasts as the prior
distribution, and then rewards agents for giving signal reports that are “unexpectedly
common” with respect to this distribution. Intuitively, an agent will believe her
private signal is underestimated by other agents which means she will believe the
actual fraction of her own private signal is higher than the average of agents’ forecasts.
Prelec also proposes the signal-prediction framework for the design of detail free
mechanism in the single-task setting.
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Signal-prediction framework [51] Given a setting (n,Σ) with a symmetric com-
mon prior Q, the signal-prediction framework defines a game in which each agent i is
asked to report his private signal σi ∈ Σ and his prediction pi ∈ ∆Σ, a distribution
over Σ, where pi = qσi . For any σ ∈ Σ, pi(σ) is agent i’s (reported) expectation for
the fraction of other agents who has received σ given he has received σi. However,
agents may not tell the truth. In this framework, the report space R = Σ×∆Σ. We
define a report profile of agent i as ri = (σˆi, pˆi) ∈ R where σˆi is agent i’s reported
signal and pˆi is agent i’s reported prediction.
We would like to encourage truth-telling T, namely that agent i reports σˆi =
σi, pˆi = qσi . To this end, agent i will receive some payment νi(σˆi, pˆi, σˆ−i, pˆ−i) from
the mechanism.
Mechanism Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS(α)) [51] The Bayesian Truth Serum
(BTS) follows the signal-prediction framework. Here, we introduce the payment of
BTS. Each agent i has two scores: a prediction score and an information score.
BTS pays each agent
prediction score + α· information score
where α > 1 To calculate the scores, for every agent i, the mechanism chooses a
reference agent j 6= i uniformly at random. Agent i’s prediction score is
scorePre(ri, rj) := L(σˆj, pˆi)− log fr(σˆj|σˆ−j) = log pˆi(σˆj)− log fr(σˆj|σˆ−j)
Note that only the log scoring rule part L(σˆj, pˆi) is related to agent i’s report. Based
on the property of the log scoring rule, for agent i, in order to maximize her prediction
score, the best pˆi(σ) should be her posterior expectation of the fraction of the agents
who report σ rather than receive.
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Agent i’s information score is
scoreIm(ri, rj) := log
fr(σˆi|σˆ−i)
pˆj(σˆi)
= log fr(σˆi|σˆ−i)− log pˆj(σˆi)
where fr(σˆi|σˆ−i) is the fraction of all reported signals σˆ−i (excluding agent i) that
agree with agent i’s reported signal σˆi, which can be seen as the posterior expectation
of the fraction of agents who report σˆi conditioning on all agents’ reports, while pˆj(σˆi)
is agent j’s posterior expectation of that fraction conditioning on agent j’s private
signal. Intuitively, the signals that actually occur more than other agents believe they
will receive a higher information score.
Now we restate the main theorem concerning Bayesian Truth Serum:
Theorem 85. [51] With the common prior, the symmetric prior, the conditional
independence, and the large group assumptions, BTS(α) is detail free, (i) truthful
and (ii) the expected average information score when everyone tells the truth is higher
than that in any other equilibrium. Moreover, (iii) for α > 1, BTS is focal.
Prelec [51] uses some clever algebraic calculations to prove the main results. In
the next section, we will apply our “accuracy gain=information gain” observation to
map Bayesian Truth Serum [51] into our information theoretical framework and show
results (ii) and (iii) via applying the data processing inequality of Shannon mutual
information. We put Prelec [51]’s proof for results (i) in appendix since it is already
sufficiently simple and not very related to our framework.
4.4.0.2 Using our information theoretic framework to analyze BTS
A key observation of BTS is that when agents report the optimal predictions,
the average information score is exactly the “accuracy gain”—the accuracy of the
posterior prediction for a random agent’s report conditioning on all agents’ reports,
minus the accuracy of a random reference agent j’s posterior prediction for the ran-
96
dom agent’s report conditioning on agent j’s private signal. Based on Lemma 24, this
accuracy gain equals the Shannon mutual information between a random agent’s
reported signal and all agents’ reports conditioning on the random reference agent
j’s private signal Ψj = σj. Therefore, the expected information score can be repre-
sented as the form of Shannon mutual information. We have similar analysis for the
prediction score. We formally state the above observation in Lemma 86. Aided by
this lemma, we will show results (ii) and (iii) via applying the information-monotone
property of Shannon mutual information.
Lemma 86. In BTS, when agents tell the truth, each agent i’s expected information
score and prediction score are
I(W ; Ψi|Ψj), −I(W ; Ψj|Ψi)
respectively, ∀j 6= i. When the agents play a non-truthful equilibrium, we denote
random variable Ψˆ as the reported signal of an agent who is picked uniformly at
random, the expected average information score and prediction score are
I(Wˆ ; Ψˆ|Ψj), −I(Wˆ ; Ψˆ|Ψi)
respectively, ∀i, j.
Proof. When agents tell the truth, each agent i’s expected information score is
EΨi,Ψj ,WL(Ψi, P r[Ψi|W ])− L(Ψi, P r[Ψi|Ψj])
= EΨi,Ψj ,WL(Ψi, P r[Ψi|W,Ψj])− L(Ψi, P r[Ψi|Ψj]) (Conditional independence)
= I(W ; Ψi|Ψj) (Theorem 24 / Expected accuracy gain equals information gain)
when she is paired with reference agent j. Since the prior is symmetric, I(W ; Ψi|Ψj)
is independent of the identity of j if j 6= i.
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In any equilibrium s, based on the properties of proper scoring rules, each agent
j will always maximize his expected prediction score by truthfully reporting his pre-
dictions. Moreover, for agent j, his reference agent is picked uniformly at random.
Therefore,
pˆj(σˆ) = Pr[Ψˆ = σˆ|Ψj = σj]
where Ψˆ is the reported signal of an agent who is picked uniformly at random.
Then we can replace W,Ψi by Wˆ , Ψˆ in the above equations and prove that the
expected average information score is
I(Wˆ ; Ψˆ|Ψj).
The analysis for the expected prediction score is the same as the above analysis
except that we need to exchange i and j.
Proof of Theorem 85 (ii), (iii). Based on Lemma 86, when agents play an equilib-
rium, the expected average information score equals
I(Wˆ ; Ψˆ|Ψj) =
∑
σj
Pr[Ψj = σj]I(Wˆ ; Ψˆ|Ψj = σj)
≤
∑
σj
Pr[Ψj = σj]I(Wˆ ,W ; Ψˆ|Ψj = σj) (Data processing inequality)
Note that, when the number of agents is infinite, since every agent’s strategy is
independent with each other, we can see W determines Wˆ 3. Therefore,
3When W = ω, Wˆ = 1n
∑
iM
T
i ω where M
T
i is the transpose matrix of the transition matrix
corresponded to agent i’s strategy for signal reporting, and the distribution ω is represented by a
column vector.
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∑
σj
Pr[Ψj = σj]I(Wˆ ,W ; Ψˆ|Ψj = σj)
=
∑
σj
Pr[Ψj = σj]I(W ; Ψˆ|Ψj = σj)
≤
∑
σj
Pr[Ψj = σj]I(W ; Ψi|Ψj = σj),∀i 6= j
(Data processing inequality and the symmetric prior assumption)
= I(W ; Ψi|Ψj),∀i 6= j
Thus, the expected average information score is maximized when everyone tells the
truth.
It is left to show for α > 1, in BTS(α), the agent-welfare is maximized by truth-
telling over all equilibria. Lemma 86 shows that when the prior is symmetric, the
sum of the expected prediction scores equals the sum of the expected information
scores in any equilibrium. Thus, when α > 1, the agent welfare is proportional to the
sum of the expected information scores which is maximized by truth-telling over all
equilibria.
It is natural to ask if we replace the −log in BTS’s information score by other
convex functions, what property of BTS we can still preserve. The following theorem
shows that even though we may not ganrantee the truthful property of BTS, the
average expected information score is still monotone with the amount of information
for any convex function we use.
Theorem 87. If we replace the information score in BTS by f(
pˆj(σˆi)
fr(σˆi|σˆ−i)) where f is
a convex function, result (ii)—the expected average information score when everyone
tells the truth is higher than that in any other equilibrium—is preserved.
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Proof. When agents tell the truth, each agent i’s expected information score is
EΨi,Ψj ,Wf(
Pr[Ψi|Ψj]
Pr[Ψi|W ] )
= EΨi,Ψj ,Wf(
Pr[Ψi|Ψj]
Pr[Ψi|W,Ψj] ) (Conditional independence)
= EΨi,Ψj ,Wf(
Pr[Ψi|Ψj]Pr[W |Ψj]
Pr[Ψi,W |Ψj] )
= MIf (W ; Ψi|Ψj)
In any equilibrium s, based on the properties of proper scoring rules, each agent
j will always maximize their prediction by truthfully report their predictions, thus,
pˆj(σˆ) = Pr[Ψˆ = σˆ|Ψj = σj].
Then we can replace W,Ψi by Wˆ , Ψˆ in the above equations and prove that the
expected average information score is
MIf (Wˆ ; Ψˆ|Ψj).
With the similar proof of Theorem 85, the theorem follow immediately from the
data processing inequality of f -mutual information.
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CHAPTER V
Expertise Elicitation
5.1 Related work
Model perspective Prior work has modeled heterogeneous expertise where dif-
ferent agents receive a different number of signals [25] or expertise is embedding in
several dimensions [20, 76, 65, 44]; however in these works lower expertise/effort along
with a certain dimension only leads to a more noisy signal. In contrast, our model
allows such signals to be systematically biased.
Mechanism design perspective The most related work with the current chapter
is Prelec, Seung, and McCoy [52] which uses Bayesian Truth Serum [51] to incentivize
agents to report their signal and selects the most surprising signal (measured by
occurring more than its average prediction) as the final answer. McCoy and Prelec
[44] follow Prelec, Seung, and McCoy [52] to propose a probabilistic model to learn
the expertise of agents. Riley [58] compares the peer prediction decision rule (similar
to Prelec, Seung, and McCoy [52]) and the majority vote rule and exhibits cases
where each outperforms the other. The current chapter differs with Prelec, Seung,
and McCoy [52] in the model and assumptions as well as the possible applications.
Prelec, Seung, and McCoy [52] only focus on the single-task setting and assume that
agents receive the signals endogenously (without effort). In contrast, this chapter
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considers both single and multiple task settings and the model used in this chapter
handles both exogenous and indigenous signals.
The mechanism design framework in the current chapter extends the information
theoretic framework MIP. Agarwal et al. [2] propose a mechanism that works for the
heterogeneous participants in the multi-task setting. Mandal et al. [42] consider the
heterogeneous tasks setting. They both do not assume the hierarchy of the informa-
tion and cannot be applied to identify and elicit expertise.
Algorithmic perspective Several works [76, 20, 65, 23] provide clever methods
to learn the expertise as well as the ground truth of the crowdsourcing tasks. The
algorithm in the current chapter differs in two main aspects: (1) The current chapter
uses a different expertise model which can successfully capture the possibly hierarchi-
cal relationship between different information/expertise as well as the most valuable
information; (2) the current chapter combines the algorithm with an incentive mech-
anism that endogenously controls the quality and structure of the input, rather than
making exogenous assumptions about the quality of the input.
5.2 Multi-task setting
In this section, we will apply the HMIP framework in the multi-task setting where
each agent receives a random batch of a priori similar tasks
5.2.1 Backgrounds and assumptions
In multi-task setting, the major challenge solved in previous peer prediction liter-
ature is that agents may “get something for nothing” by always answering the same
answer (e.g. always saying good in peer grading).
In the setting where agents are assigned ≥ 2 tasks, Dasgupta and Ghosh [18],
Kong and Schoenebeck [34], and Shnayder et al. [63] solve this challenge by assuming
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agents are homogeneous and rewarding agents not only for their agreements but also
for the diversity of their answers. If an agent answers the same answer all the time (no
diversity), she will be paid nothing. Kong and Schoenebeck [34] show that this idea es-
sentially means rewarding each agent MI tvd(her information; her peer’s information).
When agents are heterogeneous, Mandal et al. [42] ask agents to answer a sufficient
number of tasks and then classify their answers into different clusters to learn their
levels and pay them.
Assumption 88 (a priori similar). All tasks are a priori similar for all agents. That
is, tasks are i.i.d samples for all agents. For every agent, before she invests any effort,
for each m, for all tasks, she has the same prior belief for the signals she and other
agents will receive by performing m.
Prior work [63, 18, 34] also makes this assumption; however in their setting it is
much stronger than in ours. For example, it insists that the only “signal” included in
a prompt is for the correct answer. In reality, some false answers are more appealing
than others (see Example 1 where Kansas is an unlikely answer). In our model,
these appealing false answers can be modeled as “cheap” information instead of being
assumed away.
Note that in the multi-task setting, we allow agents to have different priors and
only require that for every agent, her prior satisfies our assumptions.
5.2.2 Known information structure and a small number of tasks
In order to avoid agents “getting something for nothing” by reporting the cheap
signals instead of the expensive signals (e.g. giving a high quality grade when there
are no typos in Example 2), we reward agents the information score of expensive
signals according to not only their agreements but also the diversity of their answers
conditioning on the tasks which have the same cheap signals. (e.g. the essays which
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all have no typos). We will show this idea is essentially the application of HMIP
framework when MIf is chosen to be MI tvd.
Assumption 89 (Positively correlated signals). We assume that for every method
m, each agent i, every σ 6= σ′, every possible {σm′}m′≺m, every subset M ′ ⊂ {m′|m′ ≺
m}, Ψm−i is positively correlated with Ψmi = σ:
Pr[Ψm−i = σ|Ψmi = σ] > Pr[Ψm−i = σ],
Pr[Ψm−i = σ|Ψmi = σ′] < Pr[Ψm−i = σ],
conditioning on {Ψm′−i}m′∈M ′ = {σm′}m′∈M .
Dasgupta and Ghosh [18] and Shnayder et al. [63] both make this assumption
as well. It means that receiving σ by performing m will increase each agent’s belief
for how many other agents receive σ by performing m. It is a substantially weaker
assumption than that agents always believe they are in the majority.
In the peer grading example, this assumption means that for every agent, receiving
, for quality signal will increase her belief for the probability other agents receive
, for quality signal.
Assumption 90 (Conditional independence). For each agent i who performs method
mi, we assume that for every possible {σm′}m′≺m, every subset M ′ ⊂ {m′|m′ ≺ m},
for each m  mi, Ψmi contains all information agent i has that is related to Ψm−i, in
other words, conditioning on Ψmi , {Ψm′i }m′mi,m′ 6=m are independent with Ψm−i, condi-
tioning on {Ψm′−i}m′∈M ′ = {σm′}m′∈M ′1.
In the peer grading example, this assumption means that for every agent, if she has
already thought the writing is good, her quality signal will not affect her opinion
for the writing.
1Note that if agents receive the same signal by performing the same method, both Assumption 89
and Assumption 90 will hold.
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With this assumption, when an agent needs to report her information that is
related to Ψm−i, assuming she has already performed method m, it’s sufficient for her
to only report Ψmi .
Multi-task Hierarchical Mutual Information Mechanism (Multi-HMIM({αm}m))
Report Each agent i is assigned a random batch of tasks (at least two). For each
task t which is assigned to agent i, she is asked to report both the method
mi(t) she performed on task t and method mi(t)’s output ψ
mi(t)
i (t); for each
m 6= mi(t), agent i is asked to optionally report her signal ψmi (t). We denote
her actual report for her performed method and signal for every method m by
mˆi(t) and ψˆ
m
i (t) respectively.
Information Score For each method m, the mechanism collects agent i’s method
m signals and records them via a T dimensional vector ψˆmi .
The tth coordinate of ψˆmi is

ψˆmi (t), if agent i provides the
method m’s output ψˆmi (t)
for task t;
∅, otherwise
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We define ψˆm−i as a vector where the t
th coordinate of ψˆm−i is
ψˆm−i(t), we arbitrarily pick an agent (who is not agent i)
whose performed method is  m for task t
and provides method’s m’s output for task t;
we denote his report by ψˆm−i(t);
∅, such agent does not exist
Agent i is paid by her information score
∑
m
2αmCorr(ψˆ
m
i ; ψˆ
m
−i|{ψˆm
′
−i}m′≺m)
and Corr(·)2 is a random algorithm defined in Algorithm 1.
We design Corr(ψˆmi ; ψˆ
m
−i|{ψˆm′−i}m′≺m) to be an unbiased estimator of
MI tvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψˆ
m
−i|{Ψˆ
m′
−i}m′≺m)3 if Ψˆmi and Ψˆm−i are positively correlated. Thus, in Multi-
HMIM, agents are essentially paid based on the (conditional) mutual information by
picking a special f -mutual information—MI tvd, if agents are honest since we have
assumed that agents’ honest signals are positively correlated. This makes our Multi-
HMIM a special case of HMIP framework.
Definition 91 (Amount of information in Multi-HMIM). In Multi-HMIM, when
agent i performs method mi, the amount of information acquired with the effort is
defined as
2Corr(·; ·) is essentially the same concept as the payment schemes in Dasgupta and Ghosh [18],
Kong and Schoenebeck [34], and Shnayder et al. [63]. Corr(·; ·|·) is a new concept in this chapter.
3In the current chapter, ψˆmi means vector, Ψˆ
m
i means random variable.
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AOI(mi,Multi-HMIM({αm}m))
:=
∑
t∈[T ]
max
fm:Π`miΣ` 7→Σm
αmMI
tvd(fm({Ψ`i}`mi); Ψm−i|{Ψm
′
−i}m′≺m).
maxfm:Π`miΣ` 7→Σm means agent i optimize her expected information score over all
report strategies that maps her received signals ({Ψ`i}`mi) to her reported signal for
method m.
Like we did in the analysis of HMIP, we need to guarantee that for agent i whose
performed method is mi, the amount of her received information defined by the above
definition should be her optimal payment in Multi-HMIM, given that Multi-HMIM
has access to all levels of honest signals reported by other agents. Note that the
building block Corr in our mechanism is an unbiased estimator of MI tvd only if the
signals are positively correlated. Thus, in order to make the above guarantee, we
make an additional assumption—positively correlated guess: agents’ optimal guesses
for each method m’s output are positively correlated with m’s real output.
Assumption 92 (Positively correlated guess). For agent i whose performed method
is mi, for all m, for all subset M
′ ⊂ {m′|m′ ≺ m}, there exists f ∗m,M ′ such that
f ∗m,M ′ ∈ arg max
fm:Π`miΣ` 7→Σm
MI tvd(fm({Ψ`i}`mi); Ψm−i|{Ψm
′
−i}m′∈M ′)
and f ∗m,M ′({Ψ`i}`mi) is positively correlated with Ψm−i.
Definition 93 (Prudent strategy in Multi-HMIM). For each agent i, we say she plays
prudent strategy in Multi-HMIM({αm}m) if she (a) performs method m∗i for all her
tasks such that
m∗i = arg max
mi
(AOI(mi,Multi-HMIM({αm}m))− hi(mi)) ;
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(b) reports her method m∗i honestly and reports her all received signals honestly for
all her tasks.
Definition 94 (Potent coefficients for Multi-HMIM). Given the priors {Qm}m, we
say the coefficients {αm}m are potent for Multi-HMIM({αm}m) if given the coefficients
{αm}m, for every maximal m, for every task t, among the agents who are assigned task
t, there exists at least two agents whose prudent strategy in Multi-HMIM({αm}m)
are performing method m.
Definition 95 (Truthful strategy in Multi-HMIM). For each agent i, we say she plays
truthful strategy if for each task t, she honestly report her method mi(t) for task t
and for each m ≺ mi(t), either she chooses to not report or she reports honestly.
We allow agents to guess the signals they did not receive. Thus, in the definition
of prudent strategy and truthful strategy, we only require agents to honestly report
the signals they receive and do not put any restriction on their guesses.
Here we propose a new mechanism design goal: we say a mechanism is (strictly)
truthful if for each agent, when she believes other agents play a truthful strategy, she
can (strictly) maximize her expected utility by playing a truthful strategy.
The truthful property is incomparable with the potent property. A potent mech-
anism incentivizes the efforts of agents but it requires agents to believe other agents
play prudent strategy. A truthful mechanism may not be able to incentivize efforts
of agents but it incentivizes truthful report by only requiring agents to believe other
agents either report honestly or choose to not report.
Theorem 96. With Assumption 88, 89, 90, Multi-HMIM({αm}m) is truthful; more-
over, when {αm}m are potent for Multi-HMIM({αm}m), Multi-HMIM({αm}m) is po-
tent and truthful.
In order to show the truth property of Multi-HMIM, we will show for each agent,
given that other agents play truthful strategy, (1) conditioning on using pure effort
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strategy, she can maximize her payment as well as her utility by reporting all her
received information honestly; (2) pure effort strategy gives her better utility than
mixed effort strategy. We can apply Theorem 43 directly and use the information
monotonicity of MI tvd to prove part (1) directly. In order to show part (2), we
need to solve the mixed effort strategy problem in the multi-task setting—agents put
high level effort only for partial number of tasks but claim that they spend high
level effort all the time. Note that even though agents can expend lower effort in
randomizing between performing a low level method and a high level method than
purely performing high level method, they also obtain lower payment since they have
less “agreement” with high level information provided by other people. It turns
out that the convexity of the f -mutual information—including MI tvd—implies that
agents cannot obtain higher utility—which is the payment minus the cost—by playing
a mixed effort strategy. The potent property immediately follows from the truthful
property and the condition that the coefficients are potent . We defer the formal
proof to appendix.
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Algorithm 1: Building Block Corr
1: procedure Corr(v1;v2) . e.g. v1 = (,, ∅,,,,,,), v2 = (,,,,,,,, ∅)
2: if either v1 or v2 has fewer than two non-empty entries then return 0
3: else
4: B ⊂ [M ]← the set of entries where both v1 and v2 are not empty .
B ← {1, 3, 4}
5: if B = ∅ then return 0
6: else
7: for tB ∈ B do . We call tB a reward task
8: v1(t1)← a random non-empty entry in v1
9: . v1(t1)← ,
10: v2(t2)← a random non-empty entry in v2, t2 6= t1 . v2(t2)← ,
11: CorrtB ← 1(v1(tB) = v2(tB))− 1(v1(t1) = v2(t2)) . CorrtB ← 0
12: return
∑
tB∈B CorrtB and “success” . Return 0
13: procedure Corr(v1;v2|V ) . e.g. v1 = (,,,,/,,,,), v2 = (,,,,/,,,/),
V = {v}, v = (,,,,/,,,/)
14: C ← the set of entries where every v ∈ V is not empty . C ← {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
15: if C = ∅ then return Corr(v1;v2)
16: else
17: t∗C ← a random element in C . t∗C ← 2
18: D ← ∅
19: for t ∈ [T ] do
20: if for every v ∈ V , v(t) = v(t∗C) then
21: put t in D
. D = {1, 2, 4}, v1(D) = v2(D) = (,,,,,)
22: return Corr(v1(D);v2(D))
23: . Return Corr(v1(D);v2(D)) = 0 and “success”
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5.2.3 Learning information structure with a large number tasks
Assumption 97 (δ0-gap). For each m, we assume that for every i 6= j, each m′ 6= m
MIf (Ψmi ; Ψ
m
j ) >
1
δ0
MIf (Ψmi ; Ψ
m′
j ) <
1
δ0
The above assumption guarantees that when we can accurately learn the f -mutual
information between two agents’ answer vectors, we can accurately classify the answer
vectors and then learn the maximal method’s outputs correctly.
Learning based Multi-HMIM(RULE)
Report Each agent i is assigned T tasks and asked to perform the same method for
all tasks. For agent i who performs method mi, she is asked to report her own
answer vector
ψmii = (ψ
mi
i (1), ψ
mi
i (2), ..., ψ
mi
i (T ))
and, for each method m 6= mi, is asked to optionally report her answer vector
ψmi . We denote the set of methods whose outputs are reported by agent i as Mi
and the actual answer vector she reports for each method ` ∈Mi as ψˆ`i . Agent
i can name the methods freely4.
Learning Information Structure We define the distance between ψˆmi and ψˆ
m′
j as
1
MIf (Ψˆmi ;Ψˆ
m′
j )
. The mechanism starts to cluster answer vectors. A set of answer
vectors are clustered into one cluster if and only if their pairwise distance is less
than δ0. A cluster may have ≥ 1 answer vector(s).
For two clusters m1,m2, m1  m2 if and only if there exists an agent who’s
own answer vector is in cluster m1 and also provides an answer vector which is
4The mechanism will ignore the name of the methods and only record the relationship that the
other answer vectors reported by agent i have lower level than agent i’s own answer vector.
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classified in cluster m2. The mechanism picks positive real values for the type
payment scale αm according to a rule RULE .
Information Score The mechanism learns the information structure using all agents’
reports excluding agent i. We denote the set of clusters by M−i. For each clus-
ter m ∈ M−i, the mechanism randomly picks an answer vector, denoted ψˆm−i,
from it.
Agent i is paid her information score:
∑
m∈M−i
αmMI
f ({Ψˆ`i}`∈Mi ; Ψˆm−i|{Ψˆm
′
−i}m′≺m,m′∈M−i)
which can be calculated accurately when the number of tasks is large.
We define α(RULE) := {αm(RULE)}m as the coefficients determined by RULE ,
given that the mechanism has access to all levels of honest answer vectors. Here the
amount of information and prudent strategy are defined by the same way in HMIP,
except that the coefficients are α(RULE).
Definition 98 (Prudent strategy in learning based Multi-HMIM). For each agent
i, we say she plays a prudent strategy in learning based Multi-HMIM(RULE) if she
chooses to (a) perform method m∗i such that
m∗i ∈ arg max
mi
(
AOI(mi,HMIP(MI
f , {αm(RULE)}m))− hi(mi)
)
;
(b) report all received information honestly.
We also define potent RULE such that α(RULE) is potent in the definition in
HMIP.
Definition 99 (Potent rule for learning based Multi-HMIM). Given the priors {Qm}m,
we say the rule RULE that determines the coefficients is potent for learning based
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Multi-HMIM(RULE) if given RULE , for every maximal m, there exists at least two
agents whose prudent strategy in learning based Multi-HMIM(RULE) are performing
method m.
Theorem 100. With Assumption 88, Learning based multi-HMIM is dominant truth-
ful.
Moreover, with Assumption 97, when the rule RULE is potent , Learning based
multi-HMIM is potent , dominant truthful and will output the hierarchical information
structure as well as the maximal level(s) answer vector given that agents play prudent
strategy.
Learning based multi-HMIM can be mapped to HMIP since when we have a large
number of tasks, we can calculate the mutual information directly by first calculating
the joint distribution over agents’ answers. We can also learn the information struc-
ture based on the gap assumption (Assumption 97) and cluster the agents correctly.
Note that even if the mechanism clusters incorrectly, the mechanism is still dominant
truthful since even each agent is paid by the mutual information between her infor-
mation and “wrong” information, the information monotonicity still incentivize the
agent to report all information she has. Thus we do not need the gap assumption
for the dominant truthfulness. With the gap assumption, we can cluster agents cor-
rectly and use Theorem 43 to show the potent property. We defer the formal proof to
appendix. Moreover, we want to emphasize that our mechanisms work even if every
agent only has a piece of correct information for the information structure.
5.3 Single-task setting
In this section, we apply the HMIM framework to the single task setting.
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5.3.1 Backgrounds and assumption
In the single task setting without known prior, previous peer prediction works all
assume the common prior assumption and follow the framework proposed in Prelec
[51]—asking agents not only her signal but also her prediction. In order to achieve
truthfulness for ≥ 3 agents, Radanovic and Faltings [55] and Kong and Schoenebeck
[35] punish each agent if her predictions differs from the predictions of other agents
who report the same signals with her, and reward each agent for the accuracy of
her prediction. Therefore, for each agent, in order to maximize her accuracy reward,
she will honestly report her predictions. In order to avoid the punishment for the
“inconsistency”, she will honestly report her received signals as well because of the
following commonly assumed assumption.
Assumption 101 (common prior and stochastic relevance). We assume that for
every two agents agent i and agent j, they will have the same belief for the distribution
of the signals received by other agents if and only if they receive the same signals.
5.3.2 Applying HMIP in the single-task setting
We naturally follow the previous “signal-prediction” framework and “punishing
inconsistency” idea in the hierarchical information case. We ask agents their received
signals and predictions for different levels. We pay each agent the accuracy of her
forecasts. The high expertise agents have accurate predictions for even high cost
information reports while the low expertise agents only has accurate prediction for
low cost information. Therefore, high expertise agents will be paid more.
Single-HMIM(PS, {αm}m)
Report (signals, predictions) Each agent i who performs method mi is asked to
report her received signals {σmi }mmi and her forecast pmii for Ψmi−i . For each
m 6= mi, she is asked to optionally report her forecast pmi for Ψm−i. We denote
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her report for her received signals as {σˆmi }mmˆi and her prediction report as
{pˆmi }m∈Mi where Mi is the set of methods whose outputs are predicted by agent
i.
Prediction Score We define M−i as the set of methods whose outputs are reported
by an agent who is not agent i. For each m ∈ M−i, we pick an arbitrary
reference agent j 6= i whose performed method is higher than m and de-
note his report for method m’s output by σˆm. Agent i’s prediction score is∑
m∈M−i∩Mi αmPS(σ
m, pˆmi ).
Information Score If there is no other agent who reports the same signals as agent
i, then agent i’s information score is 0. Otherwise, arbitrarily pick a reference
agent j 6= i from the agents who report the same signals as agent i. Agent i’s
information score is minus the inconsistency between her prediction report and
agent j’s prediction report, that is,
−
 ∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
αm(PS(pˆ
m
j , pˆ
m
j )− PS(pˆmj , pˆmi ))
 .
In Single-HMIM, the payment of each agent is
α ∗ Information Score + β ∗ Prediction Score.
Definition 102 (Truthful strategy in Single-HMIM). For each agent i whose per-
formed method is mi, we say she plays truthful strategy if she honestly report her
received signals {σmi }mmi and her forecast for Ψmi−i and for each m 6= mi, either she
chooses to not report or she reports her forecast for Ψm−i honestly.
We denote pmmi as agent i’s honest forecast for Ψ
m
−i given that she performs method
mi.
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Definition 103 (Amount of information in Single-HMIM). For each agent i who
performs method mi, her acquired amount of information is defined as
AOI(mi, Single-HMIM(PS, {αm}m)) :=
∑
m
αmEQm [PS(σm, pmmi)].
Later in the proof of Theorem 106, we will see the amount of information is also
the optimal payment of agent i who performs method mi in Single-HMIM, given that
Single-HMIM has access to all levels of honest signals reported by other agents.
Definition 104 (Prudent strategy in Single-HMIM). For each agent i, we say she
plays a prudent strategy in Single-HMIM(PS, {αm}m) if she chooses to (a) perform
method m∗i such that
m∗i ∈ arg max
mi
(AOI(mi, Single-HMIM(PS, {αm}m))− hi(mi)) ;
(b) play a truthful strategy.
Definition 105 (Potent coefficients for Single-HMIM). Given the priors {Qm}m,
we say the coefficients {αm}m are potent for Single-HMIM(PS,{αm}m) if given the
coefficients {αm}m, for every maximal m, there exists at least two agents whose
prudent strategy in Single-HMIM(PS,{αm}m) is performing method m.
Recall that a mechanism is (strictly) truthful if for each agent, when she believes
other agents play a truthful strategy, she can (strictly) maximize her expected utility
by playing a truthful strategy.
Theorem 106. With Assumption 101, single-HMIM is strictly truthful; moreover,
when the coefficients is potent for single-HMIM, single-HMIM is potent and strictly
truthful.
The strictly truthful property follows from the common prior and stochastic rel-
evance assumption using a proof similar to that in Radanovic and Faltings [55] and
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[35]. The potent property follows from the definition of prudent strategy and potent
coefficients. We defer the formal proof to appendix.
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CHAPTER VI
Forecast Elicitation and An Information
Aggregation Problem: Co-training
6.1 Related work
Learning Co-training/multiview learning is a problem that asks to aggregate two
views of data into a prediction for the latent label and was first proposed by Blum and
Mitchell [9] and explored by many works (e.g. Dasgupta, Littman, and McAllester
[19] and Collins and Singer [14]). Xu, Tao, and Xu [73] and Li, Yang, and Zhang
[39] give surveys on this literature. Although co-training is an important learning
problem, it lacks a unified theory and a solid theoretic guarantee for the general
model. Most traditional co-training methods usually require additional restrictions on
the hypothesis space (e.g. weakly good hypotheses) to address the “naive agreement”
issue and fail to deal with soft hypotheses whose output is not a discrete signal and
thus cannot fully aggregate the two sources of information. Becker [7] deals with a
feature learning problem which is very similar to the co-training problem. Becker
[7] designs the optimization goal as maximizing the Shannon mutual information
between the outputs of two functions. However, Becker [7] only considers hard (not
soft) hypotheses and lacks a solid theoretic analysis for the maximizer. Kakade and
Foster [30] consider the multi-view regression and maximize the correlation between
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the two hypotheses. Their method captures the “mutual information” idea (in fact,
correlation is a special f -mutual information [34]) but their model has a very specific
set up and the analysis cannot be extended to other co-training problems.
In contrast, we propose a simple, powerful and general information theoretic
framework, f -mutual information gain, that has a solid theoretic guarantee, works
for soft hypothesis and addresses the “naive agreement” issue without any additional
assumption.
Natarajan et al. [46], Sukhbaatar and Fergus [64] and many other work (e.g.
[6, 33, 62]) consider the learning with noisy labels problem. Natarajan et al. [46]
consider binary labels and calibrate the original loss function such that the Bayesian
posterior predictor that forecasts ground truth Y is a maximizer of the calibrated
loss. Sukhbaatar and Fergus [64] extend this work to the multiclass setting. These
works require additional estimation steps to learn the transition probability that
transits the ground truth labels to the noisy labels and fix this transition probability
in their calibration step. In contrast, by mapping this problem into our framework
(Section 6.6.4), we do not need the additional estimation steps to make the calibrated
forecaster part of a maximizer of our optimization problem, and can incorporate
any kind of side information to learn the calibrated forecaster and true transition
probability simultaneously.
Moreover, our results can handle more complicated setting where each instance
is labeled by multiple labels. Rather than preprocessing the labels by a particular
algorithm (e.g. majority vote, weighted average, spectral method) and assuming
some information structure model among the crowds [56], our framework is model-
free and can learn the best calibrated forecaster (predictor PA) and the best processing
algorithm (predictor PB) simultaneously.
Raykar et al. [57] also jointly learn the calibrated forecaster and the distribution
over the crowd-sourced feedback and ground truth labels. Raykar et al. [57] uses
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the maximum likelihood estimator and assumes a simple generative model for the
distribution over the crowdsourced feedback and the ground truth labels, which is
conditioning the ground truth label, the crowdsourced feedback is drawn from a bi-
nomial distribution, while our framework is model-free. We also extend the maximum
likelihood estimator method in Raykar et al. [57] to a general family of estimators,
PS-gain estimators, based on the family of proper scoring rules, which also jointly
learn the calibrated forecaster and the distribution. We will show the range of applica-
tions of PS-gain is more limited compared with the range of applications of f -mutual
information gain (see Section 6.6.3 for more details). Cid-Sueiro [13] also uses proper
scoring rules to design the loss functions that address the learning with noisy labels
problem. However, Cid-Sueiro [13] designs a different family of loss functions from
the PS-gain and cannot jointly learn the calibrated forecaster and the distribution.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [26] combine game theory and learning
theory to make innovative progress. We also combine game theory and learning theory
by proposing a peer prediction game between two predictors. The game in GAN is a
zero-sum competitive game while the game in the current chapter is collaborative.
Several learning problems (e.g. finding the pose of an object in an image [8], blind
source separation [12], feature selection [50]) use mutual information maximization
(infomax) as their optimization goal. Some of these problems require data labeled
with ground truth and some of them have a very different problem set up than our
work.
We borrow the techniques about the duality of f -divergence from Nguyen, Wain-
wright, and Jordan [49, 48]. Nguyen, Wainwright, and Jordan [49] show a corre-
spondence between the f -divergence and the surrogate loss in the binary supervised
learning setting and Nguyen, Wainwright, and Jordan [48] propose a way to estimate
the f -divergence between two high dimensional random variables. We apply the du-
ality of f -divergence to an unsupervised learning problem and not restricted to the
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binary setting.
We also differ from the crowdsourcing literature that infers ground truth answers
from agents’ reports (e.g. [76, 32, 75, 17]) in the sense that their agents’ reports are a
simple choice (e.g. A, B, C, D) while in our setting, the report can come from a space
larger than the space of ground truth answers, perhaps even a very high dimensional
vector.
Mechanism design Our mechanism design setting differ from the traditional peer
prediction literature (e.g.[45, 51, 18, 34, 63, 42]) since we are eliciting forecast rather
than a simple signal. We can discretize the forecast report and apply the traditional
peer prediction literature results. However, this will only provide approximated truth-
fulness and fail to design focal mechanisms which pay truth-telling strictly better
than any other non-permutation equilibrium since the forecast is discretized, while
our mechanisms are focal for ≥2 tasks setting.
Witkowski et al. [72] consider the forecast elicitation situation and assume that
they have an unbiased estimator of the optimal forecast while we assume an additional
conditional independence assumption but do not need the unbiased estimator.
Liu and Chen [41] connect mechanism design with learning by using the learning
methods to design peer prediction mechanisms. In the setting where several agents
are asked to label a batch of instances, Liu and Chen [41] design a peer prediction
mechanism where each agent is paid according to her answer and a reference answer
generated by a classification algorithm using other agents’ reports. Instead of us-
ing learning methods to design the peer prediction mechanisms, our work uses peer
prediction mechanism design techniques to address a learning problem. Moreover,
our mechanism design problem has a very different set up from theirs. Agarwal and
Agarwal [1] connect learning theory with information elicitation by showing the equiv-
alence between the calibrated surrogate losses in supervised learning and the eliciting
121
of some certain properties of the underlying conditional label distribution. Both our
learning problem and mechanism design problem have a very different set up from
theirs.
Independent work Like the current chapter, McAllester [43] also use Shannon
mutual information to propose an information theoretic training objective that can
deal with soft hypotheses/classifiers. We use a more general information measure,
f -mutual information, which has Shannon mutual information as a special case, and
we also propose an innovative connection between co-training and peer prediction.
6.2 Preliminaries
Given a finite set [N ] := {1, 2, ..., N}, for any function φ : [N ] 7→ R, we use
(φ(y))y∈[N ] to represent the vector (φ(1), φ(2), ..., φ(N)) ∈ RN .
6.2.1 f-divergence, f-mutual information and Fenchel’s duality
f-divergence [3, 16] Recall that f -divergence Df : ∆Σ × ∆Σ 7→ R is a non-
symmetric measure of the difference between distribution p ∈ ∆Σ and distribution
q ∈ ∆Σ and is defined to be
Df (p,q) =
∑
σ∈Σ
p(σ)f
(
q(σ)
p(σ)
)
where f : R 7→ R is a convex function and f(1) = 0.
Definition 107 (Fenchel Duality [60]). Given any function f : R 7→ R, we define its
convex conjugate f ? as a function that also maps R to R such that
f ?(x) = sup
t
tx− f(t).
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Fact 108 (Dual version of f -divergence [49, 48]).
Df (p,q) ≥ sup
u∈Σ
Epu− Eqf ?(u) = sup
u∈G
∑
σ
u(σ)p(σ)−
∑
σ
f ?(u(σ))q(σ)
where G is a set of functions that maps σ ∈ Σ to R.
The equality holds if and only if u(σ) = u∗(σ) ∈ ∂f(p(σ)
q(σ)
).
We call (u∗, f ?(u∗)) a pair of best distinguishers.
We define K(X = x, Y = y) as the ratio between UX,Y (x, y) and VX,Y (x, y)—
K(X = x, Y = y) :=
Pr[X = x, Y = y]
Pr[X = x] Pr[Y = y]
=
Pr[Y = y|X = x]
Pr[Y = y]
=
Pr[X = x|Y = y]
Pr[X = x]
.
K(X = x, Y = y) represents the “pointwise mutual information(PMI)” between
X = x and Y = y.
Fact 108 directly implies:
Fact 109 (Dual version of f -mutual information).
MIf (X;Y ) ≥ sup
u∈G
EUX,Y u− EVX,Y f ?(u)
where G is a set of functions that maps (x, y) to R.
The equality holds if and only if u(x, y) = u∗(x, y) ∈ ∂f(K(X = x, Y = y)).
6.2.2 Property of the pointwise mutual information
We will introduce a simple property of the pointwise mutual information that
we will use multiple times in the future. In addition to several different formats of
the pointwise mutual information (e.g. joint distribution/product of the marginal
distributions, posterior/prior), if there exists a latent random variable Y such that
random variable XA and random variable XB are independent conditioning on Y ,
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f -divergence f(t) u∗(x, y) = ∂f(K(x, y)) f ?(u∗(x, y))
Total Variation Distance |t− 1| sign(logK(x, y)) sign(logK(x, y))
KL divergence t log t 1 + logK(x, y) K(x, y)
Reverse KL − log t − 1
K(x,y)
−1 + logK(x, y))
Pearson χ2 (t− 1)2 2(K(x, y)− 1) (K(x, y))2 − 1
Squared Hellinger (
√
t− 1)2 1−
√
1
K(x,y)
√
K(x, y)− 1
Table 6.1:
Reference for common f -divergences and corresponding pairs of best dis-
tinguishers (u∗(x, y), f ?(u∗(x, y)) of f -mutual information.
K(x, y) = K(X = x, Y = y) := Pr[X=x,Y=y]Pr[X=x] Pr[Y=y] =
Pr[Y=y|X=x]
Pr[Y=y] =
Pr[X=x|Y=y]
Pr[X=x] .
we can also represent the pointwise mutual information between XA and XB by the
“agreement” between the “relationship” between XA and Y , and the “relationship”
between XB and Y .
Claim 110. When random variables XA, XB are independent conditioning on Y ,
K(XA = xA, XB = xB) =
∑
y
Pr[Y = y]K(XA = xA, Y = y)K(XB = xB, Y = y)
=
∑
y
Pr[Y = y|XA = xA]K(XB = xB, Y = y)
=
∑
y
Pr[Y = y|XA = xA] Pr[Y = y|XB = xB]
Pr[Y = y]
.
We defer the proof to appendix.
6.3 General Model and Assumptions
Let XA, XB, Y be three random variables and we define prior Q as the joint dis-
tribution over XA, XB, Y . We want to forecast the ground truth Y whose realization
is a signal in a finite set Σ. XA, XB are two sources of information that are related to
Y . XA’s realization is a signal in a finite set ΣA. XB’s realization is a signal in a finite
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set ΣB. We may have access to both of the realizations of XA and XB or only one of
them. Thus, we need to learn the relationship between XA, XB and Y to forecast Y .
It’s impossible to learn by only accessing the samples of XA, XB without additional
assumption. We make the following conditional independence assumption:
Assumption 111 (Conditional independence). We assume that conditioning on Y ,
XA, and XB are independent.
Intuitively, Y can be seen as the “intersection” between XA and XB. We call Z a
solution if conditioning on Z, XA, and XB are independent. Y is a solution. However,
there are a lot of solutions. For example, conditioning on XA or XB, XA and XB are
independent, which means XA and XB are both solutions. Thus, we have additional
restriction on the prior—well-defined prior and stable prior.
6.3.1 Well-defined and stable prior
We will need restrictions on the prior when we analyze the strictness of our learning
algorithm/mechanism. Readers can skip this section without losing the core idea of
our results.
To infer the relationship between Y and XA, XB with only samples of XA, XB,
we cannot do better than to just solve the system of equations (6.1), given the joint
distribution over XA, XB—Q. Our goal is to obtain the Bayesian posterior predictor.
Thus, we list a system that the Bayesian posterior predictor satisfies. The following
system equations involve variables {axA ,bxB ∈ ∆Σ}xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB , and r ∈ ∆Σ. We
insist axAy = Pr[Y = y|XA = xA], bxBy = Pr[Y = y|XB = xB] and ry = Pr[Y = y] is a
solution and we call it the desired solution.
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S({axA ,bxB}xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB , r) (6.1)
:=
{∑
y∈Σ
axAy b
xB
y
ry
−K(XA = xA, XB = xB)
}
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB
= 0
Claim 110 shows the above system has the desired solution.
Note that any permutation of a solution is still a valid solution1. Since we cannot
do better than to solve the above system, if the above system only has one “unique”
solution, in the sense that any two solutions are permuted version of each other, we
call the prior Q a well-defined prior. Formally,
Definition 112 (Well-defined). A prior Q is well-defined if for any two solutions
{axA ,bxB}xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB , r and {cxA ,dxB}xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB , r′ of the system of equations
(6.1), there exists a permutation pi : Σ 7→ Σ such that r = pir′ for any xA, xB,
axA = picxA , bxB = pidxB .
The well-defined prior exist since intuitively, if |ΣA| and |ΣB| are high and |Σ| is
low, it is likely Y is the “unique intersection” since the number of constraints of the
system will be much greater than the number of variables.
We say a prior is stable if fixing part of the desired solution of the system (6.1),
in order to make it still a solution of the system, other parts of the desired solution
should also be fixed.
Definition 113 (Stable). A prior Q is stable if fixing axAy = Pr[Y = y|XA = xA] and
ry = Pr[Y = y], the system (6.1) S({axA ,bxB}xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB , r) = 0 has unique solution
bxA such that bxBy = Pr[Y = y|XB = xB]; and fixing bxBy = Pr[Y = y|XB = xB] and
ry = Pr[Y = y], the system (6.1) S({axA ,bxB}xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB , r) = 0 has unique solution
axA such that axAy = Pr[Y = y|XA = xA].
1We may be able to distinguish a solution with its permuted version if we have some side infor-
mation (e.g. the prior of Y /a few (xA, xB , y) samples).
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We require stable priors when we design strictly truthful mechanisms.
6.3.2 Predictors
This section gives the definition of predictors. We have two sets of samples SA :=
{x`A}`∈LA and SB := {x`B}`∈LB which are i.i.d samples of XA and XB respectively.
For ` ∈ LA ∩ LB, (x`A, x`B)s are i.i.d samples of the joint random variable (XA, XB).
A predictor PA : ΣA 7→ ∆Σ for XA maps xA ∈ Σ to a forecast PA(xA) for ground
truth Y . We similarly define the predictors for XB. We define the Bayesian posterior
predictor as the predictor that maps any input information X = x to its Bayesian
posterior forecast for Y = y—Pr(Y = y|X = x).
With the conditional independence assumption, we have
Pr[Y |XA, XB] =Pr[Y,XA, XB]
Pr[XA, XB]
=
Pr[Y ] Pr[XA|Y ] Pr[XB|Y ]
Pr[XA, XB]
(conditional independence)
=
Pr[Y |XA] Pr[Y |XB]
K(XA, XB) Pr[Y ]
(K(XA, XB) is the pointwise mutual information.)
When we have access to both the sources where XA = xA and XB = xB, given
the prior of the ground truth Y , we can construct an aggregated forecast for Y = y
using PA, PB:
PA(xA)PB(xB)
Pr[Y = y]
∗ normalization
In this case, if both PA and PB are the Bayesian posterior predictor, the aggregated
forecast is the Bayesian posterior predictor as well. Thus, it’s sufficient to only train
PA and PB. In the rest sections, we will show how to train PA and PB (Section 6.4),
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given the two sets of samples SA and SB, as well as how to incentivize high quality
predictors from the crowds (Section 6.5).
6.4 Co-training: find the common ground truth
We have a set of candidatesHA for the predictor for XA and a set of candidatesHB
for the predictor for XB. We sometimes call each predictor candidate a hypothesis.
Given the two sets of samples SA = {x`A}`∈LA and SB = {x`B}`∈LB , our goal is to figure
out the best hypothesis in HA and the best hypothesis in HB simultaneously. Thus,
we need to design proper “loss function” such that the best hypotheses minimize the
loss. In fact, we will show how to design a proper “reward function” such that the
best hypotheses maximize the reward.
6.4.1 f-mutual information gain
f-mutual information gain MIGf (R) (Figure 1.7)
Hypothesis We are given HA = {hA : ΣA 7→ ∆Σ}, HB = {hB : ΣB 7→ ∆Σ}: the set
of hypotheses/predictor candidates for XA and XB, respectively.
Gain Given reward function R : ∆Σ ×∆Σ 7→ R,
for each ` ∈ LA ∩ LB, reward “the amount of agreement” between the two
predictor candidates’ predictions for task `—
R(hA(x
`
A), hB(x
`
B));
for each distinct pair (`A, `B), `A ∈ LA, `B ∈ LB, `A 6= `B, punish both predictor
candidates “the amount of agreement” between their predictions for a pair of
distinct tasks (`A, `B)—
f ?(R(hA(x
`A
A ), hB(x
`B
B )).
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The f -mutual information gain MIGf (R) that is corresponding to the reward
function R is
MIGf (R(hA, hB))|SA,SB =
1
|LA ∩ LB|
∑
`∈LA∩LB
R(hA(x
`
A), hB(x
`
B))
− 1|LA||LB| − |LA ∩ LB|2
∑
`A∈LA,`B∈LB ,`A 6=`B
f ?(R(hA(x
`A
A ), hB(x
`B
B )))
Lemma 114. The expected total f -mutual information gain is maximized over all
possible R, hA, and hB if and only if for any (xA, xB) ∈ ΣA × ΣB,
R(hA(xA), hB(xB)) ∈ ∂f(K(xA, xB)).
The maximum is
MIf (XA;XB).
Proof. (x`A, x
`
B)` are i.i.d. realizations of (XA, XB). Therefore, the expected f -mutual
information gain is
EUXA,XBR− EVXA,XB f ?(R)
The results follow from Fact 109.
Although any reward function corresponds to an f -mutual information gain func-
tion, we need to properly design the reward function R such that, fixing R, there exist
hypotheses to maximize the corresponding f -mutual information gain MIGf (R) to
the f -mutual information between the two sources. We will use the intuition from
Lemma 114 to design such reward functions R in the next section.
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6.4.2 Finding the common ground truth: maximizing the f-mutual in-
formation gain
In this section, we will construct a special reward function Rf and then show that
the maximizers of the corresponding f -mutual information gain MIGf (Rf ) are the
Bayesian posterior predictors.
Definition 115 (Rf ). We define reward function Rf as a function that maps the two
hypotheses’ outputs p1,p2 ∈ ∆Σ and the vector p ∈ ∆Σ to
Rf (p1,p2,p) := g
(∑
y
p1(y)p2(y)
p(y)
)
where g(t) ∈ ∂f(t),∀t. When f is differentiable,
Rf (p1,p2,p) := f
′
(∑
y
p1(y)p2(y)
p(y)
)
.
With this definition of the reward function, fixing p ∈ ∆Σ which can be seen as
the prior over Y , the “amount of agreement” between two predictions p1,p2 are an
increasing function g of
∑
y
p1(y)p2(y)
p(y)
,
which is intuitive and reasonable. The increasing function g is the derivative of the
convex function f . By carefully choosing convex function f , we can use any increasing
function g here.
Example 116. Here we present some examples of the f -mutual information gain
MIGf (Rf ) with reward function Rf , associated with different f -divergences. We use
Table 1 as reference for ∂f(·) and f ?(∂f(·)).
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Total variation distance:
1
|LA ∩ LB|
∑
`∈LA∩LB
sign
(
log[
∑
y
hA(x
`
A)(y)hB(x
`
B)(y)
p(y)
]
)
− 1|LA||LB| − |LA ∩ LB|2
∑
`A∈LA,`B∈LB ,`A 6=`B
sign
(
log[
∑
y
hA(x
`A
A )(y)hB(x
`B
B )(y)
p(y)
]
)
KL divergence:
1
|LA ∩ LB|
∑
`∈LA∩LB
(
1 + log[
∑
y
hA(x
`
A)(y)hB(x
`
B)(y)
p(y)
]
)
− 1|LA||LB| − |LA ∩ LB|2
∑
`A∈LA,`B∈LB ,`A 6=`B
(∑
y
hA(x
`A
A )(y)hB(x
`B
B )(y)
p(y)
)
Pearson:
1
|LA ∩ LB|
∑
`∈LA∩LB
2 ∗
(∑
y
hA(x
`
A)(y)hB(x
`
B)(y)
p(y)
− 1
)
− 1|LA||LB| − |LA ∩ LB|2
∑
`A∈LA,`B∈LB ,`A 6=`B
(
(
∑
y
hA(x
`A
A )(y)hB(x
`B
B )(y)
p(y)
)2 − 1
)
Theorem 117. With the conditional independent assumption on XA, XB, Y , given
the samples SA, SB, given a convex function f , we define the optimization goal as the
expected f -mutual information gain with reward function Rf—
MIGf (hA, hB,p) := EXA,XBMIG
f (Rf (hA, hB,p))|SA,SB
and optimize over all possible hypotheses hA : ΣA 7→ ∆Σ, hB : ΣB 7→ ∆Σ and
distribution vectors p ∈ ∆Σ. We have
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Solution→Maximizer: any solution Z corresponds to a maximizer of MIGf (hA, hB,p)2:
for any solution Z,
h∗A(xA) := (Pr[Z = y|XA = xA])y h∗B(xB) := (Pr[Z = y|XB = xB])y3
and the prior over Z, Pr[Z = y]y, is the maximizer of MIG
f (hA, hB,p) and
the maximum is MIf (XA;XB);
Maximizer→(Permuted) Ground truth when the prior is well-defined, f is dif-
ferentiable, and f ′ is invertible, any maximizer of MIGf (hA, hB,p) corresponds
to the (possibly permuted) ground truth Y : for any maximizer (h∗A(·), h∗B(·),p∗)
of MIGf (hA, hB,p), there exists a permutation pi such that
h∗A(xA) := (Pr[pi(Y ) = y|XA = xA])y h∗B(xB) := (Pr[pi(Y ) = y|XB = xB])y
and p∗ = Pr[pi(Y ) = y]y.
The above theorem does not investigate computation complexity (this may be
affected by the choice of f), data requirement and the choice of the hypothesis class
in practical implementation. To implement our f -mutual information gain framework
in practice, we implicitly assume that for high dimensional XA, XB, there exists a
trainable set of hypotheses (e.g. neural networks) that is sufficiently rich to contain
the Bayesian posterior predictor but not everything to cause over-fitting. The most
apparent empirical direction will be running experiments on real data by training two
neural networks to test our algorithms.
Proof for Theorem 117. Lemma 114 shows that the expected f -mutual information
2Given the prior over Y , we can fix p as the prior over Y . Without knowing the prior over Y , p
becomes a variable of the optimization goal and helps us learn the prior over Y .
3Recall that we use (φ(y))y∈[N ] to represent the vector (φ(1), φ(2), ..., φ(N)) ∈ RN .
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gain is maximized if and only if for any (xA, xB),
Rf (h∗A(xA), h
∗
B(xB),p
∗) ∈ ∂f(K(xA, xB)).
(1) Solution→Maximizer: For any solution Z, we can construct
h∗A(xA) := (Pr[Z = y|XA = xA])y h∗B(xB) := (Pr[Z = y|XB = xB])y
and p∗ = Pr[Z = y]y. Then
Rf (h∗A(xA), h
∗
B(xB),p
∗) ∈ ∂f
(∑
y
Pr[Z = y|XA = xA] Pr[Z = y|XB = xB]
Pr[Z = y]
)
= ∂f(K(xA, xB) (Claim 110)
Thus, based on Lemma 114, any solution Z corresponds to a maximizer of the
optimization goal.
(2)Maximizer→(Permuted) Ground truth: For any maximizer (h∗A(·), h∗B(·),p∗) of
the optimization goal, when f is differentiable, Lemma 114 shows that
Rf (h∗A(xA), h
∗
B(xB),p
∗) = f ′(K(xA, xB)).
When f ′ is invertible, we have
∑
y
h∗A(xA)(y)h
∗
B(xB)(y)
p∗(y)
= K(xA, xB)
for all xA, xB.
Thus, {(h∗A(xA), h∗B(xB),p∗)}xA,xB is actually the solution of the system (6.1).
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When the prior is well-defined, there exists a permutation pi such that
h∗A(xA) := (Pr[pi(Y ) = y|XA = xA])y h∗B(xB) := (Pr[pi(Y ) = y|XB = xB])y
and p∗ = Pr[pi(Y ) = y]y where Y is the ground truth.
6.5 Forecast elicitation without verification
In this section, we consider the setting where the predictions are provided by
human beings and we want to incentivize high quality forecast by providing an instant
reward without instant access to the ground truth.
There is a forecasting task. Alice and Bob have private information XA, XB =
xA ∈ ΣA, xB ∈ ΣB correspondingly and are asked to forecast the ground truth Y = y.
We denote (Pr[Y = y|XA = xA])y, (Pr[Y = y|XB = xB])y by pxA , pxB correspond-
ingly. Alice and Bob are asked to report their Bayesian forecast pxA , pxB . We denote
their actual reports by pˆxA and pˆxB . Without access to the realization of Y , we want
to incentivize both Alice and Bob play truth-telling strategies—honestly reporting
their forecast pxA , pxB for Y .
We define the strategy of Alice as a mapping sA from xA (private signal) to a
probability distribution over the space of all possible forecast for random variable
Y . Analogously, we define Bob’s strategy sB. Note that essentially each (possibly
mixed) strategy sA can be seen as a (possibly random) predictor PA where PA(xA) is a
random forecast drawn from distribution sA(xA). In particular, the truthful strategy
corresponds to the Bayesian posterior predictor.
We say agents play a permutation strategy profile if there exists permutation pi :
Σ 7→ Σ such that each agent always reports pip given her truthful report is p.
Note that without any side information about Y , we cannot distinguish the sce-
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nario where agents are honest and the scenario where agents play a permutation
strategy profile. Thus, it is too much to ask truth-telling to be strictly better than
any other strategy profile. The focal property defined in the following paragraph is
the optimal property we can obtain.
Mechanism Design Goals
(Strictly) Truthful Mechanism M is (strictly) truthful if truth-telling is a (strict)
equilibrium.
Focal MechanismM is focal if it is strictly truthful and each agent’s expected pay-
ment is maximized if agents tell the truth; moreover, when agents play a non-
permutation strategy profile, each agent’s expected payment is strictly less.
We consider two settings:
Multi-task Each agent is assigned several independent a priori similar forecasting
tasks in a random order and is asked to report her forecast for each task.
Single-task All agents are asked to report their forecast for the same single task.
In the single-task setting, it’s impossible to design focal mechanisms since agents
can collaborate to pick an arbitrary y∗ ∈ Σ and pretend that they know Y = y∗.
However, we will show we can design strictly truthful mechanism in the single-task
setting. In the multi-task setting, since agents may be assigned different tasks and
the tasks show in random order, they cannot collaborate to pick an arbitrary y∗ ∈ Σ
for each task. In fact, we will show if the number of tasks is greater or equal to 2, we
can design a family of focal mechanisms.
Achieving the focal goal in the multi-task setting is very similar to what we did
in finding the common ground truth. Note that in the forecast elicitation problem,
incentivizing a truthful strategy is equivalent to incentivizing the Bayesian posterior
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predictor. Thus, we can directly use the f -mutual information gain as the reward in
multi-task setting. Achieving the strictly truthful goal in the single-task setting is
more tricky and we will return to it later.
6.5.1 Multi-task: focal forecast elicitation without verification
We assume Alice is assigned tasks set LA and Bob is assigned tasks set LB. For
each task `, Alice’s private information is x`A and Bob’s private information is x
`
B.
The ground truth of this task is y`.
Multi-task common ground mechanism MCG(f) Given the prior distribution
over Y , a convex and differentiable function f whose convex conjugate is f ?,
Report for each task ` ∈ LA, Alice is asked to report pxA` := (Pr[Y = y|x`A])y; for
each task ` ∈ LB, Bob is asked to report pxB` := (Pr[Y = y|x`B])y. We denote
their actual reports by pˆ`
xA`
and pˆ`
xB`
.
Payment For each ` ∈ LA ∩ LB, reward both Alice and Bob “the amount of agree-
ment” between their forecast in task `—
R(pˆ`xA` , pˆ
`
xB`
);
for each pair of distinct tasks (`A, `B), `A ∈ LA, `B ∈ LB, `A 6= `B, punish both
Alice and Bob “the amount of agreement” between their forecast in distinct
tasks (`A, `B)—
f ?(R(pˆ`A
xA
`A
, pˆ`B
xB
`B
).
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In total, both Alice and Bob are paid
1
|LA ∩ LB|
∑
`∈LA∩LB
R(pˆ`xA` , pˆ
`
xB`
)
− 1|LA||LB| − |LA ∩ LB|2
∑
`A∈LA,`B∈LB ,`A 6=`B
f ?(R(pˆ`A
xA
`A
, pˆ`B
xB
`B
)
where
R(p1,p2) := f
′(
∑
y
p1(y)p2(y)
Pr[Y = y]
).
We do not want agents to collaborate with each other based on the index of the
task or other information in addition to the private information. Thus, we make the
following assumption to guarantee the index of the task is meaningless for all agents.
Assumption 118 (A priori similar and random order). For each task `, fresh i.i.d.
realizations of (XA, XB, Y ) = (x
`
A, x
`
B, y
`) are generated. All tasks appear in a random
order, independently drawn for each agent.
Theorem 119. With the conditional independence assumption, and a priori similar
and random order assumption, when the prior Q is stable and well-defined, given the
prior distribution over the Y , given a differential convex function f whose derivative
f ′ is invertible, if max{|LA|, |LB|} ≥ 2, then MCG(f) is focal.
When both Alice and Bob are honest, each of them’s expected payment in MCG(f)
is
MIf (XA;XB).
Like Theorem 117, in order to show Theorem 119, we need to first introduce a
lemma which is very similar with Lemma 114.
Lemma 120. With the conditional independence assumption, the expected total pay-
ment is maximized over Alice and Bob’s strategies if and only if ∀`1 ∈ LA, `2 ∈ LB,
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for any (x`1A , x
`2
B ) ∈ ΣA × ΣB,
R(pˆ`1
xA
`1
, pˆ`2
xB
`2
) = f ′(K(x`1A , x
`2
B )).
The maximum is
MIf (XA;XB).
The proofs of Lemma 120 and Theorem 119 are very similar with Lemma 114 and
Theorem 117. We defer the formal proofs to the appendix.
6.5.2 Single-task: strictly truthful forecast elicitation without verification
This section introduces the strictly truthful mechanism in the single-task setting.
If we know the realization y of Y , we can simply apply a proper scoring rule and
pay Alice and Bob PS(y, pˆxA) and PS(y, pˆxB) respectively. Then according to the
property of the proper scoring rule, Alice and Bob will honestly report their truthful
forecast to maximize their expected payment. However, we do not know the realiza-
tion of Y . In the information elicitation without verification setting where Alice and
Bob are required to report their information, Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser [45]
propose the “peer prediction” idea, that is, pays Alice the accuracy of the forecast
that predicts Bob’s information conditioning Alice’s information—
PS
(
xˆB, (Pr[XB = xB|xˆA])y
)
where xˆA and xˆB are Alice and Bob’s reported information. It’s easy to see the peer
prediction mechanism in Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser [45] is truthful. With a
similar “peer prediction” idea, we propose a strictly truthful mechanism in forecast
elicitation.
Common ground mechanism Given the prior distribution over Y ,
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Report Alice and Bob are required to report pxA , pxB . We denote their actual
reports by pˆxA and pˆxB .
Payment Both Alice and Bob are paid
log
∑
y
pˆxA(y)pˆxB(y)
Pr[Y = y]
.
Theorem 121. With the conditional independence assumption (and when the prior
is stable), given the prior distribution over the Y , the common ground mechanism is
(strictly) truthful; moreover, when both Alice and Bob are honest, each of them’s ex-
pected payment in the common ground mechanism is the Shannon mutual information
between their private information
I(XA;XB) = MI
KL(XA;XB).
Proof. When both Alice and Bob are honest, their payment is logK(xA, xB) according
to Claim 110. Their expected payment will be
∑
xA,xB
Pr[xA, xB] logK(xA, xB) =
∑
xA,xB
Pr[xA, xB] log
Pr[xA, xB]
Pr[xA] Pr[xB]
= MIKL(XA;XB)
Given that Bob honestly reports pˆxB = pxB , we would like to show that the
expected payment of Alice is less than MIKL(XA;XB) regardless of the strategy
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Alice plays. The expected payment of Alice is
∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA, XB = xB] log
∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y]
=
∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA, XB = xB] log
∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y]
Pr[XB = xB]
−
∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA, XB = xB] log Pr[XB = xB]
=
∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA, XB = xB] log
∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y]
Pr[XB = xB]− C
(C is a constant that does not depend on Alice’s strategy)
=
∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA] Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA] log
∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y]
Pr[XB = xB]− C
Moreover, fixing XA = xA
∑
xB
∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y]
Pr[XB = xB]
=
∑
xB
∑
y
pˆxA(y) Pr[XB = xB, Y = y]
Pr[Y = y]
=
∑
xB
∑
y
pˆxA(y) Pr[XB = xB|Y = y]
=
∑
y
pˆxA(y) = 1
Thus,
∑
y
pˆxA (y)pxB (y)
Pr[Y=y]
Pr[XB = xB] can be seen as a forecast for XB = xB. Since
LSR(p,q) =
∑
σ p(σ) log q(σ) ≤
∑
σ p(σ) log p(σ) = LSR(p,p) for any p,q ∈ ∆Σ,
we have
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∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA] Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA] log
∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y]
Pr[XB = xB]− C
(6.2)
≤
∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA] Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA] log Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA]− C
=
∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA] Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA] log Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA]
−
∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA, XB = xB] log Pr[XB = xB]
=
∑
xA,xB
Pr[XA = xA, XB = xB] log
Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA]
Pr[XB = xB]
=I(XA;XB)
It remains to analyze the strictness of the truthfulness. We need to show for
any xA, given that Alice receives XA = xA, she will obtain strictly less payment via
reporting pˆxA 6= pxA .
Given that Alice receives XA = xA, her expected payment is
∑
xB
Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA] log
∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y]
Pr[XB = xB]− C
(see equation (6.2))
≤
∑
xB
Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA] log Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA]− C (6.3)
Note that
∑
σ p(σ) log q(σ) <
∑
σ p(σ) log p(σ) when q 6= p. When the prior is
stable, since pˆxA 6= pxA , then pxB , pˆxA , (Pr[Y = y])y is not the solution of system
(6.1). This implies that there exists xB such that
Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA] 6=
∑
y
pˆxA(y)pxB(y)
Pr[Y = y]
Pr[XB = xB].
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Thus, the inequality (6.3) must be strict. Therefore, when the prior is stable, the
common ground mechanism is strictly truthful.
6.6 PS-gain
In this section, we will extend the maximum likelihood estimator method in
Raykar et al. [57] to a general family of optimization goals—PS-gain and compare
the general family with our f -mutual information gain. We will see the application of
PS-gain requires either one of the information sources to be low dimensional or that
we have a simple generative model for the distribution over one of the information
sources and ground truth label. Thus, the range of applications of PS-gain is more
limited compared with the range of applications of f -mutual information gain.
In Raykar et al. [57], XA is a feature vector which has multiple crowdsourced labels
XB. We have access to (x
`
A, x
`
B)`∈L which are i.i.d samples of (XA, XB). Raykar et al.
[57] also have the conditional independence assumption.
6.6.1 Maximum likelihood estimator (MLE)
Let ΘA,ΘB be two parameters that control the distribution over XA and Y and
the distribution over XB and Y respectively.
With the conditional independence assumption, we have
log Pr[(x`A, x
`
B)`∈L|ΘA,ΘB] = log Π`∈L Pr[XB = x`B|XA = x`A,ΘA,ΘB]
= log Π`∈L
∑
y
Pr[XB = x
`
B|Y = y,ΘB] Pr[Y = y|XA = x`A,ΘA]
=
∑
`∈L
log
(∑
y
Pr[XB = x
`
B|Y = y,ΘB] Pr[Y = y|XA = x`A,ΘA]
)
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The MLE is a pair of parameters Θ∗A,Θ
∗
B that maximizes the expected
log Pr[(x`A, x
`
B)`∈L|ΘA,ΘB] =
∑
`∈L
log
(∑
y
Pr[XB = x
`
B|Y = y,ΘB] Pr[Y = y|XA = x`A,ΘA]
)
.
Raykar et al. [57] use the MLE to estimate the parameters. In order to compare
this MLE method with our f -mutual information gain framework, we map this MLE
method into our language and provide a theoretical analysis for the condition when
MLE is meaningful.
LSR-gain/MLE
Hypothesis We are given HA = {hA : ΣA 7→ ∆Σ}, VB = {vB : ΣB 7→ [0, 1]|Σ|}: the
set of hypotheses candidates for XA and XB, respectively. Note that vB maps
xB ∈ ΣB into a vector in [0, 1]|Σ| rather than a distribution vector.
Gain We see
(vB(xB) · hA(x`A))xB
as a forecast for random variable XB conditioning on XA = x
`
A and we reward
the hypotheses LSR-gain—the accuracy of this forecast via log scoring rule
(LSR):
∑
`∈L
LSR
(
x`B, (vB(xB) · hA(x`A))xB
)
=
∑
`∈L
log
(
vB(x
`
B) · hA(x`A)
)
We use v · v′ to represent the dot product between two vectors.
Note that by picking HA as the set of mappings—associated with a set of param-
eters {ΘA}—that map XA = xA to (Pr[Y = y|XA = x`A,ΘA])y and picking VB as the
set of mappings—associated with a set of parameters {ΘB}—that map XB = xB to
(Pr[XB = xB|Y = y,ΘB])y, maximizing LSR-gain is equivalent to obtaining MLE.
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The idea of LSR-gain is very similar with the original peer prediction idea intro-
duced in Section 6.5.2 as well as our common ground mechanism.
Theorem 122. When
∑
xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1, 1, .., 1) for all vB ∈ VB, the ground truth
Y corresponds to a maximizer of LSR-gain:
v∗B(xB) = (Pr[XB = xB|Y = y])y h∗A(xA) = (Pr[Y = y|XA = xA])y.
The maximum is the conditional Shannon entropy H(XB|XA).
Remark 123. Note that without the restriction:
∑
xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1, 1, .., 1) for all
vB ∈ VB,
v∗B(xB) = (Pr[XB = xB|Y = y])y h∗A(xA) = (Pr[Y = y|XA = xA])y
is not a maximizer and we will have a meaningless maximizer vB(xB) = (1, 1, .., 1),∀xB
and hA(xA) = (1, 0, ..., 0),∀xA.
By picking VB as the set of mappings—associated with a set of parameters {ΘB}—
that map XB = xB to (Pr[XB = xB|Y = y,ΘB])y, the restriction
∑
xB∈ΣB vB(xB) =
(1, 1, .., 1) for all vB ∈ VB satisfies naturally. However, it requires the knowledge of
the generative distribution model over XB and Y with parameter ΘB. Raykar et al.
[57] assume a simple distribution model between XB and Y with parameter ΘB—
conditioning the ground truth label, the crowdsourced feedback XB is drawn from a
binomial distribution, such that Pr[XB = xB|Y = y,ΘB] has a simple explicit form.
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Proof of Theorem 122.
E
∑
`∈L
log
(
vB(x
`
B) · hA(x`A)
)
=
∑
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB
Pr[XA = xA, XB = xB] log
(
vB(xB) · hA(xA)
)
=
∑
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB
Pr[XA = xA] Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA] log
(
vB(xB) · hA(xA)
)
=
∑
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB
Pr[XA = xA]LSR
(
(Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA])xB , (vB(xB) · hA(xA))xB
)
Fixing XA = xA, since
∑
xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1, 1, ..., 1) for all vB ∈ VB, we have
∑
xB
(
vB(xB) · hA(xA)
)
=
∑
y
hA(xA)(y) = 1
Since LSR(p,q) ≤ LSR(p,p) for any p,q ∈ ∆Σ, we have
E
∑
`∈L
log
(
vB(xB) · hA(xA)
)
=
∑
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB
Pr[XA = xA]LSR
(
(Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA])xB , (vB(xB) · hA(xA))xB
)
≤
∑
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB
Pr[XA = xA]LSR
(
(Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA])xB , (Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA])xB
)
=
∑
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB
Pr[XA = xA] Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA] log Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA]
=H(XB|XA)
=
∑
xA∈ΣA,xB∈ΣB
Pr[XA = xA] Pr[XB = xB|XA = xA] (conditional independence)
log
(∑
y
Pr[XB = xB|Y = y] Pr[Y = y|XA = xA]
)
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Thus,
v∗B(xB) = (Pr[XB = xB|Y = y])y h∗A(xA) = (Pr[Y = y|XA = xA])y
is a maximizer and the maximum is the conditional Shannon entropy H(XB|XA).
6.6.2 Extending LSR-gain to PS-gain
The property LSR(p,q) =
∑
σ p(σ) log q(σ) ≤
∑
σ p(σ) log p(σ) = LSR(p,p)
for any p,q ∈ ∆Σ is also valid for all proper scoring rules. Thus, we can naturally
extend the MLE to PS-gain by replacing the LSR by any given proper scoring rule
PS.
PS-gain
Hypothesis We are given HA = {hA : ΣA 7→ ∆Σ}, VB = {vB : ΣB 7→ [0, 1]|Σ|}: the
set of hypotheses candidates for XA and XB, respectively.
Gain We see
(vB(xB) · hA(x`A))xB
as a forecast for random variable XB conditioning on XA = x
`
A and we reward
the hypotheses PS-gain—the accuracy of this forecast via a given proper scoring
rule PS:
∑
`∈L
PS
(
x`B, (vB(xB) · hA(x`A))xB
)
Note that the general PS-gain may involve the calculations of (vB(xB) ·hA(x`A))xB
while LSR-gain only requires the value of vB(x
`
B) · hA(x`A). Thus, unlike LSR-gain,
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the general PS-gain may be only applicable for low dimensional XB, even if we assume
a simple generative distribution model over XB and Y .
Theorem 124. Given a proper scoring rule PS, when
∑
xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1, 1, ..., 1)
for all vB ∈ VB, the ground truth Y corresponds to a PS-gain maximizer:
v∗B(xB) = (Pr[XB = xB|Y = y])y h∗A(xA) = (Pr[Y = y|XA = xA])y.
The proof is the same with Theorem 122 except that we replace LSR(p,q) ≤
LSR(p,p) by PS(p,q) ≤ PS(p,p) for any p,q ∈ ∆Σ.
6.6.3 Comparing PS-gain with f-mutual information gain
Generally, f -mutual information gain can be applied to a more general setting.
PS-gain requires the restriction
∑
xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1, 1, ..., 1) for all vB ∈ VB.
Thus, PS-gain requires the full knowledge of vB for all vB ∈ VB to check whether it
satisfies the restriction, while for the f -mutual information gain, it is sufficient to just
have the access to the outputs of the hypothesis: {hB(x`B)}`∈LB . Therefore, in the
mechanism design part, we can only use f -mutual information gain to design focal
mechanisms since we only have the outputs from agents.
Moreover,
∑
xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1, 1, ..., 1) is also hard to check when |ΣB| is very
large. For example, when xB is a 100× 100 black-and-white image, |ΣB| = 2100 and
checking
∑
xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1, 1, ..., 1) requires 2
100 time. Normalizing vB such that
it satisfies the condition also requires 2100 time. Thus, when |ΣB| is very large, we
need a simple generative distribution model between XB and Y with parameter ΘB
such that we can pick VB as the set of mappings—associated with a set of parameters
{ΘB}—that map XB = xB to (Pr[XB = xB|Y = y,ΘB])y, to make the restriction∑
xB∈ΣB vB(xB) = (1, 1, .., 1) for all vB ∈ VB satisfy naturally. When we have the
simple generative distribution model, we can use LSR-gain. The general PS-gain
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may involve the calculations of the |ΣB| dimensional vector—(vB(xB) · hA(x`A))xB—
for each x`A. Thus, the general PS-gain may be only applicable to low dimensional
XB.
In the learning with noisy labels problem, the distribution between XB and Y can
be represented by a simple transition matrix and XB is low dimensional. Therefore,
both PS-gain and f -mutual information gain can be applied to the learning with
noisy labels problem.
Therefore, the application of PS-gain requires either one of the information sources
to be low dimensional or that we have a simple generative model for the distribution
over one of the information sources and ground truth label, while f -mutual informa-
tion gain does not have the restrictions.
6.6.4 Applications
In our startup running example, we consider the situation where one source of
information is the features and another source of information is the crowdsourced
feedback. In fact, our results apply to all kinds of information sources. For example,
we can make both sources features or crowdsourced feedback. Different setups for the
information sources and predictor candidates can bring different applications of our
results.
Let’s consider the “learning with noisy labels” problem where the labels in the
training data are a noisy version of the ground truth labels Y and the noise is inde-
pendent. We can map this problem into our framework by letting XB be the noisy
label of features XA. That is , XB is a noisy version of Y . Our framework guarantees
that the Bayesian posterior predictor that forecasts Y using XA must be part of a
maximizer of the optimization problem. However, there are many other maximiz-
ers. For example, since XA and XB are independent conditioning XB. The Bayesian
posterior predictor that forecasts XB using XA is also part of a maximizer, since the
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scenario Y = XB also satisfies the conditional independence assumption. If XB has
much higher dimension than Y , we do not have this issue. But XB has the same
signal space with Y in the learning with noisy label problem. Thus, it’s impossible
to eliminate other maximizers without any side information here. With some side
information (e.g. a candidate set F—like linear regressions—that only contains our
desired maximizer.), it’s possible to obtain the Bayesian posterior predictor that fore-
casts Y using XA. Note that our framework does not require a pre-estimation on the
transition probability that transits the ground truth label Y to the noisy ground truth
label XB, since our framework has this transition probability, which corresponds to
the predictor PB, as parameters as well and learn the correct forecaster PA and the
transition probability PB simultaneously.
Ratner et al. [56] propose a method to collect massive labels by asking the crowds
to write heuristics to label the instances. Each instance is associated with many
noisy labels outputted by the heuristics. In their setting, the crowds use a different
source of information from the learning algorithm (e.g. the learning algorithm uses
the biology description of the genes and the crowds use the scientific papers about
the gene). Thus, the conditional independence assumption is natural here and we can
map this setting’s training problem into our framework. Ratner et al. [56] preprocess
the collected labels to approximate ground truth by assuming a particular information
structure model on the crowds. Our framework is model-free and does not need to
preprocess the collected labels since we can learn the best forecaster (predictor PA)
and the best processing/aggregation algorithm (predictor PB) simultaneously.
Moreover, since the highest evaluation value of the predictors PA, PB is the f -
mutual information between XA and XB, our results provide a method to calculate
the f -mutual information between any two sources of information XA, XB of any
format. Kong and Schoenebeck [34] propose a framework for designing information
elicitation mechanisms that reward truth-telling by paying each agent the f -mutual
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information between her report and her peers’ report. Thus, the f -mutual information
gain method can be combined with this framework to design information elicitation
mechanisms when the information has a complicated format.
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CHAPTER VII
Conclusion and Future work
This thesis addresses two central problems in crowdsourcing, information elicita-
tion and information aggregation, in the context where the ground truth is unknown,
by distilling the essence of the central problems to the design of proper informa-
tion measurements. Aided by the finding of two (weakly) information-monotone
measurements—f -mutual information, Bregman-mutual information, a variety of novel
information elicitation mechanisms, information aggregation algorithms are designed
and a natural connection between information elicitation and information aggregation
is built.
When people and information are homogeneous, this thesis proposes a simple yet
powerful information theoretic paradigm—the Mutual Information Paradigm (MIP)—
for designing information elicitation mechanisms that are truthful, focal, and, detail-
free. Moreover, some of the mechanisms based on this paradigm are additionally
minimal and dominantly truthful. Aided by the mutual information paradigm, this
thesis exhibits two families of novel mechanisms that are dominantly truthful, detail
free, and minimal in the multi-task setting when the number of questions is large—the
f -mutual information mechanism and the Bregman mutual information mechanism.
This thesis also employs the information theory tools in a more subtle way to exhibit
the first strictly truthful, focal, detail free mechanism which applies to a small num-
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ber of people in the single-question setting—Disagreement mechanism. Moreover,
this thesis also unifies several important previous works by mapping them into the
MIP framework.
This thesis also addresses a main problem, how to elicit expertise without verifica-
tion, in crowd-sourcing situations, where agents have different levels of expertise and
the lack of effort can systemically bias agents reports. This thesis creates a model of
expertise based on a natural assumption that more sophisticated agents know the be-
liefs of less sophisticated agents. Within the model, this thesis provides a mechanism
design framework the Hierarchical Mutual Information paradigm (HMIP) and apply
HMIP in three different settings creating three mechanisms: Multi-HMIM, Learning
Based Multi-HMIM, and Single-HMIM.
Finally, this thesis builds a natural connection between information elicitation
and information aggregation by addressing two related problems: (1) co-training:
how to learn to forecast ground truth using two conditionally independent sources,
without access to any data labeled with ground truth; (2) forecast elicitation without
verification: how to elicit high quality forecasts from the crowds without verification,
by the same information theoretic approach, the MIP framework.
7.1 Future directions
A big goal in the future is to build an unsupervised/decentralized information
trading and information aggregation system in real-world by combining this thesis’s
information theoretic approach, blockchain technique and unsupervised learning the-
ory. To achieve this goal, many interesting future directions can be explored.
Experiments For the information elicitation mechanisms, the most apparent fu-
ture direction is to test the mechanisms by performing real-world experiments. For
example, for the expertise elicitation mechanisms, we can design the experiments by
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simplifying the information structure by roughly dividing it into two levels where the
higher level requires more time. Then we can test our Multi-HMIM or Single-HMIM
in the peer grading scenario or any other situations where certain agents are only
given 15 seconds to grade a work and others are expected to do a good job. We value
the information conditioning on the reports provided by the “15 seconds” agents.
We could also use machine learning to obtain the lower level information. For the
forecast elicitation problem, to test the mechanisms proposed in this thesis, we do
not need that every two agents’ information is conditionally independent. In fact,
for each agent, we only need to find a single reference agent for her such that the
reference agent’s information is conditionally independent with hers. Then we can
run our mechanisms on the agent and her reference agent. In practice, we can pair
the agents with some side information and make sure each pair of agents’ information
is conditionally independent.
For the co-training problem, as usual in the related literature, this thesis reduces
the problem to an optimization problem and do not investigate the computation
complexity and data requirement. The most apparent direction will be running ex-
periments on real data by training two neural networks.
Robust to adversary In order to run the system in real-world, the existence of
adversary who has other incentives must be considered. Adversarial mechanism design
and adversarial algorithm design are two important future directions. Hopefully, those
two problems can also be connected and addressed by the same theoretic approach.
Information cost elicitation Another future direction is the information cost
elicitation: tuning the coefficients of the mechanisms such that the payment matches
the actual effort required by agents pay and the cost needed to elicit high quality
information is minimized.
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Sample complexity, empirical risk The theoretic analysis of the sample com-
plexity needed in calculating the information measures and the empirical risk in
addressing the co-training problem are other interesting theoretic future directions.
Another direction would be the analysis of the influence of the choice of the convex
function f on the convergence rate.
Hopefully, after exploring the above theoretic and experimental future directions,
the real-world unsupervised/decentralized information trading and information ag-
gregation system can be built and applied to many contexts like online education
(e.g. MOOC, peer grading), sharing economy, products pricing.
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APPENDIX A
Additional proofs
A.1 Disagreement mechanism
A.1.1 Proof for main theorem
In this section, we are going to show the first three parts of Theorem 82. Part 4
(tight property) is implied by the impossibility results in Section 2.5.
Lemma 125. The Disagreement Mechanism has the same equilibria as the Divergence-
based BTS.
Theorem 82 Part 1: M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) is truthful.
Proof for Theorem 82 Part 1. Radanovic and Faltings [55] have already show
M(α, β, PS(·, ·)) has truth-telling as a strict equilibrium for any SNIFE prior in
Theorem 81. Since M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) does not change the equilibrium structure
of M(α, β, PS(·, ·)) according to Claim 125, we have M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) has truth-
telling as a strict equilibrium for any SNIFE prior as well.
We finish our proof for the first part of the main theorem. For other parts, We
first give technical definitions for Diversity and Inconsistency and then prove that the
average agent-welfare in the Disagreement Mechanism is Diversity− Inconsistency.
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We first introduce a short hand which will simplify the formula for Diversity and
Inconsistency.
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ) ,
∫
σˆj ,pˆj ,σˆk,pˆk
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj, pˆj)Pr(σˆk,pˆk)←sk(σk)(σˆk, pˆk)
where sj is the strategy of agent j and sj(σj) is a distribution over agent j’s report
profile (σˆj, pˆj) given agent j receives private signal σj and uses strategy sj, and
similarly for agent k. This defines the natural measure on the reports of agents j and
k given that they play strategies sj and sk and a fixed prior Q (which is implicit),
and allows us to succinctly describe probabilities of events in this space.
We define Diversity as the expected Hellinger divergence D∗ between two random
agents when they report different signals, so
Diversity =
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj 6= σˆk)D∗(pˆj, pˆk)
where Pr(j, k) is the probability agents j, k are picked, and Pr(σj, σk) is the
probability that agent j receives private signal σj and agent k receives private signal
σk.
Similarly, we can write down the technical definition for Inconsistency. But here
we do not use Hellinger divergence as the “difference” function in
∑
u,v∈U,Cr(u)=Cr(v) D(u, v),
we use square root of the Hellinger divergence which is the Hellinger distance as the
“difference” function. The reason is we want to use the convexity of the Hellinger
divergence and the triangle inequality of the Hellinger distance. We will describe the
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details in the future. For now we give a technical definition for Inconsistency :
Inconsistency = −
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj = σˆk)
√
D∗(pˆj, pˆk)
Now we define the ClassificationScore as the expected average extra score scoreC :
ClassificationScore =
∑
i
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
σi,σj ,σk
Pr(i)Pr(σi)Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk|σi)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)scoreC(rj, rk)
Claim 126. ClassificationScore = Diversity− Inconsistency.
Claim 127. Every permutation strategy profile has the same ClassificationScore,
Diversity, and Inconsistency as truth-telling.
Claim 128. The average agent-welfare in our Disagreement Mechanism is the
ClassificationScore.
A.1.1.1 Proof outline for main theorem
First note that the average agent-welfare is the ClassificationScore. We want to
show that: if the number of agents is greater than 3, then any symmetric equilibrium
that is not permutation equilibrium must have ClassificationScore strictly less than
truth-telling; and any symmetric equilibrium that has ClassificationScore close to
truth-telling must be close to a permutation equilibrium.
To prove our main theorem, we first introduce the concept of TotalDivergence and
then we use this value as a bridge. Recall that we defined
Diversity =
∑
j,k 6=j,σj ,σk Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj 6= σˆk)D∗(pˆj, pˆk), now we
158
define a similar concept
TotalDivergence =
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)D∗(pˆj, pˆk)
First note that total divergence is robust to summing over j, k or j 6= k since when
j = k, D∗(pˆj, pˆk) = 0.
We can see TotalDivergence ≥ Diversity since TotalDivergence also includes the
divergence between the agents who report the same signals. We show that the equality
holds if and only if Inconsistency = 0:
Claim 129. For any strategy profile s, Diversity(s) = TotalDivergence(s)
⇔ Inconsistency(s) = 0
Corollary 130.
ClassificationScore(truth-telling)
=Diversity(truth-telling)
=TotalDivergence(truth-telling)
Proof. At the truth-telling equilibrium, σˆi = σi, pˆi = qσi for any i, so the inconsis-
tency score of truth-telling is 0 since σˆj = σˆk ⇒ σj = σk ⇒ pˆj = pˆk ⇒ D∗(pˆj, pˆk) = 0
which implies this corollary.
Now we begin to state our proof outline: For any equilibrium s, we define a
modified strategy for s:
We define sBP what we call a best prediction strategy of s as a strategy where each
agent uses the same signal strategy which he uses in s but plays his best prediction
which maximizes the prediction score. In this case, based on Claim 74, for any i,
agent i plays θ−iqσi . In the symmetric case, agents i play θqσi .
The results or our main theorem follows from two technical lemmas:
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(1) ClassificationScore(s) ≤ TotalDivergence(sBP ).[ Lemma 131 ]. This is
our main lemma and we defer the proof of main lemma to Section A.1.1.2.
Once we show it, we can directly prove that the focal property of Disagreement
Mechanism. Note that this result is valid for any equilibrium s—symmetric or
asymmetric—and still a main ingredient when we extend the focal property to
asymmetric case.
(2) TotalDivergence(truthtelling) ≈ TotalDivergence(sBP ) ⇒ θ ≈ pi when s
is a symmetric equilibrium with signal strategy θ. [Lemma 136] This, informally,
means that if a symmetric equilibrium pays close to truth-telling, it must be
close to a permutation equilibrium, and thus pays about the same as truth-
telling.
We will show TotalDivergence(truthtelling) is
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)D
∗(qσj ,qσk)
=
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)D
∗(θpiqσj , θpiqσk)
where Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk) is the probability that agent j, k are picked and agent
j receives private signal σj; agent k receives private signal σk.
We will also show TotalDivergence(sBP ) is∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)D
∗(θqσj , θqσk).
A.1.1.2 Proof for main lemma
In this section, we will prove the main lemma the classification score of non-
permutation equilibrium s is less than the total divergence of the report profiles
when agents report their best predictions given they still use the signal strategy of
s. We first show the inequality and then show that if the equality holds, then s is
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consistent and s = sBP .
Lemma 131 (Main Lemma). For any equilibrium s, if sBP is a best prediction strat-
egy of s, we have
ClassificationScore(s) ≤ TotalDivergence(sBP )
If the equality holds, then we have Inconsistency(s) = 0 and s = sBP .
In order to show the inequality, we first show
TotalDivergence(s)− TotalDivergence(sBP ) ≤ Inconsistency(s)
once we show this, since we have ClassificationScore = Diversity− Inconsistency and
Diversity ≤ TotalDivergence, our main lemma ClassificationScore(s) ≤ TotalDivergence(sBP )
will follow since
ClassificationScore(s) =Diversity(s)− Inconsistency(s)
≤TotalDivergence(s)− Inconsistency(s) ≤ TotalDivergence(sBP )
(A.1)
To prove TotalDivergence(s) − TotalDivergence(sBP ) ≤ Inconsistency(s), we will
write it in a explicit form:
TotalDivergence(s)− TotalDivergence(sBP ) (A.2)
=
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)(D∗(pˆj, pˆk)−D∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk)) (A.3)
It is difficult to compare D∗(pˆj, pˆk) and D∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk) directly. To deal with
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this problem, we introduce a new value D∗(pˆj, θ−kqσk) and write (A.2) as
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)∗∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)
(
D∗(pˆj, pˆk)−D∗(pˆj, θ−kqσk) +D∗(pˆj, θ−kqσk)−D∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk)
)
(A.4)
We will first give the analysis for D∗(pˆj, pˆk) − D∗(pˆj, θ−kqσk), then we will see
D∗(pˆj, θ−kqσk)−D∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk) is similar.
Remember that both D∗(a, ·) and D∗(·, b) are convex functions. So D∗(pˆj, pˆk)−
D∗(pˆj, θ−kqσk) can be seen as g(pˆk)−g(θ−kqσk) where g(·) is convex functionD∗(pˆj, ·).
Recall that
Inconsistency =
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj = σˆk)
√
D∗(pˆj, pˆk)
We hope we can obtain a upper bound for g(pˆk)− g(θ−kqσk) that relates to agent
k’s neighbors’ best response predictions. Here agent k’s neighbors mean the agents
who report the same signal with agent k and best response prediction means the
reported prediction at equilibrium.
Now we begin to analyze the relationship between pˆk and θ−kqσk . Recall that
each agent’s payment depends on his prediction score and information score. θ−kqσk
maximizes the prediction score while pˆk maximizes the payment. The information
score depends on agent k’s neighbors’ reported predictions {pˆl|l 6= k}. So we can see
pˆk is related to both his best prediction θ−kqσk and his neighbors’ reported predictions
{pˆl|l 6= k}. Actually we will show that pˆk can be computed as a linear combination
of θ−kqσk and {pˆl|l 6= k}, which is based on the fact that every proper scoring rule is
linear for the first entry (we will discuss the detail in the following proof). Once we
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have this result, we can construct a linear system about agents’ reported predictions
{pˆi|i} and their best predictions. This linear system helps us obtain a upper bound for
g(pˆk)− g(θ−kqσk) which upper-bounds the distance between agent k’s best response
prediction and his neighbors’ best response predictions.
Equilibrium Analysis We will analyze the equilibrium in our Truthful Mechanism
which is also the equilibrium in our Disagreement Mechanism. We first show, in
Claim 132, that at equilibrium, an agent’s reported prediction only depends on his
private signal and reported signal. Then we use this property to construct a linear
system and via this linear system, we obtain a upper bound for g(pˆk)− g(θ−kqσk) in
Claim 133.
Claim 132. At any equilibrium s = (s1, ..., sn), for each agent i, fix s−i, agent i’s
private signal σi ∈ Σ and reported signal σˆi ∈ Σ, then there exists a unique prediction
which is agent i’s best response.
We define this unique prediction as pˆ(i, σi, σˆi)
In other words, si(σi) is a distribution over at mostm vectors: {(σˆi, pˆ(i, σi, σˆi))|σˆi ∈
Σ} and
Pr(σˆi,pˆi)←si(σ)(σˆi, pˆi) =

θi(σˆi, σi) pˆi = pˆ(i, σi, σˆi)
0 pˆi 6= pˆ(i, σi, σˆi)
Proof. For any agent i, assume his private signal is σi and he reports σˆi at equilibrium
(s1, s2, ..., sn). Now we will prove there is a unique prediction that maximize agent
i’s payment.
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arg max
pˆ
E[payment(i,M+)|σi] (A.5)
= arg max
pˆ
αPS(θ−iqσi , pˆ) (A.6)
+ β
∑
j 6=i
Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj|σi)
∫
σˆj ,pˆj
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj, pˆj)δ(σˆi = σˆj)PS(pˆj, pˆ) (A.7)
= arg max
pˆ
α + β∑
j 6=i
Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj|σi)
∫
σˆj ,pˆj
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj, pˆj)δ(σˆi = σˆj)

PS(
αθ−iqσi + β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj|σi)
∫
σˆj ,pˆj
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj, pˆj)δ(σˆi = σˆj)pˆj
α + β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj|σi)
∫
σˆj ,pˆj
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj, pˆj)δ(σˆi = σˆj)
, pˆ)
(A.8)
=
αθ−iqσi + β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj|σi)
∫
σˆj ,pˆj
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj, pˆj)δ(σˆi = σˆj)pˆj
α + β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj|σi)
∫
σˆj ,pˆj
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj, pˆj)δ(σˆi = σˆj)
(A.9)
In equation (A.6), the first part is the prediction score of agent i, the second
part is part of the information score of agent i. Note that for the information score
PS(pˆj, pˆ) − PS(pˆj, pˆj) of agent i, only PS(pˆj, pˆ) is related to agent i’s reported
prediction pˆ so we only consider this part to analyze the equilibrium. Pr(j) is the
probability that agent j is matched with agent i, Pr(σj|σi) is the probability that
agent j receives σj given agent i receives σi. Then given agent j’s strategy sj and
private signal, we integrate over agent j possible report profiles and only consider the
case σˆi = σˆj.
The second equality follows since proper scoring rule is linear for the first entry.
The last equality follows since we obtain the highest value only if pˆ equals the
first entry based on the property of strict proper scoring rule.
The following claim tells us we can bound the distance between each agent’s
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best response prediction (the prediction which maximizes his total reward) and his
best prediction (the prediction which maximizes his prediciton score) by the distance
between his best response prediction and his neighbors’ best response predictions.
Claim 133. For any convex function g(·), for any σi and σˆi, we have
αPr(σi)(g(pˆ(i, σi, σˆi))− g(θ−iqσi))
≤β
∑
j 6=i
Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj, σi)θj(σˆi, σj)(g(pˆ(j, σj, σˆi))− g(pˆ(i, σi, σˆi)))
Proof. Based on Claim 132, we can rewrite (A.5)=(A.8) as a n×m×m linear system
about
{pˆ(k, σk, σˆk)|k ∈ [1, n], σk ∈ Σ, σˆk ∈ Σ}:
pˆ(i, σi, σˆi) = arg max
pˆ
E[payment(i,M+)|σi] (A.10)
=
αθ−iqσi + β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj|σi)θj(σˆi, σj)pˆ(j, σj, σˆi)
α + β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj|σi)θj(σˆi, σj) (A.11)
Fix i, let λi =
α
α+β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)θj(σˆi,σj) , λj,σj =
β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)θj(σˆi,σj)
α+β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)θj(σˆi,σj)
for j 6= i and σj ∈ Σ, we have λi +
∑
j 6=i,σj λj,σj = 1
Based on the convexity of g(·), we have
g(pˆ(i, σi, σˆi)) = g(λiθ−iqσi +
∑
j 6=i,σj
λj,σj pˆ(j, σj, σˆi))
≤ λig(θ−iqσi) +
∑
j 6=i,σj
λj,σjg(pˆ(j, σj, σˆi))
After substitutions, we multiply
(
α + βPr(j)
∑
j 6=i
∑
σj
Pr(σj|σi)θj(σˆi, σj)
)
Pr(σi)
in both sides. Note that Pr(σi)Pr(σj|σi) = Pr(σj, σi), then by manipulation, the
claim follows.
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Claim 133 gives an upper bound to g(pˆk)−g(θ−kqσk) that is the distance between
agent k’s best response prediction and his neighbors’ best response predictions. Now
we continue the proof for our main lemma.
To bound
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)∗∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)(D∗(pˆj, pˆk)−D∗(pˆj, θ−kqσk) +D∗(pˆj, θ−kqσk)−D∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk))
(A.12)
We rewrite
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ) as θj(σˆj, σj)θk(σˆk, σk) and pˆj as pˆ(j, σj, σˆj), pˆk as pˆ(k, σk, σˆk)
which we can do because of Claim 132.
We first give an upper bound to
∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)θj(σˆj, σj)θk(σˆk, σk)
(D∗(pˆ(j, σj, σˆj), pˆ(k, σk, σˆk))−D∗(pˆ(j, σj, σˆj), θ−kqσk))
The analysis for the second part is similar.
Based on Claim 133, we have
166
∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)θj(σˆj, σj)θk(σˆk, σk) (A.13)
∗ (D∗(pˆ(j, σj, σˆj), pˆ(k, σk, σˆk))−D∗(pˆ(j, σj, σˆj), θ−kqσk)) (A.14)
≤
∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)θj(σˆj, σj)θk(σˆk, σk) (A.15)
∗ β
αPr(σk)
∑
l 6=k
∑
σl
Pr(l)Pr(σl, σk)θl(σˆk, σl) (A.16)
∗ (D∗(pˆ(j, σj, σˆj), pˆ(l, σl, σˆk))−D∗(pˆ(j, σj, σˆj), pˆ(k, σk, σˆk))) (A.17)
Since
Pr(σj ,σk)
Pr(σk)
≤ 1, we obtain (A.19) from (A.17).
(A.17) ≤
∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)θj(σˆj, σj)θk(σˆk, σk)
β
α
∑
l 6=k
∑
σl
Pr(l)Pr(σl, σk)θl(σˆk, σl) (A.18)
∗ (D∗(pˆ(j, σj, σˆj), pˆ(l, σl, σˆk))−D∗(pˆ(j, σj, σˆj), pˆ(k, σk, σˆk))) (A.19)
≤
∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)θj(σˆj, σj)θk(σˆk, σk)
β
α
∑
l 6=k
∑
σl
Pr(l)Pr(σl, σk)θl(σˆk, σl) (A.20)
∗ |(D∗(pˆ(j, σj, σˆj), pˆ(l, σl, σˆk))−D∗(pˆ(j, σj, σˆj), pˆ(k, σk, σˆk)))| (A.21)
Note that (A.21) and (A.19) are identical except for the value sign.
Then we obtain (A.22) from (A.21) since
|D∗(x, y)−D∗(x, z)| ≤ (
√
D∗(x, y) +
√
D∗(x, z))|
√
D∗(x, y)−
√
D∗(x, z))|
≤ 2|
√
D∗(x, y)−
√
D∗(x, z))|
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The second inequality follows since 0 ≤ D∗ ≤ 1
(A.21) ≤2
∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)θj(σˆj, σj)θk(σˆk, σk)
β
α
∑
l 6=k
∑
σl
Pr(l)Pr(σl, σk)θl(σˆk, σl)
|(
√
D∗(pˆ(j, σj, σˆj), pˆ(l, σl, σˆk))−
√
D∗(pˆ(j, σj, σˆj), pˆ(k, σk, σˆk)))| (A.22)
Once we get (A.22), we can use the fact that
√
D∗ is metric which implies the
triangle inequality; (A.23) follows.
(A.22) ≤2
∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)θj(σˆj, σj)θk(σˆk, σk)
β
α
∑
l 6=k
∑
σl
Pr(l)Pr(σl, σk)θl(σˆk, σl)(
√
D∗(pˆ(k, σk, σˆk), pˆ(l, σl, σˆk))) (A.23)
Note that
∑
σj
∑
σˆj
θj(σˆj, σj) =
∑
σj
1 = m, also we have
∑
j Pr(l) =
∑
j Pr(j) =
1, Pr(k, l) = Pr(j, k) then (A.25) follows.
(A.23) =2m
β
α
∑
l
∑
k 6=l
∑
σk,σˆk
Pr(k, l)θk(σˆk, σk)
∑
σl
Pr(σl, σk)θl(σˆk, σl) (A.24)
∗ (
√
D∗(pˆ(k, σk, σˆk), pˆ(l, σl, σˆk))) (A.25)
=2m
β
α
∑
k,l 6=k
∑
σk,σˆk,σl
Pr(k, l)θk(σˆk, σk)Pr(σl, σk)θl(σˆk, σl) (A.26)
∗ (
√
D∗(pˆ(k, σk, σˆk), pˆ(l, σl, σˆk))) (A.27)
=2m
β
α
× Inconsistency (A.28)
The analysis for the second part
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∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)θj(σˆj, σj)θk(σˆk, σk)(D
∗(pˆ(j, σj, σˆj), θ−kqσk)−D∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk))
is similar, note that j and k are symmetric and D∗(·, θ−kqσk) is a convex function.
We can use Claim 133 and triangle inequality to bound the second part by 2mβ
α
×
Inconsistency.
So if we set 2mβ
α
< 1
2
, then TotalDivergence(s)−TotalDivergence(sBP ) < Inconsistency,
proving the inequality in our main lemma.
To prove that if the equality in our main lemma holds then s = sBP , we first show
that
Claim 134. The equality in ClassificationScore(s) ≤ TotalDivergence(sBP ) holds iff
Inconsistency(s) = 0.
Proof. Note that (A.1) tells us when ClassificationScore(s) = TotalDivergence(sBP ),
we have Diversity(s) = TotalDivergence(s) which implies Inconsistency(s) = 0 based
on Claim 129.
Then we will prove
Claim 135. If Inconsistency(s) = 0 then s = sBP
Proof. Recall in (A.10), we have for any i,
pˆ(i, σi, σˆi) = arg max
pˆ
E[payment(i,M+)|σi]
=
αθ−iqσi + βPr(j)
∑
j 6=i
∑
σj
Pr(σj|σi)θj(σˆi, σj)pˆ(j, σj, σˆi)
α + βPr(j)
∑
j 6=i
∑
σj
Pr(σj|σi)θj(σˆi, σj) (A.29)
If Inconsistency(s) = 0, we can see if θj(σˆi, σj) > 0 we must have pˆ(j, σj, σˆi) =
pˆi(i, σi, σˆi). So we have θ−iqσi = pˆi(i, σi, σˆi) for any i since we have αθ−iqσi =
αpˆi(i, σi, σˆi) if we multiply
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α+βPr(j)
∑
j 6=i
∑
σj
Pr(σj|σi)θj(σˆi, σj) in both sides of equation (A.29) and combine
the fact that pˆ(j, σj, σˆi) = pˆi(i, σi, σˆi). Thus we have s = sBP .
A.1.1.3 Proof for main theorem part 2 and 3
Theorem 82 Part 2: M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) has truth-telling as a focal equilib-
rium. We use our main lemma ClassificationScore(s) < TotalDivergence(sBP )
directly to prove: any symmetric non-permutation equilibrium’s agent wel-
fare (ClassificationScore) must be strictly less than truth-telling
Notice that if all agents play a symmetric signal strategy θ, then for any j, k,
θ−j = θ−k = θ. For any symmetric non-permutation equilibrium s, it is possible that
the signal strategy of s is not a permutation or it is a permutation θpi but agents do
not report piqσ given σ is their private signal. So we consider two cases:
(a) We first consider the case that the signal strategy θ of s is a permutation
matrix θpi, but agents do not report piqσ.
ClassificationScore(s) <TotalDivergence(sBP )
=
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)D
∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk)
=
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)D
∗(θpiqσj , θpiqσk)
=
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)D
∗(qσj ,qσk)
=TotalDivergence(truthtelling)
=ClassificationScore(truthtelling)
The first inequality follows from our main lemma. The inequality is strict for the
following reason: when the signal strategy θ of s is a permutation matrix, sBP is a
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permutation strategy profile since for any i, agent i’s best prediction is θ−iqσ = θqσ.
Based on our main lemma if ClassificationScore(s) = TotalDivergence(sBP ), we have
s = sBP which implies that s is a permutation strategy profile which is a contradiction
to the fact s is a non-permutation strategy profile.
The second line follows since at sBP , each agent’s reported prediction only depends
on his private signal.
The last equality follows from Corollary 130.
(b) We consider the case that the signal strategy θ of s is not a permutation
matrix. The above proof still holds except in two places: one is the inequality in the
first line may not be strict; another is the equality in the fourth line should be a strict
inequality:
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)D
∗(θpiqσj , θpiqσk)
<
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)D
∗(qσj ,qσk)
The inequality must be strict since based on Corollary 80, we know that if θ is
not a permutation, and Q is fine-grained, then there exists σ1 6= σ2 such that
D∗(θqσ1 , θqσ2) < D
∗(qσ1 ,qσ2). Also based on non-zero assumption of Q, we have
Pr(σj = σ1, σk = σ2) > 0.
So in both of the above two cases, we have
ClassificationScore(s) < ClassificationScore(truthtelling)
if s is not a permutation equilibrium
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Theorem 82 Part 3: M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) has truth-telling as a robust focal
equilibrium:
TotalDivergence(truthtelling) ≈ TotalDivergence(sBP )⇒ θ ≈ pi Now we start
to prove that when a symmetric equilibrium has classification score that is close to
that of truth-telling, its signal strategy θ is close to a permutation. We prove it
by contradiction. We will assume θ is far from a permutation equilibrium, that is,
recalling the definition of τ -close, we assume there exists a row of θ that has at least
two large numbers. Under this assumption, we will show the total divergence of sBP is
far from classification score of truth-telling when n is sufficiently large. Formally, we
assume that given any τ , there exists u′, v′, w′ ∈ Σ such that θ(u′, v′) > τ, θ(u′, w′) >
τ . Under this assumption, we will prove that, when n > N(τ,Q), the total divergence
of sBP is O(τ
3) far from classification score of truth-telling.
Lemma 136. Given any fixed τ , for any symmetric equilibrium s with signal strategy
θ, if there exists u′, v′, w′ ∈ Σ such that θ(u′, v′) > τ, θ(u′, w′) > τ , then
TotalDivergence(truthtelling)− TotalDivergence(sBP ) ≥ c2(τc1)3c4c3
Proof of Lemma 136. We first write TotalDivergence in an explicit form:
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)D
∗(qσj ,qσk)−
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)D
∗(θqσj , θqσk)
(A.30)
Actually, We will show for any j, k,
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(σj, σk)D
∗(qσj ,qσk)−
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(σj, σk)D
∗(θqσj , θqσk) (A.31)
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is greater than c2(τc1)
3c4c3, which implies the result.
We want give a lower bound for (A.31). In order to obtain this lower bound,
we are going to transform this value to
∑
u λug(xu) − g(
∑
u λuxu) where g(·) is a
convex function. To obtain a lower bound of
∑
u λug(xu)− g(
∑
u λuxu), we have an
observation:
For any convex function g(·), g(∑u λuxu) and ∑u λug(xu) are “very different” if
there are two large coefficients λ1 and λ2 with the corresponding x1 and x2 that are
“very different”. Now we introduce a claim to show this observation.
Claim 137.
∑
u
λug(xu)− g(
∑
u
λuxu) ≥ d2(g)
2
λ1λ2
λ1 + λ2
||x1 − x2||2
where d2(g) is a lower bound of g
′′(·)
Proof.
g
(∑
u
λuxu
)
≤ (λ1 + λ2)g
(
λ1x1 + λ2x2
λ1 + λ2
)
+
∑
u>2
λug(xu) ≤
∑
u
λug(xu)
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So
∑
u
λug(xu)− g(
∑
u
λuxu)
≥
∑
u
λug(xu)− (λ1 + λ2)g
(
λ1x1 + λ2x2
λ1 + λ2
)
−
∑
u>2
λug(xu)
= λ1g(x1) + λ2g(x2)− (λ1 + λ2)g(λ1x1 + λ2x2
λ1 + λ2
)
= (λ1 + λ2)(
λ1g(x1) + λ2g(x2)
λ1 + λ2
− g(λ1x1 + λ2x2
λ1 + λ2
))
≥ (λ1 + λ2)d2(g)
2
λ1λ2
(λ1 + λ2)2
||x1 − x2||2
=
d2(g)
2
λ1λ2
λ1 + λ2
||x1 − x2||2
where d2(g) is the lower bound of g
′′(·)
The first inequality follows if we rewrite
∑
u λuxu as (λ1+λ2)
λ1x1+λ2x2
λ1+λ2
+
∑
u>2 λuxu
and apply convexity.
Then we do several manipulations including taking λ1+λ2 outside. For continuous
convex function g(·), we have tg(x) + (1 − t)g(y) − g(tx + (1 − t)y) ≥ 1
2
d2(g)t(1 −
t)||x − y||2 according to [47], then we replace t by λ1
λ1+λ2
and set x = x1, y = x2 and
obtain the final result.
We can think of θ(u′, v′) and θ(u′, w′) as the two large coefficients (actually they
are part of the coefficients). Then we need to find two “very different” entries that
corresponding to those large coefficients. We pick two specific signals s′, t′ ∈ Σ such
that qs′ and qt′ are “very different” in position v
′ and w′. The reason we do this
is that when we compute θq, θ(u′, v′) and θ(u′, w′) are the two large entries which
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correspond to the positions v′ and w′ in q. Formally, we pick s′, t′ ∈ Σ such that
∥∥∥∥q(v′|s′)q(v′|t′) − q(w′|s′)q(w′|t′)
∥∥∥∥ = maxs,t
∥∥∥∥q(v′|s)q(v′|t) − q(w′|s)q(w′|t)
∥∥∥∥
Once we have chosen the two specific signals, since Pr(s′, t′)(D∗(qs′ ,qt′)−D∗(θqs′ , θqt′))
is less than (A.31) based on the fact D∗(qs,qt)−D∗(θqs, θqt) ≥ 0 for s, t 6= s′, t′, we
will give a lower bound of Pr(s′, t′)(D∗(qs′ ,qt′)−D∗(θqs′ , θqt′)) which is also a lower
bound of (A.31).
Let f(x) = (
√
x − 1)2. For convenience, we will write the dot product of two
vectors
∑
v a(v)b(v) as a(·)b(·). Now we give a explicit form of D∗:
Pr(s′, t′)(D∗(qs′ ,qt′)−D∗(θqs′ , θqt′)) (A.32)
= Pr(s′, t′)
(∑
v
q(v|s′)f
(
q(v|t′)
q(v|s′)
)
−
∑
u
θ(u, ·)q(·|s′)f
(
1
θ(u, ·)q(·|s′)θ(u, ·)q(·|t
′)
))
(A.33)
We take
∑
u θ(u, ·)q(·|s′) out and note that
∑
u θ(u, v) = 1,
so
∑
u θ(u, ·)q(·|s′) 1θ(u,·)q(·|s′)θ(u, v) = 1, then we obtain (A.35) from (A.33).
(A.33) =Pr(s′, t′)
∑
u
θ(u, ·)q(·|s′)∗(
1
θ(u, ·)q(·|s′)
∑
v
θ(u, v)q(v|s′)f
(
q(v|t′)
q(v|s′)
)
(A.34)
− f
(
1
θ(u, ·)q(·|s′)
∑
v
θ(u, v)q(v|s′) q(v|t
′)
q(v|s′)
))
(A.35)
Then we pick the special u′ to obtain (A.37). For the part
∑
u6=u′ , since f(·) is a
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convex function, we have
1
θ(u, ·)q(·|s′)
∑
v
θ(u, v)q(v|s′)f( q(v|t
′)
q(v|s′)) ≥ f
(
1
θ(u, ·)q(·|s′)
∑
v
θ(u, v)q(v|s′) q(v|t
′)
q(v|s′)
)
so (A.35) is greater than (A.37).
(A.35) ≥Pr(s′, t′)θ(u′, ·)q(·|s′)∗(
1
θ(u′, ·)q(·|s′)
∑
v
θ(u′, v)q(v|s′)f
(
q(v|t′)
q(v|s′)
)
(A.36)
− f
(
1
θ(u′, ·)q(·|s′)
∑
v
θ(u′, v)q(v|s′) q(v|t
′)
q(v|s′)
))
(A.37)
Note that θ(u′, v′) and θ(u′, w′) are large, so in the convex function f(·), there
are two large coefficients 1
θ(u′,·)q(·|s′)θ(u
′, v′)q(v′|s′) and 1
θ(u′,·)q(·|s′)θ(u
′, w′)q(w′|s′) which
correspond to q(v
′|t′)
q(v′|s′) and
q(w′|t′)
q(w′|s′) . Then based on our choice for s
′, t′ and Claim 137,
we have
(A.37) ≥Pr(s′, t′)θ(u′, ·)q(·|s′)c4
2
(
(θ(u′, v′)q(v′|s′)) ∗ (θ(v′, w′)q(w′|s′))
θ(u′, v′)q(v′|s′) + θ(v′, w′)q(w′|s′)
∥∥∥∥ q(v′|t′)q(v′|s′) − q(w′|t′)q(w′|s′)
∥∥∥∥2
)
(A.38)
≥c2(τc1)3c4c3 (A.39)
The last inequality follows since Pr(s′, t′) ≥ c2, both θ(u′, v′)q(v′|s′) and θ(v′, w′)q(w′|s′)
are greater than τc1. Also note that:
θ(u′, ·)q(·|s′) ≥ θ(u′, v′)q(v′|s′) + θ(v′, w′)q(w′|s′) ≥ 2τc1
and
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θ(u′, v′)q(v′|s′) + θ(v′, w′)q(w′|s′) ≤ 1.
Any symmetric equilibrium that has agent-welfare close to truth-telling
must be close to a permutation equilibrium: We have already proved that no
symmetric equilibrium pays more than truth-telling. For the symmetric equilibrium
s∗ such that
ClassificationScore(s∗) > ClassificationScore(truthtelling)− γ1
we have
TotalDivergence(truthtelling) = ClassificationScore(truthtelling)
≤ClassificationScore(s∗) + γ1
≤TotalDivergence(s∗BP ) + γ1 ≤ ClassificationScore(truthtelling) + γ1
Let γ1 = (τ1c1)
3c2c3c4, then s
∗ is τ1 close to a permutation equilibrium or there
will be a contradiction based on Lemma 136. By manipulations, we will obtain our
result.
A.1.2 Asymmetric equilibria
Theorem 138. For any number of signals m, given any SNIFE prior, inM+(α, β, PS(·, ·))
with α
β
< 1
4m
,
1. no equilibrium has agent welfare greater than γ2(n) more than that of truth-
telling where n is the number of agents; and
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2. any profile that pays within γ2(n) of truth-telling must be τ2(n) close to a per-
mutation strategy profile.
where γ2(n) = O(
m√
n
) and τ2(n) = O(
6
√
m2
n
) (the constants we omit only depend
on the first two moments of prior Q)1.
Proof Outline for Theorem 138 We want to show that if the number of agents
is sufficiently large, then no equilibrium can have a ClassificationScore that is much
greater than truth-telling; any equilibrium that has ClassificationScore close to truth-
telling must be close to a permutation equilibrium.
The proof is similar with the proof of our main theorem. At a high level, we will
show when the number of agents is sufficiently large, any asymmetric equilibrium
can be symmetrized. Then we follow the proof of our main theorem by using the
symmetrized version of the asymmetric equilibrium.
We define symmetrized sBP as a strategy where each agent plays θ¯nqσ given σ is
his private signal where θ¯n is the average signal strategy of sBP (also of s). We show
the report profiles of symmetrized sBP in the third picture of Figure A.1
Recall that in the proof of our main theorem, we show that
(1) ClassificationScore(s) ≤ TotalDivergence(sBP ).[ Lemma 131 ].
(2) TotalDivergence(truthtelling) ≈ TotalDivergence(sBP )⇒ θ ≈ pi. [Lemma 136]
Note that in part (2) is valid only if s is symmetric. However, if we replace θ by
θ¯n where θ¯n is the average signal strategy of s
∗. We can rewrite part (2) as
(2) TotalDivergence(truthtelling) ≈ TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) ⇒
θ¯n ≈ pi where θ¯n is the average signal strategy of s∗. [Lemma 136]
1Actually γ2(n) =
4
√
2m√
n
and τ62 (n) =
128∗m2
nc61(c2c3c4)
2 , c1 = mins,t∈Σ q(s|t), c2 = mins,t∈Σ Pr(s, t),
c3 = minu,v maxs,t || q(u|s)q(u|t) − q(v|s)q(v|t) ||2, c4 = mins,t,u f ′′( q(u|s)q(u|t) ) where f(x) = (
√
x− 1)2.
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It is valid for any equilibrium s.
In addition to the two key parts proved in the proof of our main theorem, we
have to prove two more parts to prove the asymmetric case. The whole proof of
Theorem 138 is illustrated in Figure A.1:
At a high level, the following two parts show that when the number of agents is
sufficiently large, we can replace any asymmetric equilibrium by its symmetrized
version since they are “close” to each other.
(3) TotalDivergence(sBP ) ≈ TotalDivergence(symmetrized sBP ) when the
number of agents is sufficiently large. [Lemma 139] Intuitively, when n is
large enough, θ−j will be close to θ¯n. We will use this observation to prove this
part.
(4) ClassificationScore(s∗) ≥ ClassificationScore(truthtelling)
⇒ TotalDivergence(truthtelling) ≈ TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP )
when the number of agents is sufficiently large.[Corollary 140] Here s∗BP
is the best prediction strategy of s∗. This part will also imply no equilibrium
can have ClassificationScore that is much greater than truth-telling.
Figure A.1: Proof Outline for Theorem 138
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A.1.3 Proof for Theorem 138
(3) TotalDivergence(sBP ) ≈ TotalDivergence(symmetrized sBP ) when the
number of agents is sufficiently large. We symmetrize sBP which means we let
each agent i report θ¯nqσi given σi is agent i’s private signal and θ¯n is the average signal
strategy of sBP and show that the total divergence will not change much. Intuitively,
this is because θ−i are similar among agents when there are many agents. l
Lemma 139. Given any SNIFE prior Q, for any  > 0, there exists N =
32∗m2
2
such
that if n > N, for any strategy (θ1, θ2, ..., θn), any two agents j, k,
|D∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk)−D∗(θ¯nqσj , θ¯nqσk)| < 
Proof of Lemma 139. For convenience, let s = σj, t = σk
|D∗(θ−jqs, θ−kqt)−D∗(θ¯nqs, θ¯nqt)| (A.40)
=|
∑
u
(√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ−k(u, ·)qt
)2
−
(√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qt
)2
| (A.41)
=|
∑
u
(√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ−k(u, ·)qt −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs +
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qt
)
∗(√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ−k(u, ·)qt +
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qt
)
| (A.42)
≤2 ∗m ∗max
u
(
|
√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs|+ |
√
θ−k(u, ·)qt −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qt|
)
(A.43)
≤4 ∗m ∗max
u,s,j
|
√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs| (A.44)
The first equality follows from the definition of Helinger-divergence.
The second equality is just formula for the difference of square.
To arrive at (A.43),
∑
u |
(√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ−k(u, ·)qt +
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qt
)
| ≤∑
u 2 = 2m where the inequality follows from the fact 0 < D
∗ < 1.
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The last equality follows since both |√θ−j(u, ·)qs−√θ¯n(u, ·)qs| and |√θ−k(u, ·)qt−√
θ¯n(u, ·)qt| are less than maxu,s,j |
√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs|.
Now we consider two cases for any u, s, j:
(1) |√θ−j(u, ·)qs−√θ¯n(u, ·)qs| ≤ 4∗m : It is clear the result in this Lemma follows.
(2) |√θ−j(u, ·)qs −√θ¯n(u, ·)qs| > 4∗m : Notice that (n − 1)θ−j = nθ¯n − θj, then
we can see
θ−j = θ¯n +
1
n
(θ−j − θj)
4 ∗m ∗ |
√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs| (A.45)
= 4 ∗m ∗ | θ−j(u, ·)qs − θ¯n(u, ·)qs√
θ−j(u, ·)qs +
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs
| (A.46)
= 4 ∗m ∗
1
n
|(θ−j(u, ·)− θj(u, ·))qs|√
θ−j(u, ·)qs +
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs
(A.47)
< 4 ∗m ∗ 2 ∗ 4 ∗m

1
n
<  (A.48)
when n > N =
32∗m2
2
The first equality follows from the formula of the difference of squares.
The second equality follows from θ−j = θ¯n + 1n(θ−j − θj).
If |√θ−j(u, ·)qs−√θ¯n(u, ·)qs| > 4∗m , we have |√θ−j(u, ·)qs +√θ¯n(u, ·)qs| > 4∗m
as well, the third line follows.
(4) ClassificationScore(s∗) ≥ ClassificationScore(truthtelling)
⇒ TotalDivergence(truthtelling) ≈ TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) when
the number of agents is sufficiently large. The following corollary is derived
from Lemma 139. It will imply not only
TotalDivergence(truthtelling) ≈ TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) but also any
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equilibrium cannot have agent-welfare (ClassificationScore) that is much greater than
truth-telling when the number of agents is sufficiently large.
Corollary 140. Given any SNIFE prior Q, for any  > 0, if n > N =
128∗m2
2
, for
any equilibrium s∗ that has greater ClassificationScore than the truth-telling Classifi-
cationScore minus /2:
Classification(truthtelling)
< Classification(s∗) +

2
< TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) + 
≤ Classification(truthtelling) + 
Proof for Corollary 140.
TotalDivergence(truthtelling) = ClassificationScore(truthtelling)
≤ ClassificationScore(s∗) + 
2
≤ TotalDivergence(s∗BP ) +

2
< TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) + 
≤ ClassificationScore(truthtelling) + 
The first equality follows from Corollary 130.
The second inequality follows from the condition.
The third inequality follows from the main lemma.
The fourth inequality follows from Lemma 139.
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The last inequality follows from information monotonicity since
ClassificationScore(truthtelling)− TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP )
=
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)D
∗(qσj ,qσk)−
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)D
∗(θ¯nqσj , θ¯nqσk)
=
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)(D
∗(qσj ,qσk)−D∗(θ¯nqσj , θ¯nqσk)) ≥ 0
The second equality follows since if j = k, D∗(qσj ,qσk) = 0
This corollary induces the following result:
No equilibrium can have agent-welfare that is much greater than truth-
telling Let 
2
= γ2, we need n ≥ 128∗m22 to obtain γ2 tolerance based on Corol-
lary 140. By manipulations, we obtain our result.
If the number of agents is sufficiently large, any equilibrium that has agent-
welfare close to truth-telling must be close to permutation equilibrium:
Let  = (τ2c1)
3c2c3c4, if n >
32∗m2
(/2)2
, we have already proved that
TotalDivergence(truthtelling)− TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) < 
based on Corollary 140. If s∗ is not τ2 close to a permutation equilibrium, we will
have
TotalDivergence(truthtelling)−TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) > (τ2c1)3c2c3c4 = 
which is a contradiction based on Lemma 136. By manipulations, we obtain our
result.
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A.1.4 Proof for claims
Claim 72. Assume that the distribution over all agents’ private signals is ω ∈ ∆Σ,
the distribution over all agents’ reported signals will be θ¯nω.
Proof for Claim 72. The probability of signal σ will be
∑
i
Pr(i)
∑
σ′
θi(σ, σ
′)ω(σ′) =
1
n
∑
i
∑
σ′
θi(σ, σ
′)ω(σ′) =
∑
σ′
θ¯n(σ, σ
′)ω(σ′)
where Pr(i) is the probability agent i is picked. For each agent i, we sum the prob-
ability agent i receives private signal σ′ which is ω(σ′) times the probability that he
reports σ given he receives σ′ which is θi(σ, σ′) over all possible private signal σ′.
So the distribution of reported signals is θ¯nω.
Claim 74. For each agent i, if he receives private signal σi, agent i will believe that
the expected likelihood of other agents’ reported signals is θ−iqσi where θ−i =
∑
j 6=i θj
n−1 .
Proof for Claim 74. For each agent i, given he receives private signal σi, he will
believe the expected likelihood for other agents’ private signals is qσi . Based on
Claim 72, he will believe the expected likelihood for other agents’ reported signals is
the average signal strategy of other agents’ signal strategies times qσi which is θ−iqσi
where θ−i =
∑
j 6=i θj
n−1 .
Claim 78. For any transition matrix θm×m where the sum of every column is 1, θ is
a permutation matrix iff for any row of θ, there at most one non-zero entry.
Proof for Claim 78. It is clear that any permutation matrix has exactly one non-zero
entry, which is 1, in each row and each column. Thus we only need to prove the
direction that if for any row of θ, there is at most one non-zero entry, θ must be a
permutation matrix.
We first prove that there are exactly m non-zero entries in θ: if for any row of θ,
there is at most one non-zero entry, we can see θ has at most m non-zero entries. θ
184
is a transition matrix where the sum of every column is 1,which implies that θ has at
least m non-zero entries. Thus we proved there are exactly m non-zero entries in θ.
We have just shown that θ has exactly m non-zero entries. Since θ has at most
one non-zero entry in each row, θ must have exactly one non-zero entry in each row.
θ also has at least one non-zero entry in each column since it is a transition matrix,
so θ must have exactly one non-zero entry 1 in each column. Thus θ has exactly one
non-zero entry 1 in each row and each column which implies that θ is a permutation
matrix.
Claim 125. The Disagreement Mechanism has the same equilibria as the Divergence-
based BTS.
Proof for Claim 125. The value of scoreC(rj, rk) does not depend on agent i’s strat-
egy. The term related to agent i’s strategy contained in scoreM is paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(i, r).
This implies that agent i’s marginal benefit from deviation in M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) is
the same with its marginal benefit from the same deviation in M(α, β, PS(·, ·)).
Claim 126.
ClassificationScore = Diversity− Inconsistency
Proof for Claim 126. Based on the definition of ClassificationScore, we have
∑
i
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
σi,σj ,σk
Pr(i)Pr(σi)Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk|σi)∗ (A.49)
∫
σˆj ,pˆj ,σˆk,pˆk
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj, pˆj)Pr(σˆk,pˆk)←sk(σk)(σˆk, pˆk)scoreC(rj, rk)
(A.50)
Now we begin our proof:
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∑
i
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
σi,σj ,σk
Pr(i)Pr(σi)Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk|σi)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)scoreC(rj, rk)
=
∑
i
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
σj ,σk
1
n(n− 1)(n− 2)Pr(σj, σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)scoreC(rj, rk)
=
1
n(n− 1)
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(σj, σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)scoreC(rj, rk)
=
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)scoreC(rj, rk)
The first equality follows since fix j, k, scoreC(rj, rk) does not depend on i and
we also have
∑
σi
Pr(σi)Pr(σj, σk|σi) = Pr(σj, σk).
The second equality follows since for any (j, k), j 6= k pair, there are n−2 numbers
that are neither j nor k which means (j, k) will repeat n − 2 times since there are
n− 2 possible i.
By definition we can see ClassificationScore = Diversity− Inconsistency.
Claim 127. Every permutation strategy profile has the same ClassificationScore,
Diversity, and Inconsistency with truth-telling.
Proof for Claim 127. Any permutation strategy profile’s report profiles can be seen
as a relabeling to truth-telling’s report profiles, which implies the claim.
Claim 128. The average agent-welfare in our Disagreement Mechanism is ClassificationScore
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Proof for Claim 128. We only need to prove
∑
i scoreM(i, r) = 0.
∑
i
scoreM(i, r) =
∑
i∈A
scoreM(i, r) +
∑
i∈B
scoreM(i, r)
=
∑
i∈A
(
paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(i, r)− 1|A|
∑
i∈B
paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(i, r)
)
+
∑
i∈B
(
paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(i, r)− 1|B|
∑
i∈A
paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(i, r)
)
= 0
Claim 129. For any strategy profile s,
Diversity(s) = TotalDivergence(s) ⇔ Inconsistency(s) = 0
Proof for Claim 129. Note that
TotalDivergence(s)− Diversity(s)
=
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj = σˆk)D
∗(pˆj, pˆk)
while
Inconsistency(s) =
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj, σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj = σˆk)
√
D∗(pˆj, pˆk)
Because each part in TotalDivergence(s)− Diversity(s) is non-negative,
TotalDivergence(s)− Diversity(s) = 0 will imply
Pr(σj, σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj = σˆk)D
∗(pˆj, pˆk) = 0.
So we have Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj = σˆk) = 0 or D
∗(pˆj, pˆk) = 0 which implies
Pr(σj, σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj = σˆk)
√
D∗(pˆj, pˆk) = 0. The proof for another direction
is similar.
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A.1.5 Proof of Theorem 81
Theorem 81. [55]
For any α, β > 0 and any strictly proper scoring rule PS, M(α, β, PS) has truth-
telling as a strict Bayesian-Nash equilibrium whenever the prior Q is informative and
symmetric.
Proof. We must show that for every agent, if other agents tell the truth, then this
agent can (strictly) maximize his expected payoff if and only if he chooses to tell the
truth.
Assume that all agents other than i are telling the truth. The probability that
agent i is matched with agent j is Pr(j) = 1
n−1 . The expected payoff for agent i is:
E[paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(i, r)|σi] (A.51)
=
∑
j 6=i
(Pr(j)E[αscoreP (ri, rj) + βscoreI(ri, rj)|σi]) (A.52)
=
∑
j 6=i
1
n− 1[αPS(E(σˆj|σi), pˆi) + β(−Pr(σˆj = σˆi|σi)E[(PS(pˆj, pˆj)− PS(pˆj, pˆi))|σi, σˆj = σˆi]]
(A.53)
=
∑
j 6=i
1
n− 1[αPS(E(σj|σi), pˆi) + β(Pr(σj = σˆi|σi)(PS(qσˆi , pˆi)− PS(qσˆi ,qσˆi)))]
(A.54)
= αPS(E(
∑
j 6=i
1
n− 1σj|σi), pˆi) +
∑
j 6=i
β
n− 1[(Pr(σj = σˆi|σi)(PS(qσˆi , pˆi)− PS(qσˆi ,qσˆi)))]
(A.55)
= αPS(θ−iqσi , pˆi) +
∑
j 6=i
β
n− 1[(Pr(σj = σˆi|σi)(PS(qσˆi , pˆi)− PS(qσˆi ,qσˆi)))]
(A.56)
= αPS(qσi , pˆi) +
∑
j 6=i
β
n− 1[(Pr(σj = σˆi|σi)(PS(qσˆi , pˆi)− PS(qσˆi ,qσˆi)))] (A.57)
From (A.52) to (A.53): When σˆi 6= σˆj, the information score is 0, so we only need
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to consider the case σˆi = σˆj.
From (A.53) to (A.54): All agents other than i tell the truth, so σˆj = σj and
pˆj = qσj = qσˆj = qσˆi .
From (A.54) to (A.55): The proper scoring rule is linear for the first entry.
From (A.55) to (A.56): Based on Claim 74, E(
∑
j 6=i
1
n−1σj|σi) = θ−iqσi .
From (A.56) to (A.57): Note that for any j 6= i, agent j tells the truth so θ−i = I.
First, if agent i plays truthfully, then σˆi = σi, pˆi = qσi , and we will have
E(payment(i,M)|σi) = αPS(qσi ,qσi) because PS(qσˆi , pˆi)− PS(qσˆi ,qσˆi) = 0.
Now show that to receive a payment this high, agent i must play truthfully.
Assume that
E(payment(i,M)|σi) ≥ αPS(qσi ,qσi). First, the second term of Equation (A.57) is
non-positive based on the property of proper scoring rule. Then we must have that
PS(qσi , pˆi) ≥ PS(qσi ,qσi), but because PS is a strictly proper scoring rule, this
happens only if pˆi = qσi . But this implies that the second term of Equations (A.57)
equals 0, and this requires that PS(qσˆi , pˆi) = PS(qσˆi ,qσˆi).
However, by the properties of strictly proper scoring rules, this means qσˆi = pˆi.
However, we already showed that pˆi = pi = qσi . Putting this together we see that
qσˆi = qσi . Based on the informative prior assumption, this implies that σˆi = σi.
So we proved that for any agent i, when other agents tell the truth, agent i can
obtain the best expected payoff if and only if he tells the truth which means truth-
telling is a strict Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the truthful mechanism.
A.2 Proof of the truthfulness of BTS
Proof of Theorem 85 (i) [51]. When everyone else tells the truth, for every i, agent
i will report truthful pi to maximize her expected prediction score based on the
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properties of log scoring rule. Thus, pˆi = pi for every i.
For the expected information score, we want to calculate the optimal σ agent i
should report to maximize her expected information score when everyone else tells
the truth, given that she receives Ψi = σi).
arg max
σ
EΨj ,W |Ψi=σi log(
Pr[Ψi = σ|W ]
Pr[Ψi = σ|Ψj] )
= arg max
σ
EΨj ,W |Ψi=σi log(
Pr[Ψi = σ|W,Ψj]
Pr[Ψi = σ|Ψj] ) (Conditional independence)
= arg max
σ
EΨj ,W |Ψi=σi log(
Pr[Ψi = σ,W |Ψj]
Pr[Ψi = σ|Ψj]Pr[W |Ψj] )
= arg max
σ
EΨj ,W |Ψi=σi log(
Pr[W |Ψi = σ,Ψj]
Pr[W |Ψj] )
= arg max
σ
EΨjL(Pr[W |Ψi = σi,Ψj],Pr[W |Ψi = σ,Ψj])
(we can add log Pr[W |Ψj] which is independent of σ)
= σi (arg maxq L(p,q) = p)
Therefore, in BTS, for every i, agent i’s best response is (σi,pi) when everyone
else tells the truth. BTS is truthful.
A.3 Expertise elicitation
Fact 12 (Information monotonicity of proper scoring rules). Given any strictly proper
scoring rule PS,
EX,Y,ZPS(Y,Pr[Y |X,Z]) ≥ EX,Y PS(Y,Pr[Y |X]).
The equality holds if and only if Pr[Y |X = x, Z = z] = Pr[Y |X = x] for all (x, z)
where Pr[X = x, Z = z] > 0.
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Proof.
EX,Y PS(Y,Pr[Y |X]) =
∑
x,y
Pr[X = x, Y = y]PS(Y = y,Pr[Y |X = x])
=
∑
x,y,z
Pr[X = x, Y = y, Z = z]PS(Y = y,Pr[Y |X = x])
=
∑
x,z
Pr[X = x, Z = z]
∗
∑
y
Pr[Y = y|X = x, Z = z]PS(Y = y,Pr[Y |X = x])
=
∑
x,z
Pr[X = x, Z = z]PS(Pr[Y |X = x, Z = z],Pr[Y |X = x])
≤
∑
x,z
Pr[X = x, Z = z]PS(Pr[Y |X = x, Z = z],Pr[Y |X = x, Z = z])
(PS is strictly proper)
= EX,Y,ZPS(Y,Pr[Y |X,Z])
The equality holds if and only if Pr[Y |X = x, Z = z] = Pr[Y |X = x] for all (x, z)
where Pr[X = x, Z = z] > 0 since PS is striclty proper.
Theorem 96. With Assumption 88, 89, 90, Multi-HMIM({αm}m) is truthful; more-
over, when {αm}m are potent for Multi-HMIM({αm}m), Multi-HMIM({αm}m) is po-
tent and truthful.
Proof. Since we assume all tasks are a priori similar, without loss of generality, we
can assume every agent uses the same (possibly mixed) report and (possibly mixed)
effort strategy for all tasks.
Truthful We divide the proof into two parts. For each agent i, given that she
believes other agents report honestly (may not report all signals they have), we will
show (1) conditioning on agent i playing pure effort strategy, she should maximize her
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payment as well as the utility by playing truthful strategy; (2) it’s better for agent i
to play pure effort strategy—performing the same method all the time—than mixed
effort strategy.
Part (1). We want to show that for each agent i who always perform method mi,
given other agents honestly report their methods and signals, for each m  mi, she
should honestly report her real signal ψmi to maximize her expected information score
in m’s level, that is,
E[2αmCorr(ψˆmi ; ψˆm−i|{ψˆm
′
−i}m′≺m].
Since we assume other agents report honestly and we have assumed that the signals
agents receive for every method are homogeneous, we replace ψˆm−i, ψˆ
m′
−i by ψ
m
−i,ψ
m′
−i .
When we run algorithm 1 to calculate Corr(ψˆmi ; ψˆ
m
−i|{ψˆm′−i}m′≺m), in the situation
the algorithm does not return “success”—situation 0—her information score in m’s
level is 0 regardless of agent i reports for method m’s output. In the situation the
algorithm returns “success”, either it runs Corr(ψˆmi ; ψˆ
m
−i) and returns “success”—
situation 1—or it runs Corr(ψˆmi (D); ψˆ
m
−i(D)) and returns “success”—situation 2.
For each task, each m, fixing agents’ choices for whether to provide a signal or ∅,
the situation which the algorithm runs in is fixed as well. We only need to consider
each situation separately.
Claim 141. Given that other agents report honestly, for each agent i who always
perform mi, for all m  mi, when agent i honestly reports method m’s output, her
expected information score in m’s level per each reward task is
αmMI
tvd(Ψmi ; Ψ
m
−i)
in situation 1;
αmMI
tvd(Ψmi ; Ψ
m
−i|{Ψm
′
−i}m′≺m)
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in situation 2.
Claim 142. Given that other agents report honestly, for each agent i, when agent
i reports method m’s output as ψˆmi , her expected information score in m’s level per
each reward task is ≤
αmMI
tvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψ
m
−i)
in situation 1;
αmMI
tvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψ
m
−i|{Ψm
′
−i}m′≺m)
in situation 2. The equality holds if Ψˆmi is positively correlated with Ψ
m
−i (conditioning
on {Ψm′−i}m′≺m).
Once we show the above two claims. Since
MI tvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψ
m
−i|{Ψm
′
−i}m′≺m)
= MI tvd(fm({Ψm′i }m′mi); Ψm−i|{Ψm
′
−i}m′≺m)
(Agent i uses the report strategy fm to report m’s output)
≤MI tvd({Ψm′i }m′mi ; Ψm−i|{Ψm
′
−i}m′≺m) (Information Monotonicity of MIf )
= MI tvd(Ψmi ; Ψ
m
−i|{Ψm
′
−i}m′≺m) (Assumption 90)
and similarly MI tvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψ
m
−i) ≤MI tvd(Ψmi ; Ψm−i). Part (1) follows immediately.
Part (2). This part is implied by the complexity of MI tvd. We give a formal proof
here. We consider situation 1 here. For any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, any two methods m1,m2, if
agent i perform method m1 with probability λ, method m2 with probability 1 − λ,
for every m, agent i’s utility in m’s level is less than
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MI tvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψ
m
−i)− (λhi(m1) + (1− λ)hi(m2))
≤ max
fm
MI tvd(fm(her received signals); Ψ
m
−i)− (λhi(m1) + (1− λ)hi(m2))
= MI tvd(f ∗m(her received signals); Ψ
m
−i)− (λhi(m1) + (1− λ)hi(m2))
(f ∗m is the optimal report strategy.)
≤ λ(MI tvd(f ∗m({Ψm
′
i }m′m1); Ψm−i)− hi(m1)) + (1− λ)(MI tvd(f ∗m({Ψm
′
i }m′m2); Ψm−i)− hi(m2))
(Convexity of MIf )
≤ max{MI tvd(f ∗m({Ψm
′
i }m′m1); Ψm−i)− hi(m1),MI tvd(f ∗m({Ψm
′
i }m′m2); Ψm−i)− hi(m2)}
in situation 1. Without loss of generality, we assume
MI tvd(f ∗m({Ψm
′
i }m′m1); Ψm−i)− hi(m1) ≥MI tvd(f ∗m({Ψm
′
i }m′m2); Ψm−i)− hi(m2).
Then
MI tvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψ
m
−i)− (λhi(m1) + (1− λ)hi(m2))
≤MI tvd(f ∗m({Ψm
′
i }m′m1); Ψm−i)− hi(m1)
≤ max
fm
MI tvd(fm({Ψm′i }m′m1); Ψm−i)− hi(m1)
The analysis for situation 2 is similar. With the positively correlated guess assumption
(Assumption 92) and Claim 142, we know maxfmMI
tvd(fm({Ψm′i }m′m1); Ψm−i) can
be obtained by agent i in Multi-HMIM by always performing m1 and playing a proper
report strategy. Thus, agent i cannot obtain better utility by playing mixed effort
strategy.
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Potent We can follow the proof of truthful property and additionally show that
when the coefficients are potent , for each agent i, when she believes others agents
play prudent strategy, agent i should pick the effort strategy defined by the prudent
strategy as her optimal effort strategy. When the coefficients are potent , based on
the definition of potent coefficients, for each agent i, when she believe other agents
play prudent strategy, for each task she finished, there must exists another agent who
finished the same task with her, using the method that is higher or equal to her.
Thus, agent i’s all tasks are reward tasks for her, and algorithm 1 will always run into
situation 2 since the mechanism always has access to all levels of information. With
the positively correlated guess assumption (Assumption 92) and Claim 142, agent i’s
optimal utility is proportional to
∑
m∈M
max
fm:Π`miΣ` 7→Σm
αmMI
tvd(fm({Ψ`i}`mi); Ψm−i|{Ψm
′
−i}m′≺m)− hi(mi)
by always performing method mi. Thus, agent i’s optimal effort strategy should
be the effort strategy defined by the prudent strategy, given that she believes other
agents play prudent strategy.
Theorem 100. With Assumption 88, Learning based multi-HMIM is dominant truth-
ful.
Moreover, with Assumption 97, when the rule RULE is potent , Learning based
multi-HMIM is potent , dominant truthful and will output the hierarchical information
structure as well as the maximal level(s) answer vector given that agents play prudent
strategy.
Proof for Theorem 100. Since we assume all tasks are a priori similar, without loss
of generality, we can assume every agent use the same report and effort strategy for
all tasks.
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In order to show the dominant truthful property, we will show for each agent,
fixing any other agents’ strategies, (1) conditioning on using pure effort strategy, she
can maximize her payment as well as the utility by reporting her received information
honestly; (2) pure effort strategy has higher utility than mixed effort strategy.
Part (1). Even if the mechanism clusters incorrectly, part (1) still follows directly
from the information monotonicity property of f -mutual information MIf .
Part (2). The proof here is the same with the part (2) proof in Theorem 96. We
give a formal proof here.
For any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, any two methods m1,m2, if agent i perform method m1 with
probability λ, method m2 with probability 1− λ, agent i’s utility in m’s level is
MIf (her reported signals; Ψˆm−i|{Ψˆm
′
−i}m′≺m,m′∈M−i)− (λhi(m1) + (1− λ)hi(m2))
≤MIf (her received signals; ; Ψˆm−i|{Ψˆm
′
−i}m′≺m,m′∈M−i)− (λhi(m1) + (1− λ)hi(m2))
≤λ(MIf ({Ψm′i }m′m1 ; Ψˆm−i|{Ψˆm
′
−i}m′≺m,m′∈M−i)− hi(m1)) (convexity of MIf )
+ (1− λ)(MIf ({Ψm′i }m′m2 ; Ψˆm−i|{Ψˆm
′
−i}m′≺m,m′∈M−i)− hi(m2))
≤max{MIf ({Ψm′i }m′m1 ; Ψˆm−i|{Ψˆm
′
−i}m′≺m,m′∈M−i)− hi(m1),
MIf ({Ψm′i }m′m2 ; Ψˆm−i|{Ψˆm
′
−i}m′≺m,m′∈M−i)− hi(m2)}
Thus, each agent i cannot obtain higher utility by playing a mixed effort strategy.
It remains to show the potent property. When the rule is potent , for each agent
i, when she believes other agents play prudent strategy, the mechanism must have
access to all levels of honest answer vectors due to the definition of prudent strat-
egy and potent rule. With Assumption 97, the mechanism can correctly learn the
whole hierarchical information structure without agent i’s report and use coefficients
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α(RULE). Thus, her optimal payment for performing method mi will be
∑
m∈M
αmMI
f ({Ψ`i}`mi ; Ψm−i|{Ψm
′
−i}m′≺m)
due to the information monotonicity of MIf . In this case, her optimal strategy is her
prudent strategy. Therefore, learning based Multi-HMIM is potent and will output
the correct hierarchical information structure as well as the maximal level(s) answer
vector(s) when agents play prudent strategy.
Theorem 106. With Assumption 101, single-HMIM is strictly truthful; moreover,
when the coefficients is potent for single-HMIM, single-HMIM is potent and strictly
truthful.
for Theorem 106. For each agent i, her highest information score is 0. When she
believes all other agents honestly report their signals and predictions, she can obtain
her highest prediction score via providing her truthful prediction based on the prop-
erty of the strictly proper scoring rule. While during the same time, she can obtain 0
(the highest) information score according to the common prior assumption. If agent
i tell lies about her predictions, in expectation she will receive strictly lower predic-
tion score since PS is strictly proper. If she honestly provides her predictions but
lie for the signals, then she will be punished for her information score with positive
probability. Therefore, when agent i believes everyone else tells the truth, honestly
reporting her truthful signals and predictions strictly maximize her payment.
It remains to show the potent property. In Single-HMIM, when the coefficients
are potent , for each agent i, when she believes other agents play prudent strategy,
for each m, there must exist a reference agent for agent i who reports method m’s
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output. Thus agent i’s optimal expected payment by performing method mi is
∑
m∈M
αmEQm [PS(σm, pmmi)]
since her optimal information score is always 0. In this case, agent i’s optimal strategy
is prudent for her. Therefore, Single-HMIM is potent .
Claim 141. Given that other agents report honestly, for each agent i who always
perform mi, for all m  mi, when agent i honestly reports method m’s output, her
expected information score in m’s level per each reward task is
αmMI
tvd(Ψmi ; Ψ
m
−i)
in situation 1;
αmMI
tvd(Ψmi ; Ψ
m
−i|{Ψm
′
−i}m′≺m)
in situation 2.
Proof for Claim 141. We first show
E[Corr(ψmi ; Ψm−i)] =
1
2
MI tvd(Ψmi ; Ψ
m
−i).
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12
MI tvd(Ψmi ; Ψ
m
−i) =
1
2
∑
σ,σ′
|Pr[Ψmi = σ,Ψm−i = σ′]− Pr[Ψmi = σ] Pr[Ψm−i = σ′]|
(Definition of MI tvd)
=
1
2
∑
σ,σ′
1(σ = σ′)
(
Pr[Ψmi = σ,Ψ
m
−i = σ
′]− Pr[Ψmi = σ] Pr[Ψm−i = σ′]
)
+ 1(σ 6= σ′) (Pr[Ψmi = σ] Pr[Ψm−i = σ′]− Pr[Ψmi = σ,Ψm−i = σ′])
(Assumption 89)
=
∑
σ
(
Pr[Ψmi = σ,Ψ
m
−i = σ]− Pr[Ψmi = σ] Pr[Ψm−i = σ]
)
(Combining like terms, Pr[E]− Pr[¬E] = 2 Pr[E]− 1)
= E[Corr(ψmi ;ψ
m
−i)] (see Algorithm 1)
To show
E[Corr(ψmi ;ψ
m
−i|{ψm
′
−i}m′≺m)] =
1
2
MI tvd(Ψmi ; Ψ
m
−i|{Ψm
′
−i}m′≺m),
we only need to replace every Pr[·] in the above equations by Pr[·|{Ψm′−i}m′≺m =
{σm′}m′≺m] with putting
∑
{σm′}m′≺m Pr[{Ψm
′
−i}m′≺m = {σm′}m′≺m] ahead. Note that
assumption 89 can be applied to this case as well.
Claim 142. Given that other agents report honestly, for each agent i, when agent
i reports method m’s output as ψˆmi , her expected information score in m’s level per
each reward task is ≤
αmMI
tvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψ
m
−i)
in situation 1;
αmMI
tvd(Ψˆmi ; Ψ
m
−i|{Ψm
′
−i}m′≺m)
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in situation 2. The equality holds if Ψˆmi is positively correlated with Ψ
m
−i.
Proof for Claim 142. The proof is similar with the proof of Claim 141. We only need
to replace Ψmi by Ψˆ
m
i and change the second equation to greater than, that is,
1
2
∑
σ,σ′
|Pr[Ψmi = σ,Ψm−i = σ′]− Pr[Ψmi = σ] Pr[Ψm−i = σ′]|
≥ 1
2
∑
σ,σ′
1(σ = σ′)
(
Pr[Ψmi = σ,Ψ
m
−i = σ
′]− Pr[Ψmi = σ] Pr[Ψm−i = σ′]
)
+ 1(σ 6= σ′) (Pr[Ψmi = σ] Pr[Ψm−i = σ′]− Pr[Ψmi = σ,Ψm−i = σ′]) . (∑ |x| ≥∑x)
Note that the equality holds if Ψˆmi is positively correlated with Ψ
m
−i. Follow the
same proof of Claim 141, we finish the proof.
A.4 Forecast elicitation and an information aggregation prob-
lem: co-training
Claim 110. When random variables XA, XB are independent conditioning on Y ,
K(XA = xA, XB = xB) =
∑
y
Pr[Y = y]K(XA = xA, Y = y)K(XB = xB, Y = y)
=
∑
y
Pr[Y = y|XA = xA]K(XB = xB, Y = y)
=
∑
y
Pr[Y = y|XA = xA] Pr[Y = y|XB = xB]
Pr[Y = y]
.
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Proof.
K(XA = xA, XB = xB) =
Pr[XA = xA, XB = xB]
Pr[XA = xA] Pr[XB = xB]
=
∑
y Pr[Y = y] Pr[XA = xA, XB = xB|Y = y]
Pr[XA = xA] Pr[XB = xB]
=
∑
y Pr[Y = y] Pr[XA = xA|Y = y] Pr[XB = xB|Y = y]
Pr[XA = xA] Pr[XB = xB]
(Conditional independence)
=
∑
y
Pr[Y = y]K(XA = xA, Y = y)K(XB = xB, Y = y)
(PMI=posterior/prior)
=
∑
y
Pr[Y = y|XA = xA]K(XB = xB, Y = y)
=
∑
y
Pr[Y = y|XA = xA] Pr[Y = y|XB = xB]
Pr[Y = y]
.
Theorem 119. Given the prior distribution over the Y , with the conditional in-
dependence assumption, with a priori similar and random order assumption, when
max{|LA|, |LB|} ≥ 2 and the prior is stable and well-defined, when the convex func-
tion f is differentiable and f ′ is invertible, MCG(f) is focal.
When both Alice and Bob are honest, each of them’s expected payment in MCG(f)
is
MIf (XA;XB).
Proof. Given that Alice’s strategy is sA and Bob’s strategy is sB, with the a priori
similar and random order assumption, we represent agents’ report as the output
(possibly being random) of their strategy operating on the private information.
We start to show MCG(f) is strictly truthful. Given that Alice is honest, based
on Lemma 120, Bob will maximize his expected payment if and only if ∀`1, `2,
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R(pxA`1 , sB(x
`2
B )) = f
′(K(x`1A , x
`2
B )).
Note that in MCG(f),
R(pxA`1 , sB(x
`2
B )) = f
′(
∑
y
pxA`1 (y)sB(x
`2
B )(y)
Pr[Y = y]
)
Since the prior is stable, the above equation is satisfied for all possible xA
`1 if and
only if Bob tells the truth—reporting pxB`2 . Therefore, MCG(f) is strictly truthful.
It remains to show MCG(f) pays truth-telling the most and strictly better than
any other non-permutation strategy profile. When agents maximize the expected
payment,
R(sA(xA
`1), sB(x
`2
B )) = f
′(K(x`1A , x
`2
B )).
Recall that we defined
R(sA(xA
`1), sB(x
`2
B )) = f
′(
∑
y
sA(xA
`1)(y)sB(x
`2
B )(y)
Pr[Y = y]
).
Thus, when f ′ is invertible, we have
∑
y
sA(xA
`1)(y)sB(x
`2
B )(y)
Pr[Y = y]
= K(x`1A , x
`2
B )
for any x`1A , x
`2
B . This is exactly system (6.1).
With the conditional independence assumption, when agents tell the truth, the
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above system will be satisfied. Therefore, agents can maximize their expected pay-
ment via truth-telling. Moreover, when the prior is well-defined, if the prior Pr[Y ]
is a uniform distribution, then any permutation strategy profile can solve the above
system and as well as maximize agents’ expected payment. Even if the prior Pr[Y ] is
not a uniform distribution, although not all permutation strategy profiles solve the
above system, still any solution of the above system must correspond to a permuta-
tion strategy profile, given the prior is well-defined. Therefore, when agents maximize
their expected payment, their strategy profile must be a permutation strategy profile
or truth-telling, which implies MCG(f) is focal.
Lemma 120. With the conditional independence assumption, the expected total pay-
ment is maximized over Alice and Bob’s strategies if and only if ∀`1 ∈ LA, `2 ∈ LB,
for any (x`1A , x
`2
B ) ∈ ΣA × ΣB,
R(pˆ`1
xA
`1
, pˆ`2
xB
`2
) = f ′(K(x`1A , x
`2
B )).
The maximum is
MIf (XA;XB).
Proof. Without loss of generality, it is sufficient to analyze Alice’s strategy and report.
With the a priori similar and random order assumption, pˆ`1
xA
`1
can be represented as
sA(xA
`1) since the index of the task `1 is meaningless to Alice when all tasks appear
in a random order, independently drawn for each agent. The strategy can be seen
as a random predictor. Thus, we can use the same proof of Lemma 114 to prove
Lemma 120.
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APPENDIX B
Mutual information calculations
We show the calculations for the mutual information table.
For the length signal, since agents has no uncertainty for this signal, the mutual
information between agent i’s length signal and agent j 6= i’s length signal will be
the entropy of length signal. Recall that we have assumed an essay has long length
with probability 0.5. Thus,
MI(length; length) = 0.5 ∗ log(0.5) + 0.5 ∗ log(0.5) = 0.6931
Since an essay’s length is independent with its writing and quality, we have the
mutual information between the length signal and writing signal, quality, writing
conditioning length, quality conditioning writing and length are all zero.
Pr[Ψmwi = ,,Ψmwj = ,] = 0.5 ∗ 0.9 ∗ 0.9 + 0.5 ∗ 0.1 ∗ 0.1 = 0.41
Pr[Ψmwi = ,,Ψmwj = /] = Pr[Ψmwi = /; Ψmwj = ,] = 0.5∗0.9∗0.1+0.5∗0.1∗0.9 =
0.09
Pr[Ψmwi = /,Ψmwj = /] = 0.5 ∗ 0.1 ∗ 0.1 + 0.5 ∗ 0.9 ∗ 0.9 = 0.41
We can put the above joint distribution over (Ψmwi ; Ψ
mw
j ) to the formulaMI(X;Y ) =∑
x,y Pr[X = x, Y = y] log
Pr[X=x,Y=y]
Pr[X=x] Pr[Y=y]
and obtain
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MI(length, writing;writing)
=MI(writing;writing)
=MI(Ψmwi ; Ψ
mw
j ) = 0.2218
Note that MI(writing;writing) is not the entropy of the writing signal since it is
the mutual information between different agents’ writing signals.
Similarly, we can calculate the joint distribution over (Ψ
mq
i ,Ψ
mw
i ,Ψ
mq
j ,Ψ
mw
j ) and
set / = 0 and , = 1:
Pr[Ψ
mq
i = a,Ψ
mw
i = b,Ψ
mq
j = c,Ψ
mw
j = d]
=0.4 ∗ 0.3a ∗ 0.71−a ∗ 0.1b ∗ 0.91−b ∗ 0.3c ∗ 0.71−c ∗ 0.1d ∗ 0.91−d
(when the essay has bad quality, bad writing:)
+ 0.1 ∗ 0.3a ∗ 0.71−a ∗ 0.9b ∗ 0.11−b ∗ 0.3c ∗ 0.71−c ∗ 0.9d ∗ 0.11−d
(when the essay has bad quality, good writing:)
+ 0.1 ∗ 0.7a ∗ 0.31−a ∗ 0.1b ∗ 0.91−b ∗ 0.7c ∗ 0.31−c ∗ 0.1d ∗ 0.91−d
(when the essay has good quality, bad writing:)
+ 0.4 ∗ 0.7a ∗ 0.31−a ∗ 0.9b ∗ 0.11−b ∗ 0.7c ∗ 0.31−c ∗ 0.9d ∗ 0.11−d
(when the essay has good quality, good writing:)
The fact that the length signal is independent with writing and quality will ease
the calculation a lot since we can ignore the length signal if it only shows in one side
when we calculate the mutual information. Moreover, since the length signal has no
uncertainty, length—length will be a value without uncertainty and can be ignored
in the calculation of mutual information.
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Aided by the calculator, we can obtain
MI(length, writing; quality)
=MI(writing; quality)
=MI(Ψmwi ; Ψ
mq
j ) = 0.0185
MI(length, writing;writing|length)
=MI(writing;writing) = 0.2218;
MI(length, writing, quality;writing)
=MI(quality, writing;writing)
=MI(Ψmwi ,Ψ
mq
i ; Ψ
mw
j ) = 0.2259
MI(length, writing; quality|writing, length)
=MI(writing; quality|writing)
=MI(writing, quality;writing)−MI(writing;writing) = 0.2259− 0.2218 = 0.0041
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MI(length, writing, quality; quality)
=MI(quality, writing; quality)
=MI(Ψmwi ,Ψ
mq
i ; Ψ
mq
j ) = 0.0267
MI(length, writing, quality;writing|length)
=MI(quality, writing;writing) = 0.2259
MI(length, writing, quality; quality|writing, length)
=MI(writing, quality; quality|writing)
=MI(writing, quality; quality, writing)−MI(writing, quality;writing)
=0.2374− 0.2259 = 0.0115
MI(length, writing, quality; length, writing)
=MI(length, writing, quality; length) +MI(length, writing, quality;writing|length)
=MI(length; length) +MI(length, writing, quality;writing|length)
=0.6931 + 0.2259 = 0.9190
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MI(length, writing, quality; length, writing, quality)
=MI(length, writing, quality; length) +MI(length, writing, quality;writing|length)
+MI(length, writing, quality; quality|writing, length)
=0.6931 + 0.2259 + 0.0115 = 0.9305
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